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VICTIMHOOD IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD:
TERRORIST CRIME, TALIBAN GUILT, AND
THE ASYMMETRIES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
MARK A. DRUMBL*
This Article posits that the September 11 attacks constitute non-
isolated warlike attacks undertaken against a sovereign state by
individuals from other states operating through a non-state actor
with some command and political structure. This means that the
attacks contain elements common to both armed attacks and
criminal attacks. The international community largely has
characterized the attacks as armed attacks. This characterization
evokes a legal basis for the use of force initiated by the United
States and United Kingdom against Afghanistan on October 7,
2001. Notwithstanding the successes of the military campaign and
the need for containment of terrorist activity, this Article suggests
that there are important deontological, communitarian, and
consequentialist reasons why the attacks-and terrorism in
general-should be constructed as criminal attacks. In this vein,
this Article explores the effects on the international legal order of
state practice supportive of the use of lethal force against
Afghanistan. These effects include: (1) an expansion of state
responsibility for individuals (even non-nationals) who may not
be effectively controlled by the state; (2) a diminution of the role of
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the Security Council and United Nations on matters of global
peace and security; and (3) an increased elasticity in time and
space of individual and collective self-defense, which now may
inform U.S. national security policy and the prospect of
intervention in Iraq. These changes have important consequences
for global rule of law. Also of closely related importance to rule
of law are the prosecutorial responses to individuals detained in
relation to the attacks and transnational terrorism, generally. This
Article assesses the advantages and disadvantages of a variety of
domestic, international, and hybrid prosecutorial strategies for
such individuals. The argument is made that the most fitting situs
for criminal prosecutions is at the international level, in the form
of a cosmopolitan tribunal operating under the aegis of the United
Nations but negotiated among nation-states connected to the
accused, victims, and planning of the attacks. Adopting an
institutionalist perspective, this Article posits that, so as more
effectively to deter future terrorist violence, trials should include
culturally pluralist approaches. This weighs against trials being
held in federal court in the United States or in U.S. military
commissions. In fact, electing to prosecute through U.S. military
commissions would evidence exceptionalism to the often weighty
machinery of international human rights and humanitarian law
that has been invoked in other cases of mass atrocity, for example
in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia. This
exceptionalism may reveal asymmetries that arise when "we" in
the United States are victims of mass atrocity, as opposed to
"others" in faraway lands. Due process rhetorically is presented
as an inconvenience to the pursuit of justice post-September 11,
whereas in other post-atrocity situations due process rhetorically is
presented as an essential requirement for justice. This, together
with rapid changes in the law regarding the use of force, also may
suggest the emergence of derogations from the "legalism" that
international human rights and criminal law, as well as public
international law generally, so vigorously have sought to inject
into international relations. These derogations pose ethical as well
as utilitarian challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
Events of seemingly incomprehensible evil can, and should, be
subject to scholarly analysis.1 The September 11, 2001 "attacks"2 are
no exception. The tragedy of that day is clear. Much more opaque,
1. See generally ALEX ALVAREZ, GOVERNMENTS, CITIZENS, AND GENOCIDE
(2001) (presenting a comparative and interdisciplinary discussion of the crime of
genocide); YEHUDA BAUER, RETHINKING THE HOLOCAUST (2000) (examining
categories and issues that arise out of contemplation of the Holocaust); CARLOS
SANTIAGO NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL (1996) (discussing the history of human rights
violations and the difficulties inherent in human rights violations trials).
*2. The word "attacks" frequently has been used to describe the violence of
September 11, 2001. This Article also uses this word for this purpose. However, this
should not obscure the important question of law whether or not the September 11
terrorist "attacks" constitute "armed attacks" (or "acts of war") or, on the other hand,
"criminal attacks."
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however, are questions involving why the attacks happened, how they
are to be legally defined, what to do about them, and how to deter
future attackers. This Article posits that the attacks can best be
described as non-isolated warlike attacks undertaken against a
sovereign state by individuals from other states operating through al-
Qaeda, a non-state actor that has some command and political
structure.3 This means that the attacks contain elements of both an
armed attack (traditionally referred to as an "act of war"' ) and a
criminal attack.'
3. A non-state actor is any organization lacking formal or legal status as a state (or
agent of a state) or any constituent subunit of a state such as a province, autonomous
region, or municipality (or agent thereof). AI-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, has been
closely linked to the attacks. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law: Terrorist Attacks on World Trade Center and Pentagon, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 237, 239-41 (2002) [hereinafter Terrorist Attacks]; U.K. Press Release,
Responsibility for the Terrorist Atrocities in the United States, 11 September 2001 (Oct. 4,
2001), available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/news.asp?Newsld=2686 (last visited Nov.
11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Sworn members of al-Qaeda are
estimated to number from 200 to 300, but al-Qaeda operated about one dozen camps in
Afghanistan that trained as many as 5,000 militants. David Johnston et al., Qaeda's New
Links Increase Threats From Global Sites, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at A10. It is
estimated that these militants operated-and may continue to operate-in as many as
sixty countries. Id.
4. The notion of an "act of war" is somewhat archaic (no nation has "declared war"
in over fifty years). See Robert F. Turner, International Law and the Use of Force in
Response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon Attacks, Jurist Legal Education
Network (Apr. 22, 2002), at http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/forumnew34.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
5. State and international organization declarations, particularly shortly after the
attacks, linked them to both categories. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, § 1 (a), 66 Fed.
Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Presidential Order] (stating that the attacks have
created a state of armed conflict); S.C. Res. 1377, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4413th mtg. at
2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (2001) (reaffirming the Security Council's "unequivocal
condemnation of all acts ... of terrorism as criminal" but also declaring that "acts of
international terrorism constitute one of the most serious threats to international peace
and security"); G.A. Res. 56/1, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 8, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A!RES/56/1 (2001) (urgently calling for international cooperation to bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers, and sponsors of the attacks, and emphasizing that those
responsible for their aiding, supporting, or harboring would be held accountable);
Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sOllOO2a.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (concluding that the attacks were directed from abroad, constituted armed
attacks, and that the self-defense provision in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was
applicable); Statement by President Prodi of the EU Commission on the Attacks Against
the United States (Sept. 12, 2001) (describing the attacks as "barbaric crimes") (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review); Paul Koring, U.S. Seeks Death Penalty for Alleged
20th Hijacker, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Mar. 29, 2002, at A10 (citing U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft as referring to the attacks as a "crime on thousands of victims").
Subsequent state and international organization practice, however, supported military
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Nonetheless, although the attacks may be at one and the same
time both armed and criminal, this Article argues that there are
consequentialist, communitarian, and deontological reasons why the
attacks should be constructed as criminal attacks to which legal
responses from the purview of the criminal law are appropriate.
However, although domestic criminal law could be a method to
prosecute perpetrators, this Article argues that the attacks, in part
because of their warlike nature, are among the "most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole." 6 Accordingly,
international criminal law and process constitute a more suitable
means of redress.
On October 7, 2001, the United States and United Kingdom
initiated military "strikes"7 against Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter,
the United States and United Kingdom resuscitated the Northern
Alliance, which for years had been involved in an internal armed
conflict with the Taliban.8  All then began joint on-the-ground
operations, in which other allies participated.' Converting this
internal conflict into an international armed conflict, this intervention
prompted impressive Northern Alliance military gains, the abdication
involvement in Afghanistan, thereby evidencing an acceptance of the armed attack
categorization.
6. This is the chapeau to the crimes over which the International Criminal Court
("ICC") will have jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art.
5(1) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/.183/9 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
romefra.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute, which the United States has renounced,
entered into force on July 1, 2002. See Neil Lewis, U.S. Rejects All Support for New Court
on Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2002, at All.
7. This Article uses the term "strikes" to refer to Operation Enduring Freedom, the
use of force initiated by the United States and United Kingdom on October 7, 2001, and
subsequent on-the-ground interventions such as Operation Anaconda and Operation
Condor. This Article does not use the term "retaliation" given that it has a punitive
connotation. Punitive use of force is not permitted under international law. Nor does this
Article use the term "reprisal." Reprisals are "countermeasure[s] that would be unlawful
if not for [a] prior illegal act of the state against which they were taken." LORI F.
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 713 (4th ed. 2001).
However, countermeasures that take the form of military force are illegal if they are
prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations. Id. at 714. As such, armed reprisals that
are not authorized by the Security Council only can take the form of self-defense. To this
end, using the term "reprisal" to describe the October 7 intervention connotes arriving at
a legal conclusion that remains open to dispute.
8. For more information, see infra text accompanying notes 320-26 (discussing the
Northern Alliance) and 358-62 (discussing the Taliban).
9. U.S. ground troops first arrived in Afghanistan on October 20, 2001 to engage
Taliban forces in battle. Aftermath, the War on Terrorism, RTIt NEWS, at http://www.
rte.ie/news/features/aftermath/timelineOct.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
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of the Taliban, the detention (and elimination) of thousands of
fighters and suspected terrorists, and the creation of multi-ethnic,
multi-party transitional governance in Afghanistan."0 As of the time
of writing, 564 detainees have been transported, initially to Camp X-
Ray and then to Camp Delta, at a U.S. naval base in Guantdnamo
Bay, Cuba." Other captured individuals have been turned over to
interrogators in a variety of locations, including Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Egypt, and Syria. 2
Part I of this Article proposes that the military success of the
strikes should not mute discussion of the reality that the strikes clash
with traditional understandings of public international law. In
particular, the Security Council did not explicitly authorize the use of
force.13  Moreover, the United States' and United Kingdom's
justification of the strikes upon their collective right of self-defense, a
position largely accepted by the international community, rests on an
expanded definition of self-defense previously resisted by that same
international community. 14  The conformity of the strikes with
international legal norms is relevant since non-conformity bears upon
10. See John Kifner & Eric Schmitt, Al Qaeda Routed From Afghanistan, U.S.
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2001, at Al (citing the Pentagon as believing that al-
Qaeda has been effectively destroyed); Mark MacKinnon, Former King Returns to Live in
Kabul, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 18, 2002, at A10 (discussing the return to
Afghanistan of the formerly exiled king to preside over a grand national assembly of tribal
leaders that is to select a transitional government); Michael E. O'Hanlon, A Flawed
Masterpiece, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2002, at 47, 55 (estimating between 8,000 and
12,000 Taliban fighters killed and 7,000 taken prisoner); David Rohde, Executions and
Looting as Alliance Nears Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at B1 ("The American raids
appeared to have destroyed enough Taliban tanks and artillery to swing the battle in favor
of the alliance."); Amy Waldman, New Leaders Set to Assume Power in Tranquil Kabul,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at Al (discussing interim government). In June 2002, a grand
national assembly, or loya jirga, was held in Afghanistan. At this event, Hamid Karzai was
designated to continue in his capacity of President for two years until Afghanistan could
hold general elections. See Mark MacKinnon, Karzai's Plans Include Afghan Truth
Commission, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 14,2002, at A13.
11. Camp Delta, a newer and more modern facility, has been constructed near Camp
X-Ray and, as of May 2002, is receiving detainees. See Roy Gutman et al., Guantinamo
Justice, NEWSWEEK, July 8, 2002, at 34, 36. Transport to Camp X-Ray began on January
11, 2002. U.S. Readies New Prison at Guantdnamo Bay, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Apr.
28, 2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
12. Gutman et al., supra note 11, at 37.
13. Jonathan Charney, The Use of Force Against Terrorism and International Law, 95
AM. J. INT'L L. 835, 835 (2001); see also infra Part L.A (discussing the Security Council's
involvement in authorizing the use of force and concluding that there was no explicit
authorization).
14. Charney, supra note 13, at 835; see also infra Part I.B (discussing modifications to
the inherent right of self-defense resulting from state practice following the September 11
terrorist attacks).
[Vol. 81
2002] VICTIMHOOD IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD 7
the longer-term process of bringing terrorists and the Taliban to book
for their conduct. It becomes more difficult to build a legitimate
social norm against terrorism in communities where the military
methods used to combat terrorism are legal because instantly the law
has changed. In this sense, September 11 is posited as a
jurisgenerative event, triggering reactions that may well transform
international law;15 in fact, one esteemed jurist believes that this
reaction has "shattering consequences for international law."' 6 Part I
maps out these consequences. I argue that, although the
transformations wrought upon international law in the aftermath of
September 11 may have short-term appeal and may, at first blush,
offer effective, realpolitik methods to fight terrorism, their long-term
implications may be less desirable. These transformations may erase
some of the gains international law recently has made in infusing
"legalism" into the often "alegal" world of international relations. In
particular, the deemed acceptability of the strikes by the international
community at large may create precedent for too ready an availability
of unilateral self-help remedies, undermine process in favor of
opportunism, erode rule of law, and escalate instability within the
international system. Whereas the classic approach of international
law was one of simple, and perhaps naive, opposition to force, now
international law is developing a more nuanced relationship with
violence. Instead of pursuing order through peace, the global
community is embracing the pursuit of order through force or, even,
war.
17
Coincident with the withering of legalism is a blurring of the
distinctions between waging an armed conflict and undertaking a
criminal investigation. In fact, the United States is pursuing both
simultaneously. Part II observes that, because of this simultaneous
pursuit of an armed conflict and a criminal investigation, the United
States designated Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters as combatants for the
purpose of justifying the lethal use of force, yet, following capture,
15. See Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 248 (discussing various states' direct and
indirect participation in and support of the airstrikes against Afghanistan).
16. Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of
International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 993, 993 (2001).
17. The phrase "law through war" is from David Westbrook's scholarship on foreign
military intervention in Kosovo. David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L.
REV. 299, 299 (2000). Of course, many states at many times have used force in
circumstances that fall outside of international law. At times such state practice was
condoned, at other times condemned. Contemporary developments, however, suggest the
emergence of a practice of armed responses to terrorism that is viewed as legally
acceptable and declared as such by states.
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these individuals essentially "became" criminal detainees facing
prosecution and punishment. Thus far, two dominant and
overlapping strategies have emerged as to how accused terrorists
ought to be prosecuted: (1) national courts, for example U.S. federal
courts or foreign national courts (some terrorism proceedings already
have begun in the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and Germany);18
and (2) military commissions (popularly called "military tribunals"). 9
Part II explores these and a number of other-largely forsaken-
prosecutorial options for captured detainees, including international
tribunals, civil damages suits, and special U.N.-administered
adjudicative bodies in Afghanistan.
Although the detainees initially were constructed as combatants
for the purpose of self-defense, and then became constructed as
criminals for the purpose of prosecution, those who face military
commissions will not receive the status or protection ascribed to
criminal defendants in U.S. courts. These individuals, therefore, are
not true criminal detainees. Moreover, senior U.S. government
officials are on record as stating that, even if acquitted by a military
commission, some detainees will not be released owing to national
security interests.2° Here, the United States is (re)shifting conceptual
18. David E. Rovella, Feds Want Terrorist Trials Held in the U.S., NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9,
2001, at Al. The first U.S. proceeding related to September 11, the trial of Zacarias
Moussaoui on conspiracy charges, is by way of a trial in federal court in Virginia. See Don
van Natta, Jr. & Benjamin Weiser, Compromise Settles Debate Over Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 2001, at Bi. Moussaoui, a French citizen, is alleged to be the twentieth hijacker
and faces the death penalty. See Koring, supra note 5.
19. On November 13, 2001, President George W. Bush signed an order enabling the
creation of military commissions to try non-U.S. citizens accused of terrorism. See
Presidential Order, supra note 5. The purpose of these commissions would not be to
"preclude any Justice Department options" (for example, criminal trials in federal court),
but would be to provide an "additional tool." See Elisabeth Bumiller & David Johnston,
Bush Sets Option of Military Trials in Terrorist Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at Al.
Upon decision by the President, an accused individual would be subject to the jurisdiction
of the military commission instead of the criminal courts. Presidential Order, supra note
5, § 2; see also Jerry Seper, Leahy Challenges Bush on Military Tribunals, WASH. TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2001, at Al (citing White House Counsel Al Gonzales), available at 2001 WL
416620. Rules regarding the operation of the commissions were issued in March 2002. See
Department of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1 (Mar. 21, 2002), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Rules]. Commissions would be staffed by military
officers. Presidential Order, supra note 5, § 1(e). Proceedings could operate, and very
likely will operate, extraterritorially. The Rules provide limited appeal rights within the
military system: there is no appeal to an independent court and the President will have
final review of guilty verdicts. Rules, supra, §§ 6(H)(2), 6(H)(4). The Rules do not
provide sentencing guidelines beyond a "sentence appropriate to the offense." Id. § 6(G).
20. Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Backs Plan to Hold Captives Even if Acquitted,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at A18.
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gears to (re)construct the detainees as combatants or prisoners of
war, who may be held under specified conditions until the end of the
armed conflict. Just as the traditional categories of armed attacks and
criminal attacks are becoming blurred, so, too, are the traditional
categories of soldier, combatant, criminal, enemy, and prisoner.
For the moment, it remains somewhat unclear who will be tried
in U.S. federal court and who will be tried by military commissions.
The charges individuals shall face also are unclear. In fact, no
detainee at Guantdnamo has yet been charged, and indefinite
detention without trial is actively under consideration as a policy
option.2 Moreover, many detainees are held and interrogated, at
times by U.S. officials, in foreign countries, thereby escaping even the
limited public scrutiny that attaches to those detained at
Guantinamo. z On the other hand, U.S. citizens who supported the
Taliban or al-Qaeda cannot face military commissions, which are
reserved exclusively for non-citizens.23  Moreover, the military
21. Paisley Dodds, U.S.: No Lawyers for War Captives, WASH. POST (Apr. 17, 2002),
at http://www.washingtonpost.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(reporting that the U.S. position is that detainees can be held as long as the war on
terrorism lasts); John Mintz, U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals, WASH. POST, Mar. 21,
2002, at Al (reporting that the Bush Administration plans indefinitely to detain low-
ranking captives who pose a danger of terrorism). But see Philip Shenon & Neil A. Lewis,
U.S. Says a Key Detainee Had Planned More Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at A12
(reporting the capture of Abu Zubaydah, an "important lieutenant to Osama bin Laden,"
who "may be the first suspected leader of AI-Qaeda to face an American military
tribunal"). Zubaydah was captured with Pakistani assistance in Pakistan. John F. Burns,
In Pakistan's Interior, a Troubling Victory in Hunt for Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14,
2002, at A20.
22. Gutman et al., supra note 11, at 37.
23. Examples include John Walker, Jos6 Padilla (now Abdullah al-Muhajir), and
Yasser Esam Hamdi. Walker pleaded guilty in federal district court in Virginia to charges
that he supplied help to the Taliban and carried explosives. Neil A. Lewis, Traces of
Terror. The Captive, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al. He received a twenty year prison
sentence. Id.; see also David Stout, U.S.-Born Taliban Faces Civilian Trial, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 3024814 (citing an official as stating
that federal district court was "the proper venue because Mr. Walker is an American
citizen"). However, Padilla and Hamdi are not being dealt with by the ordinary criminal
justice system. Padilla, born in Brooklyn, New York, is detained on suspicion of building a
radiation dispersal bomb intended for detonation in an American city. Dexter Filkins,
Pakistan Holds Terror Suspects; Cites U.S. Ties, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at Al. No
charges have been brought against Padilla, but he remains in custody incommunicado as
an enemy combatant and subject to questioning regarding his knowledge of al-Qaeda. See
generally Michael Isikoff & Sarah Downey, And Justice for All, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19,
2002, at 32 (discussing the Padilla case). Hamdi was transferred from Guantdnamo Bay to
a military jail in the United States upon discovery that he had a Louisiana birth certificate.
Katharine Q. Seelye, Move Likely for Inmate Who May Be American, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
2002, at A8 (reporting that if Hamdi were an American citizen, he may have a right to file
a habeas corpus petition in federal court and that he was moved because "officials were
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commission procedure may skirt international humanitarian law24 and
international human rights law,2" although this remains the subject of
concerned that his case could affect the status of all prisoners at Guantinamo").
However, Hamdi remains incommunicado in solitary confinement, and the U.S.
government maintains he has no right of judicial review and that he may be held without
charges, bail, or access to a lawyer until "hostilities cease." Katharine Q. Seelye, Court to
Hear Arguments in Case of U.S. Citizen Seized with Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2002, at
A13.
24. International humanitarian law consists of the rules governing the conduct of war.
The manner in which detainees currently are held and the operation of the commissions as
envisaged may infringe the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Law of War, in particular
Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III]. The Geneva
Conventions form a cornerstone of international humanitarian law. Geneva Convention
III provides certain protections to prisoners of war. Virtually all states, including the
United States and Afghanistan, are parties to Geneva Convention III. On February 7,
2002, the United States affirmed that Taliban detainees are entitled to the coverage of the
Geneva Conventions whereas al-Qaeda fighters are not. Katherine Seelye, A Nation
Challenged: Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. However, the United States
denies prisoner of war status to all detainees. Id. In fact, the White House stated that the
February decision would have "little practical effect on how either Taliban or Al Qaeda
prisoners are treated." Id.; see also Paul Koring, No PoWs Being Held in Cuba, Bush Says,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 8, 2002, at A12 ("The practical consequences of the
narrowly legalistic decision are essentially nil."). But, according to the Geneva
Conventions, the actual determination whether an individual is or is not a prisoner of war
is to be made by a tribunal, not unilaterally by the executive branch of a party to the
armed conflict. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of
Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. Until such a determination is made,
detainees are to be treated as prisoners of war. Id. Thus, the declaration by the United
States that it is abiding by the Geneva Conventions may not be correct, as this declaration
arguably has not been followed by adherence to the actual terms of the Conventions. In
essence, the United States is declaring that the Geneva Conventions apply, and then ex
ante exempting all detainees from prisoner of war status without determining eligibility in
the prescribed manner on an expost basis. The International Committee of the Red Cross
and the International Commission of Jurists have stated that the February declaration
"still falls short of the requirements of international law." Bush's PoWs Stance Falls Short.
Red Cross, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Feb. 8, 2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Given that a state of armed conflict existed
between the United States and Afghanistan from October 7, 2001, to the fall of the
Taliban government, it is arguable that captured Taliban soldiers are prisoners of war.
This position is in fact that of U.N. Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson. Daniel
LeBlanc, Canada Defies U.S. on PoWs, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 17, 2002, at Al. It
is much less clear whether captured al-Qaeda members could constitute prisoners of war.
However, the U.S. position in justifying the strikes against Afghanistan-namely that al-
Qaeda and the Taliban are one and the same-could be read to imply that al-Qaeda
fighters were part of the armed forces of Afghanistan and, hence, entitled to be treated as
prisoners of war. Given that prisoners of war have been authorized to use force, they
cannot be prosecuted for common crimes committed during the hostilities, but only for
violations of the law of armed conflict or crimes that are unrelated to the hostilities. See
John Cerone, Status of Detainees in International Armed Conflict, and their Protection in
the Course of Criminal Proceedings, ASIL INSIGHTS (Jan. 2002), at http://www.asil.org/
insights/insigh8l.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Prisoners of war are
guaranteed the protections in articles 82 to 108 of Geneva Convention III, which require,
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inter alia, that they be tried by the same courts according to the same procedure as is the
case of members of the armed forces of the detaining power. Id. This includes the same
appeal rights as those made available to members of the armed forces of the detaining
power. Id. Prisoners of war are to be sentenced to the same penalties that would apply to
members of the detaining power's armed forces, and there is a waiting period of six
months before a death sentence can be carried out. Id. Geneva Convention III also
provides for the right to counsel of the accused's choice, the right to confer privately with
counsel (possibly even at pretrial stages, such as interrogations), the right to call witnesses,
and the right to an interpreter. Id. These provisions may mean that, contrary to ongoing
practice, detainees currently facing interrogation are entitled to have a lawyer, and
possibly to have that lawyer present during interrogation. Dodds, supra note 21 (reporting
that the U.S. government has declared that the detainees are not entitled to counsel).
Failing to guarantee Geneva Convention rights may itself constitute a war crime and, if
undertaken willfully, may amount to a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions. Id.
(quoting human rights lawyers as stating that the United States is holding the detainees
illegally). Moreover, failing to adhere to international human rights law or international
humanitarian law would place the United States in a weak position when critiquing rights
violations, including perfunctory military justice, in other, often much poorer, countries.
Recall that the United States has "repeatedly voted in the U.N. Security Council for
observance of the Geneva Conventions even in conflicts, such as civil wars, to which their
full application is debatable: it did so on a resolution on Afghanistan on 28 August 1998."
Adam Roberts, Even Our Enemies Have Rights, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 20, 2002,
at 23. Recall also that the United States has protested the use of military tribunals to try
U.S. citizens in foreign countries. Id. To be sure, the proposed military commissions also
trigger U.S. constitutional law concerns, but these are well beyond the scope of this
Article.
25. International human rights law establishes minimum human rights standards that
states are to respect and ensure nationally. Although the Rules provide additional due
process protections not present in the initial Presidential Order, it is debatable whether
the commissions comply with the tenets of international human rights law. See Jordan J.
Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of Procedure, 23
MICH. J. INT'L L. 677, 694 (2002). International human rights law, together with
customary international law, certain treaties, and other provisions of the Geneva
Conventions (for example, common art. 3 of the Geneva Civilian Convention) would
apply regardless of the status of the detainees as prisoners of war. These protections inure
at all times to all human beings. See Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter.-Am. C.H.R.
55, OEA/ser.L/V/II95, doc. 7 rev. 271, 158 (1997), available at http://heiwww.unige.ch/
humanrts/cases/1997/argentina55-97a.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
Relevant elements of international human rights law include the right to a fair and public
hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law. See
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, art.14(1), at 54, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. There
are also the following rights: the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
according to law, id. art. 14(2); the right to be informed promptly and in detail in a
language which the accused understands of the nature and cause of the charge against the
accused, id. art. 14(3)(a); the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of a defense and to communicate with counsel of one's own choosing, id. art. 14(3)(b); the
right to legal assistance, id. art. 14(3)(d); and the right to examine, or have examined, the
witnesses and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses, id. art. 14(3)(e).
Moreover, everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right to the review of the
conviction and sentence by a higher tribunal according to law. Id. art. 14(5). Customary
international law and a variety of other treaties also provide freedom from national origin
discrimination; it is arguable that the differential treatment of citizens and non-citizens
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vigorous debate. Moreover, the fact that none of the detainees on
Guantdnamo Bay have yet been charged triggers due process
concerns; and the fact that they apparently may continue to be held
notwithstanding acquittals may prompt possibilities of arbitrary or
indefinite detention.26
Part III argues that the September 11 attacks, although criminal
in nature, transcend ordinary criminality, embody warlike elements,
and tend toward what Carlos Santiago Nino and Hannah Arendt
would call "radical evil. '27 As such, the attacks are among the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.
Part III explores the advantages of prosecuting the perpetrators of
the attacks in international fora and considers how these fora could
be created. Part III also explores the shortcomings that inhere in
such a process. Throughout, an institutionalist perspective is adopted.
Institutionalists opine that legal institutions can change individual or
state behavior in a manner that facilitates cooperation and, therefore,
should be carefully designed.28
(i.e., military commissions being reserved for non-citizens whereas citizens would face
prosecution only in national courts) may constitute national origin discrimination. For an
explication of this argument, see Jordan Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions:
Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 17 (2001), and E-mail from Jordan Paust, Law
Foundation Professor, University of Houston, to Mark A. Drumbl, Assistant Professor of
Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law (Dec. 31, 2001, 15:45:34 EST) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
26. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 25, art. 9 (containing a prohibition against arbitrary
detention). International law permits indefinite detention in cases of national emergency,
which might apply to the current terrorist threat.
27. NINO, supra note 1, at vii, ix (citing Immanuel Kant and asserting that "radical
evil" are offenses against human dignity so widespread, persistent, and organized that
normal moral assessment seems inappropriate; radical evil "seems to surpass the
boundaries of moral discourse; it embodies a form of life and a conceptual scheme that is
alien to us"). "We seem unable to evaluate such acts from a moral vantage point because
they are as incomprehensible to us as would be the behavior of people who did not share
our concepts of time and space." Id. at ix. "The kind of collective behavior that leads to
radical evil would not have materialized unless carried out with a high degree of
conviction on the part of those who participated in it." Id.; see also HANNAH ARENDT,
THE HUMAN CONDITION 241 (1958) (observing that "we can neither punish nor forgive
such offenses and that they therefore transcend the realm of human affairs and the
potentialities of human power"); UPENDRA BAXI, THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19
(2002) ("Radical evil is the imposition of suffering beyond redress, remorse and rights, and
even recall.").
28. Robert 0. Keohane, Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge After the
Cold War, in NEOREALISM AND NEOLIBERALISM: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 269,
271 (David A. Baldwin ed., 1993). Institutionalism's foil is realism. See, e.g., John J.
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, INT'L SECURITY, Winter
1994-1995, at 5, 7 ("Realists maintain that institutions are basically a reflection of the
distribution of power in the world. They are based on the self-interested calculations of
the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behavior.").
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Part IV addresses the internalization and externalization of
justice. Here, I posit that proceeding internationally may more
effectively deter future terrorist acts and may more adroitly involve
the global public in constructing narratives that condemn terrorism.
On the other hand, although domestic proceedings undertaken in the
United States satisfy the deontological need to punish evil, they may
not be a particularly effective way to build a widespread, deep-rooted
social norm that condemns terrorism in the places where disaffected29
individuals may be inspired to join terrorist movements. Nor may
such an approach resonate within communities-such as what I
learned of the Afghan refugee community3" in Peshawar, Pakistan 3-
29. The word disaffected is deliberately chosen as it is not only poor people who join
these networks, but also middle and upper class individuals. This suggests some acute
sense of alienation, not just economic disempowerment. See Thomas L. Friedman,
Editorial, Yes, But What?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at A27.
30. In March 2001, 1 taught an intensive international human rights law course to the
Afghan "bar in exile." This course was organized by the International Law Project and
held at the Afghan University in Peshawar, Pakistan. The International Law Project is an
association of lawyers and law professors affiliated with the International Legal
Foundation, a private not-for-profit organization working to build rule of law in post-
conflict societies. For more information on the International Law Project, see
http://www.ThelLF.org (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The Afghan University is not a fixed "brick and mortar" place, but rather an
association of scholars seeking to sustain some semblance of an academic environment.
By way of example, our course was taught in a restaurant lobby in Peshawar. Our
students included Afghan lawyers, judges, secondary school graduates, and politicians
living outside Afghanistan. Most had left out of opposition to the Taliban regime, while
others had left out of an inability to live in Afghanistan owing to famine, drought, armed
conflict, and a general sense of hopelessness. They largely viewed the Taliban with
antipathy. The Afghan University opened in April 1999 with about 2000 students. See
Mohammed Riaz, Afghanistan Women Have University in Pakistan, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 5, 1999. It was the only institution in the area that provided higher education for
women. Women comprised approximately one quarter of the students at the Afghan
University. The Taliban banned women and girls from school in Afghanistan. Eighty-
seven percent of Afghan women are illiterate, a percentage considerably above the
national illiteracy rate of seventy percent. See David Rohde, Afghan Family Salvages
Little but Its Hopes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al. Our course was unique insofar as
both women and men were taught together in one classroom (sitting separately, however).
Although the Afghan University operated outside of Afghanistan, the Taliban exercised
some (albeit limited) control over the curriculum. This created tension insofar as "[t]he
refugees who dislike[d] the Taliban have conceived of the university as a place to educate
people who could lend their expertise and leadership to the rebuilding of Afghanistan in a
post-Taliban world." See Daniel Del Castillo, A University in Pakistan Struggles to
Educate Refugees From Afghanistan, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 19, 2001, at A42. The
teaching was divided into a morning and afternoon program. In the morning, instructors
gave lectures. In the afternoon, discussion was opened to the students. The discussions
were heated, yet instructive.
31. Peshawar is a border city near the Khyber Pass that links Afghanistan to Pakistan
that was founded over 2,000 years ago. Peshawar has been called the "capital of the
Afghan diaspora." Barry Bearak, A City of Exiles Dreams of Power Regained, N.Y.
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even when those communities are opposed to the Taliban, terrorism,
or violent extremism undertaken in the name of religious fervor.
Similar legitimacy concerns arise with trials held in the national courts
of other Western nations. Even more serious concerns arise
regarding military commission proceedings.
Part IV concludes that, by taking a firm stand in favor of a truly
cosmopolitan32 international tribunal33 to prosecute at least some
individuals responsible for the attacks, the United States and United
Kingdom could take an important watershed step in favor of securing
justice but would do so in a principled, rule-based manner. A truly
cosmopolitan tribunal would be cross-civilizational in spirit and
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2001, at Al. Following the strikes, Peshawar carried the "intrigue of
Casablanca. Men who were once very important are making big plans to be important
again in an imagined post-Taliban Afghanistan." Id. While I was teaching at the Afghan
University, there were over one million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan under
extremely difficult circumstances. Afghans Stream Into Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2001), at http://www.nytimes.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). These
refugees put tremendous strains on Pakistan, lacking the infrastructure and resources to
cope with this influx. See Barry Bearak, For Afghan Exiles, "Promised Land" Turns
Hostile, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2001, at A6. Pakistani frustration was fueled by the fact that
"[in 1981, when Afghanistan was a hot spot in the cold war, the U.N. program for
refugees in Pakistan spent $87 million .... In 2000, the amount was $13 million." Id.
Following the strikes, 300,000 refugees migrated back to Afghanistan, but the number of
those who remain in Pakistan is very high (and also difficult to ascertain, since many
Afghans fled the country when it became clear that the United States would launch
military strikes). See John F. Burns, Ignoring the Risks, Afghans Rush Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2002, at A14.
32. This Article defines cosmopolitan as the sense of being equally comfortable in
various cultures and legal traditions that meet on an equal footing as equal strangers.
International law may be cosmopolitan-but is not necessarily so-and, in practice,
generally is not. To be sure, this is not the only possible definition. A more pejorative
understanding of cosmopolitan also is possible, whereby the term is taken to signify
internationally mobile, aloof elites that are not grounded in any particular cultural context.
33. There is a fair bit of semantic overlap between "court," "tribunal," and
"commission." This Article identifies the institution it propounds as a cosmopolitan
"tribunal," as opposed to a "court." This Article understands a court to mean a
permanent judicial body with a general mandate, and understands a tribunal generally to
have a fixed purpose and circumscribed existence. This is not to say that tribunals never
can become permanent, nor make permanent contributions to international law, nor that
the institution propounded by this Article necessarily will (or should always) remain
temporary. A further precision is required: the use of the term "tribunal" to describe the
institution propounded by this Article does not imply that this institution should be
modeled on the structure of the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"). Nor
is the manner in which the ICTY and ICTR were created something that the proposed
cosmopolitan tribunal emulates. Both "tribunals" and "courts" abide by traditional due
process requirements and are staffed by civilians, unlike "commissions," which are
understood to refer to military justice initiatives that often operate amid extenuating
external circumstances.
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substance, thereby incorporating some Islamic judges, jurists, and
sources of law.34 It would arise from careful negotiations under U.N.
auspices, conducted among all 'implicated nation-states, and not
ordered through Security Council fiat or victors' justice. This
procedure could mitigate disconnects that have existed between
international tribunals, such as those adjudicating mass atrocity in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the communities for which
such institutions are designed to engineer justice and accountability.
In the end, such a tribunal may strike a balance between the
deontological need to punish egregious breaches of international law,
the utilitarian need to deter future breaches, the protection of
national security interests, and the construction of viable multi-ethnic
governance in Afghanistan. A cosmopolitan tribunal also may offer
an opportunity to build linkages between the Islamic and Western
communities-as well as between public international law and Islamic
law 36-and also mediate local justice initiatives.
Thus far, policy makers have not warmed to international
institutions as fora for legalresponses to the September 11 terrorist
attacks. This aloofness derives from a number of factors, including
ineffective presentation of such alternatives outside academic circles,
along with a demonstrable lack of political will to establish them.
This aloofness does not reflect the irrelevance or wrong-headedness
of international institutional alternatives. If anything, it heightens the
urgency for such alternatives to be communicated effectively to the
body politic such that fully informed policy choices can be made,
particularly given the growing success in arresting al-Qaeda suspects.
In the absence of such communication, international institutional
responses will remain a lost opportunity.
On a broader note, Part V suggests that trials, regardless of the
fora in which they are undertaken, can only constitute one small step
in the process of securing justice and accountability. Trials fulfill the
immediate and necessary exercise of identifying those most guilty and
prosecuting and punishing them. But guilty individuals operate
within a social and historical context. Individual members of the
Taliban and al-Qaeda are no exceptions. Trials may not spark a
34. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Editorial, Terrorism and Justice, FIN. TIMES (London),
Oct. 12, 2001, at 23.
35. For a discussion of these disconnects, see generally Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment,
Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221 (2000).
36. Islamic law is broad and heterogeneous. For an overview of some of the general
precepts of Islamic law potentially applicable to the attacks, see generally Frank E. Vogel,
The Trial of Terrorists Under Classical Islamic Law, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (2002).
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discussion of the collective, foreign, and institutional involvement that
created conditions in Afghanistan that were so dire that the country
became a sanctuary for radical evil. To promote justice rigorously,
trials cannot be pursued in isolation from these deeper questions
involving the past, just as they cannot be pursued in isolation from
issues of nation-building involving the future.
Part VI signals asymmetries that may be emerging in public
international law following September 11. Exceptional treatment
may be accorded to the Western world when it is the victim of mass
violence, but, asymmetrically, supposedly universal rule of law and
legalism apply to poor victims in "far away" places. This signals a
retreat from previous trends that sought to expand the scope of
international law and increase the number of conflicts brought under
its aegis. In the end, this exceptionalism not only poses an ethical
challenge, but also has important utilitarian consequences. If
punishment is perceived as fundamentally non-neutral, will it deter
future terrorism or, on the other hand, will it simply be viewed as a
further step in a cycle of endless retribution? Moreover, and to come
full circle, rapid changes in international law definitions of self-
defense, liberalization of unilateral national security intervention, and
circumvention of the U.N. process all may portend the emergence of
precisely the sort of anarchic, and increasingly violent, world
(dis)order for which terrorists may longingly pine.
I. ARMED ATTACKS, CRIMINAL ATTACKS, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW: THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST AFGHANISTAN
The Charter of the United Nations (Charter) establishes the
basic principle that U.N. members shall settle their disputes by
peaceful means.37 This principle presumptively prohibits the use of
force.38 There are two exceptions. A state can use lethal force: (1)
with Security Council authorization that such force is necessary for
the maintenance of international peace and security;39 or (2) that is
necessary in self-defense from an armed attack.4" These are the only
exceptions.4'
37. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(3). The United States is a party to the Charter. See BARRY
E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1
n.* (2001-2002).
38. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4); Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, $ 190 (June 27).
39. U.N. CHARTER arts. 9-22.
40. Id. art. 51. Self-defense is referenced as an "inherent" right, thereby implying that
its contours are informed by customary international law. See Scott Silliman, Comments
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A. Did the Security Council Authorize the Use of Force?
The Security Council issued a number of resolutions following
the September 11 attacks. In Resolution 1373, adopted on September
28, 2001, the Security Council reaffirmed its initial position (taken in
Resolution 1368 on September 12, 2001) that terrorist acts constitute
"threats to international peace and security. 4 2  The preamble of
Resolution 1373 recognizes the need to combat these threats by all
means in accordance with the Charter.4" The Security Council also
reaffirmed the "inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense," again in accordance with the Charter." It also decided that
all states are to prevent and suppress financing of terrorist acts,
refrain from supporting anyone involved in terrorist acts, take all
necessary steps to prevent such acts, and bring to justice any person
at the Panel on "Combating Terrorism Abroad," South-East Association of American
Law Schools Annual Meeting (Aug. 1, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter Silliman Comments]. The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") has
held that customary international law as regards the use of force and the right of self-
defense is virtually identical to the law of the Charter. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, at
190-93. It has been suggested that armed attacks mean very serious attacks that must
"form part of a consistent pattern of violent terrorist action rather than just being isolated
or sporadic attacks." Antonio Cassese, The International Community's "Legal" Response
to Terrorism, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 589, 596 (1989). "Cassese would seem to exclude
major but isolated attacks from those terrorist acts constituting 'armed attacks.' " Robert
J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on Us": International Law and Forcible
State Responses to Terrorism, 12 WIS. INT'L L.J. 153, 201 n.255 (1994). Armed attacks
were traditionally called "acts of war."
41. "[A]ny use of force for purposes other than defense against an armed attack or
execution of a Security Council mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter constitutes the
crime of aggression." Tom J. Farer, Restraining the Barbarians: Can International
Criminal Law Help?, 22 HuM. RTS. Q. 90, 114 (2000).
42. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1373
(2001) [hereinafter Resolution 1373]; S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001) [hereinafter Resolution 1368]; Cassese, supra note 16, at
996 (characterizing Resolution 1368 as "ambiguous and contradictory") (emphasis
omitted).
43. Resolution 1373, supra note 42, at 1. This preamble is not the operative part of
the Resolution. Even the phraseology "combat by all means" differed from the usual
formulae employed by the Security Council in the operative parts of resolutions when it
comes to authorizing the use of force. Typically, the Security Council states that it
authorizes the taking of "all necessary" means or measures for the implementation of the
Security Council resolutions. See Carsten Stahn, Security Council Resolutions 1368 (2001)
and 1373 (2001); What They Say and What They do Not Say, European Journal of
International Law Discussion Forum, at 7, available at http://www.ejil.org/forum (last
visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). On a related note,
the U.N. General Assembly condemned the "heinous acts of terrorism" but did not
recognize a right to response in self-defense nor characterize the terrorism as an "attack."
Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 244.
44. Resolution 1373, supra note 42, at 1; Resolution 1368, supra note 42, at 1.
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who participates in such acts.45 On January 16, 2002, the Security
Council imposed sanctions on the remnants of the Taliban, and
mandated all countries to impose an arms embargo; freeze assets, and
impose a travel ban on individuals and groups associated either with
al-Qaeda or the Taliban.46
However, the Security Council never explicitly authorized the
use of armed force in response to the September 11 attacks. Frederic
Kirgis accurately observes that:
Resolution 1373 does not authorize states to take all
necessary steps to implement it. Instead, it stands as a
warning that the Council itself stands ready to take further
steps, which presumably could involve an authorization of
some form of armed force that would not necessarily be
limited to self-defense, to ensure that the measures taken in
the resolution are adequately implemented.47
But this additional authorization was not obtained prior to the
October 7 strikes, nor has it since been forthcoming.
It has been suggested that the mandate to take all necessary steps
to prevent terrorist acts, or the categorization of such acts as threats
to international peace or security, impliedly authorizes military
strikes and the use of lethal force.48 It also has been suggested that
the discussion within the Security Council resolutions of self-defense
and Article 51 of the Charter impliedly means that an armed attack
had occurred.49 Scholars arguing in favor of implied authorization
have encountered resistance from others who deny that any implied
authorization can be found or, alternately, disapprove of the entire
45. Resolution 1373, supra note 42, at 2.
46. Edie Lederer, New Sanctions Target bin Laden, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE,
Jan. 17, 2002, at A4.
47. Frederic Kirgis, Addendum: Security Council Adopts Resolution on Combating
International Terrorism, ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 1, 2001), at http://www.asil.org/insights.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
48. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Comment: Security Council Authorization to Combat
Terrorism in Afghanistan, ASIL INSIGHTS (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.asil.org/insights/
insigh77.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting that the use of the
phrase "all necessary means" is not absolutely required in order for the Security Council
to authorize the use of armed force and that this authorization can impliedly be read into
Resolution 1373); Arthur Rovine, Notes From the President, ASIL NEWSL. (Am. Soc'y of
Int'l Law, Washington, D.C.), Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 1 (concluding that preambular and other
statements in the Resolutions "given the context, sound very much like characterizations
of the attacks as armed attacks within the meaning of Article 51, and thus
characterizations consistent with the attacks as acts of war").
49. Nico J. Schrijver, Responding to International Terrorism: Moving the Frontiers of
International Law for "Enduring Freedom"?, 48 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 271, 284 (2001).
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notion that authorization to use force ever can be implied.50 This
second point is supported by Article 39 of the Charter, a plain reading
of which appears to foreclose the possibility of implied authorization
of the use of force.51 On the other hand, state practice recognizes
(and is not unwelcoming of) the notion of implied authorization.
Whatever the outcome of the debate on implied authorization,
the point remains that there was no clear, unequivocal, explicit
authorization of the use of force prior to or following the October 7
strikes. This contrasts with the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (an
obvious interstate armed attack), where the Security Council clearly
authorized the use of force against Iraq to maintain international
peace and security.52 There is less of a contrast with the 1998 Security
Council resolutions that preceded NATO's "humanitarian armed
intervention" against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY")
for its conduct in Kosovo.53 The FRY resolutions did not contain
50. See Postings to the European Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, at
http://www.ejil.org/forumWTC (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
51. U.N. CHARTER art. 39 ("The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken ... to maintain or restore
international peace and security.").
52. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. S/Res/688
(1991); see also Michael Byers, The Shifting Foundations of International Law: A Decade
of Forceful Measures Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 21, 23 (2002) (finding explicit
authorization of the use of force against Iraq); Christine Gray, From Unity to Polarization:
International Law and the Use of Force Against Iraq, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (2002)
(noting that the Security Council specifically authorized the use of all necessary means to
ensure Iraqi withdrawal); Michael Mandelbaum, A Perfect Failure: NA TO's War Against
Yugoslavia, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 2, 6 (contrasting Kosovo resolutions with
the clear authorization of the use of force against Iraq and describing authorization by a
"legitimate authority," such as the United Nations, as a prerequisite to interfering in the
domestic affairs of a sovereign state); Helen Duffy, Responding to September 11: The
Framework of International Law, 12 (Oct. 2001), at http://www.interights.org (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (contrasting the language of the 2001 terrorism
resolutions to those related to Iraq and noting that the 2001 resolutions stop short of
authorizing the use of force or the taking of all measures). The Iraq resolutions did
represent a new beginning for the United Nations insofar as member states were
authorized to undertake enforcement action as opposed to the United Nations' engaging
in such actions itself. Byers, supra, at 23. However, at the time the authorization was
explicit.
53. S.C. Res. 1203, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3937th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1203(1998); S.C. Res. 1199, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3930th mtg. at 13, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1199 (1998); S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg. at 10, U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1160 (1998). Some scholars conclude that the Security Council had authorized
forcible humanitarian intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina in Resolution 770, adopted on
August 13, 1992. See CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1120 (5th ed. 2001). Assuming arguendo that
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express language unambiguously authorizing the use of force;54 nor do
the Security Council resolutions that the United States and United
Kingdom argue justify the "no-fly" zones in Iraq and sporadic
bombing to support the maintenance of those zones."
The response of international organizations to the October 7
strikes has not been critical. For example, immediately following the
strikes, Secretary General Annan commented that the states that
launched the strikes "have set their current military action in
Afghanistan in th[e] context [of Resolutions 1368 and 1373]. ''56 This
statement connotes a condoning of this use of force. 7 Security
Council Resolution 1378, adopted on November 14, 2001, did not
criticize the strikes and military intervention.5 8 In fact, it stated in the
preamble that it supported "international efforts to root out
terrorism," although no explicit reference was made to the military
efforts that were operational at the time.59 Moreover, state practice
and commentary by eminent jurists suggest that the Security Council
Resolutions were "interpreted as a green light for the United States
to respond militarily to the attacks. 6 ° Many states even sent troops.61
such use of force indeed was authorized, it is unclear whether the Bosnia-Herzegovina
resolution is applicable to the Kosovo violence.
54. See Gray, supra note 52, at 5; Mary Ellen O'Connell, The UN NATO, and
International Law After Kosovo, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 57, 88 (2000); Thomas M. Franck,
Sidelined in Kosovo? The United Nations' Demise Has Been Exaggerated, FOREIGN AFF.,
July-Aug. 1999, at 116, 117. In fact, the FRY resolutions were even more reticent
regarding the use of force prior to the initiation of that force than were the Afghan
resolutions.
55. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law After 11
September, 51 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 401,402 (2002).
56. Secretary General's Statement on the Situation in Afghanistan, New York (Oct. 8,
2001), at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/latestsm.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
57. Acts of international organizations, in particular the United Nations, contribute to
and are reflected in the practice and opinio juris of states, both of which are central
elements in the formulation of customary international law. See Christine Chinkin, The
Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 850, 856-59 (1989).
58. S.C. Res. 1378, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4415th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1378
(2001) [hereinafter Resolution 1378].
59. Id. Resolution 1378 also stated, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, that the
Security Council reaffirmed "its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence,
territorial integrity and national unity of Afghanistan." Id.
60. Siobhan Roth, A United Front?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al. Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf also stated that "[t]his is a resolution for war against
terrorism." Id.; see also Suzanne Daley, European Leaders Voice Support, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 8, 2001, at Al (reporting on European leaders' support for military operations in
Afghanistan); Statement by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), at
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/sOllOO2a.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (concluding that the attacks were directed from abroad, constituted armed
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All in all, the Secretary General's comments, Resolution 1378,
and state practice consolidate a shift in international legal
understandings of when lethal force can be used. This is a shift
toward deregulation.
This deregulatory shift builds upon the use of force against the
FRY in 1999. In that case, NATO intervention was positioned upon
the fact that "humanitarian armed intervention" could constitute a
legitimate basis for a nation or group of nations to use lethal force
against another.62 Although there were individual dissenters, many
states were quite comfortable with the Yugoslav strikes. Possibly the
same argument-and a similar skirting of a priori (and, thus far, ex
post) explicit Security Council approval-could exist as a basis for the
use of lethal force in Afghanistan (or whichever country may shelter
terrorist camps or bin Laden himself), given the humanitarian and
national security goals of incapacitating terrorists and putting them
on trial. This is not to obfuscate the differences between armed
intervention in a state to protect groups within that state from that
state's government (the case in Kosovo, a situation of humanitarian
armed intervention where there were only ancillary threats to the
national security of the intervening countries) and armed intervention
in a country that harbors individuals who are responsible for
attacking the intervening nation, killing its citizens, and destroying its
infrastructure (more readily classified as armed intervention in self-
defense or to protect national security).63 International law more
clearly recognizes armed intervention in self-defense than in the
protection of third parties victimized by their national governments.64
However, what both kinds of intervention share in common is a
attacks, and that the self-defense provision in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty was
applicable).
61. See Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 248.
62. David Wippman, Kosovo and the Limits of International Law, 25 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 129, 130-31 (2001). "Humanitarian armed intervention" denotes military intervention
by foreign armed forces in a state to protect individuals living within that state from
systematic human rights abuses perpetrated by that state's government.
63. Prior to the September 11 attacks, there was no military intervention in
Afghanistan to protect the human rights of Afghan citizens from systematic abuse by the
Taliban government. See Talya Friedman, Comment, Cures to the Enigmatic Taliban
Plague: Legal and Social Remedies Addressing Gender Apartheid in Afghanistan, 23 LOY.
L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 81,104 (2001).
64. But see Alain Pellet, No, This is Not War!, European Journal of International Law
Discussion Forum, at http://www.ejil.org/forum (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (arguing that the use of force in Kosovo was more
compelling than the use of force against Afghanistan).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
formal sidelining of the Security Council and possibly a reformulation
through state practice of the general law of armed intervention.65
Has international law shied away from the need for Security
Council approval to ensure the legality of armed intervention when
such intervention may be multilaterally coordinated and undertaken
for laudable humanitarian or security purposes? Is the simple
proclamation that an actor or state is a "threat to international peace
and security" now the trigger mechanism permitting unilateral or
multilateral military intervention, including the lethal use of force?
Whereas in Kosovo the use of force likely would have been vetoed by
the Russian Federation or China66 (and, thus, there could have been
some moral imperative to contracting out of a paralyzed Security
Council process), there appeared to be no such obstacles present
regarding the October 7 strikes. Nor do there appear to have been
pressing time constraints, insofar as the United States and United
Kingdom waited a number of weeks before launching the strikes.
There was, therefore, the time to solicit Security Council approval for
the use of force and good reason to anticipate receiving that approval.
Yet such approval never was solicited.67 Although the United States
and United Kingdom did inform the Security Council that they were
exercising self-defense in taking actions in Afghanistan,68 they did not
request "a green light from the Council."69  The fact that the
substance and procedure of public international law may be
derogable at the behest of a number of dominant states may signal
the transformation of public international law into "hegemonic
international law.
'70
Professor Charney suggests that failing to acknowledge a formal
role for the Security Council may not only weaken the U.N. system
65. In the aftermath of the October 7 strikes, there was little discussion in the media
of the role of the United Nations, or the question of Security Council authorization. For
example, in over one dozen pages of articles in the NEW YORK TIMES on the day
following the first strikes (October 8, 2001), no mention was made of the role of the
United Nations or the Security Council nor the legality at international law of the strikes.
66. Franck, supra note 54, at 117.
67. Charney, supra note 13, at 835.
68. See Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 245-46.
69. Christopher S. Wren, U.S. Advises U.N. Council More Strikes Could Come, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at B5. Following the receipt of this letter and two hours of
deliberations, the president of the Security Council stated "that the unanimity of support
expressed in the Security Council's two prior resolutions 'is absolutely maintained.'
Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 246.
70. For recent uses of the phrase "hegemonic international law," see Konrad Ginther,
Hegemony, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 685 (Bernhardt
Rudolf ed., 1995); Detlev F. Vagts, Hegemonic International Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 843,
843 (2001).
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but also undermine long-term U.S. objectives in suppressing
terrorism.7' The response to September 11 may have contributed
little to the officialization or legalization of anti-terrorist
condemnation within the international system. Instead, the response
has been politically constructed and therefore susceptible to political
disintegration or non-replication in terms of combating terrorism
outside of al-Qaeda.
Moreover, this pattern continues. There has been considerable
talk of the United States expanding its scope of military operations
beyond Afghanistan-to Somalia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and into
Pakistan, for example-and well into the future, without any
indication that such an expanded theater of operations would depend
on Security Council approval; in fact, lethal force has been used in
Yemen.7 2 This represents a blurring among law enforcement, military
intervention, and killing suspected enemies. Iraq also is particularly
prominent on the list of places where military intervention is
envisioned.73 In the case of Iraq, the United States and United
71. Charney, supra note 13, at 835, 837 (positing that the United States could have
"benefited greatly from the direct involvement of the Security Council" because this
would have resulted in inter alia: (1) a wider condemnation of international terrorism; (2)
a more stable anti-terrorism coalition because states that would otherwise be embarrassed
by national action could "cast[] their lot with the United Nations as the lead agency"; and
(3) avoidance of the current reality whereby states now have "freer reign" to oppose
combating international terrorism outside of Afghanistan).
72. See R.W. Apple, Jr., Home Front: Edgy Sunday, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at Al;
Michael Evans, US Turns to Yemen and Somalia in War on Terrorism, TIMES (London),
Feb. 11, 2002, at 5L (reporting that "[t]he [United States] is ready to begin intensive
surveillance missions over Somalia and Yemen as it prepares to launch the next phase of
President Bush's war against terrorism"); Michael R. Gordon, Bush, Focusing on
Terrorism, Says Secure U.S. is Top Priority, Broadening of "Doctrine," N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
30, 2002, at Al (noting that President Bush "laid the basis for an ambitious campaign...
against Iraq and other hostile nations"); David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Yemen
Killing Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2002, at Al (reporting the
CIA initiated a missile strike against a vehicle, killing six al-Qaeda operatives); Allison
Lawlor, "My Fellow Americans, Let's Roll": Bush, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Nov. 8,
2001), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(quoting President Bush as stating, "[w]e are at the beginning of our efforts in
Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is only the beginning of our efforts in the world"); Eric
Schmitt, U.S. and Philippines Setting up Joint Operations to Fight Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
16, 2002, at Al (reporting on the deployment of U.S. military support troops to the
Philippines to train and advise Philippine army soldiers in how to destroy a Muslim
extremist group linked to al-Qaeda); Tim Weiner, A Nation Challenged: Global Links;
Other Fronts Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2001, at Al (reporting that "[t]he United States
Ambassador to the United Nations, John D. Negroponte, told the Security Council on
Monday that the United States, acting in self-defense after the Sept. 11 attacks, may take
'further actions with respect to other organizations and other states' ").
73. Thom Shanker & David E. Sanger, U.S. Envisions Blueprint on Iraq Including Big
Invasion Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at Al (reporting that direct military
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Kingdom successfully encouraged the U.N. Security Council to pass
Resolution 1441, which gives Iraq a final opportunity to comply with
its disarmament obligations through weapons inspections. However,
assuming evidence of Iraqi involvement with terrorist activity74 (or of
persisting Iraqi capacity for weapons of mass destruction), the U.S.
position is that armed intervention could be justifiable based on self-
defense, and hence could proceed independently of Security Council
approval.75 Moreover, U.S. national security strategy evinces a
involvement is being considered after the Bush Administration concluded that a coup in
Iraq would be unlikely to succeed); Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Again Placing Focus on Ousting
Hussein, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2001, at Al (reporting that "[tihe option of taking the war
against terrorism to Iraq and Saddam Hussein has gained significant ground in recent
weeks"). Although the United States appears to be seeking Security Council approval for
the use of force against Iraq, it has reserved the right to proceed independently in the
event such approval fails to materialize and the United States deems force to be necessary
in self-defense. At the time of writing, the use of force against Iraq in the event of non-
compliance with weapons inspections has received support from some, but not all, U.S.
allies. See, e.g., John Ibbitson, Bush Rallies Support for Wider War, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Mar. 12, 2002, at Al (discussing the United Kingdom's support); Julia Preston
& Eric Schmitt, U.S.-French Split on Iraq Deepens, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at Al
(discussing French opposition to U.S. action in Iraq); U.S. Offers a Deal for U.N.
Resolution on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2002), at http://www.nytimes.com (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting that two dozen nations have refused to
endorse military force if Iraq fails to comply with weapons inspections).
74. See Chris Hedges, Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
8, 2001, at Al (providing evidence of Iraqi government camps that had trained Islamic
terrorists); David E. Sanger, Bush Sees "Urgent Duty" to Pre-empt Attack by Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2002, at Al (reporting President Bush as building a lengthy, if
circumstantial, case of Saddam Hussein's ties to al-Qaeda). But see James Risen & Dexter
Filkins, Qaeda Fighters Said to Return to Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2002, at Al
(reporting that senior U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials "say that they have
found no evidence to prove that Iraq had any involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks"); David
Stout, Bush Calls Iraqi Vow a Trick; Rumsfeld Urges Early Action, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18,
2002), at http://www.nytimes.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (noting
that the United States has not accused Iraq of having a role in the September 11 attacks,
but that the Secretary of Defense has affirmed that any move to dislodge the Iraqi dictator
should be thought of as an integral part of the campaign against terrorism, because Iraq
and al-Qaeda are partners in terror).
75. See Oliver Moore, U.S. Troops Going Cave-to-Cave in Tora Bora, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto) (Dec. 18, 2001), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) ("Asked whether the United States might need a new resolution
from the United Nations Security Council to strike suspected terrorist targets outside
Afghanistan, [Defense Secretary Rumsfeld] said: 'Nothing is needed by way of additional
authorization. Every country has the right to self-defense.' "); Steven R. Weisman, U.S
and France Near Deal on Iraq Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at Al ("American
officials made clear that the United States would reserve the right to lead a military action
against Iraq if Iraq continued to block inspections, even if the Security Council did not
give its approval."). Since December 1998, Iraq has refused to admit U.N. weapons
inspectors. See Mark A. Drumbl, Legal Issues, in A GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE
THE 54TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 242-43 (John Tessitore &
Susan Woolfson eds., 1999). These inspectors investigate Iraqi possession of weapons of
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commitment not to hesitate to act alone, and chafes at U.N. control
over the use of force against rogue states that present perceived
security threats.76
All in all, the role of multilateral global coalitions or unilateral
action in policing "evil-doing" may be increasing and potentially
supplanting what initially was designed as the role of the Security
Council or the United Nations generally. To be sure, the Security
Council is not representative of the world's population and its five
permanent members wield disproportionate influence.77 As such,
circumventing Security Council processes is not akin to upending
deliberative democratic representation. Regardless, and
notwithstanding the short-term appeal of circumventing Security
Council processes, it is unclear whether the longer-term consequences
of this circumvention may be desirable. Richard Bilder's discussion
of Kosovo illuminates this concern: "[I]f NATO can decide on its
own that Yugoslavia's treatment of its Kosovar Albanians warrants
NATO's bombing, occupation, and de facto severance of Kosovo
from Yugoslavia, why can not every powerful nation or regional
group ... do the same?"78 If supra-national institutions weaken, then
decisions regarding the use of force once again become nationalized.
National decisions to use force may lead to anarchic, piecemeal,
random, and unilateral enforcement of the desirable shared goal of
stamping out terrorism. After September 11, states simply may
believe, more than before, that they are justified in acting outside the
U.N. system.
A collective, institutional response to terrorism may be more
effective than ad hoc unilateralism or narrow coalition building. It
may be difficult to prevent ad hoc unilateralism from devolving into
self-interested opportunism. Who defines what is an armed attack?
A "threat to the peace"? Who defines when, where, how, and why
the use of force can be initiated to contain (or punish) rogue states?
mass destruction (and the capacity to develop such weapons). Id. at 243. Furthermore,
Iraq is in non-compliance with a series of Security Council resolutions dating back to
1991.
76. Bush's National Security Strategy, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Sept. 20, 2002, available at
WESTLAW, Newswires.
77. In particular, the five permanent members of the Security Council wield
disproportionate influence through the use of the veto power.
78. Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism": Promise or Peril?, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 162-63 (1999). In his trial, Slobodan Milosevic has raised
arguments regarding the alleged illegality of the NATO strikes against the FRY. See New
War Charges Rejected by Milosevic, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 30, 2001, at A17.
This example demonstrates the linkages between the means used to stop human rights
abusers and the subsequent prosecutions of those abusers.
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If the United States can use extensive military force to respond to
terrorism, there is no principled basis to deny others that entitlement.
The fact that the armed intervention also involved actively
supporting one faction in an internal armed conflict-in this case the
Northern Alliance, in a previous case the Kosovo Liberation Army-
may foreshadow an increasingly elastic view of the manner in which
that intervention can operate. This, in turn, may reveal another level
of erosion to what Gerry Simpson calls "Charter liberalism," namely,
the traditional precept of international law according to which all
states, including rogue or outlaw states such as Iraq, are treated
equally in terms of respect for territorial sovereignty. 9 Simpson notes
that, traditionally, the primary opportunity to rebut this precept
presents itself when the Security Council acts under Chapter VII of
the Charter.8° Post-September 11, upending this precept may have
become procedurally simplified and the locus of decision-making
returned to the national level. This, in turn, reflects (and also
contributes to) an increasing tendency, detected by Anne-Marie
Slaughter and Thomas Franck, to distinguish between states based on
their internal policies, particularly when these may enable external
harms, leading to a more contextual and normative allocation of the
benefits and burdens of international law.8" Following September 11,
state sovereignty may selectively be under siege, and the principle of
non-intervention more fragile than before. To be sure, there may be
much good in denying the benefits of sovereignty to outlaw states.
However, the implications of these developments for legalism and
universalism in international law are significant and need to be
thought through with prudence and care.
B. Self-Defense
States can use force, if necessary, in self-defense to an armed
attack. States can exercise this force independently of Security
Council authorization.82 After all, self-defense is an "inherent"
79. Gerry Simpson, Two Liberalisms, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 537, 541 (2001) (emphasis
omitted).
80. Id. at 555.
81. See generally Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992) (arguing that effective democracy leads to a perception of
legitimacy and cooperative relations with other countries); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 504 (1995) (exploring a
framework of international law that distinguishes among different types of states based on
how they are internally constituted).
82. Force in self-defense is subject to clearer limits than actions authorized under
Chapter VII, which may exceed the ambit of self-defense depending on the scope of
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right.83 Self-defense is the only exception to the prohibition of the use
of force outside of Security Council authorization. "Like all
exceptions, it is to be strictly applied."84 Thus, because the use of
force in self-defense must be in response to an armed attack, the
definition of "armed attack" is of great importance.
1. Defining an Armed Attack
Armed attacks traditionally are thought to be perpetrated by
states against other states." If the party responsible for an attack is
not a state, a state actor, or agents sent by a state government, then
the lawfulness of the use of armed force on a state where that party is
believed to be is open to question.86 In the case of the September 11
authorization. Moreover, self-defense differs from the use of countermeasures. See John
Cerone, Comment: Acts of War and State Responsibility in "Muddy Waters": The Non-
State Actor Dilemma, ASIL INSIGHTS (Sept. 2001), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.
htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. By virtue of its "inherent" nature, the parameters of self-
defense can be influenced by customary international law and, accordingly, can be
modified by state practice. Some modifications to the right of self-defense following the
September 11 attacks operate at the level of customary international law, but, as such,
inform the scope of Article 51 of the Charter.
84. ROBERT JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
421 (9thed. 1996).
85. "[T]he [U.N.] Charter was drafted on an assumption that all force was inter-state
and that it governed inter-state relations ...." Duffy, supra note 52, at 11 n.42. Giorgio
Gaja observes:
When stating the conditions for individual and collective self-defence, neither
Article 51 of the UN Charter nor Article 5 of the NATO Treaty specifies that an
"armed attack" has to originate from a state. However, this condition may be
taken as implicit .... Moreover, armed attack is a subcategory of aggression, as
explicitly said in the French text of Article 51 of the Charter, and also aggression
clearly has to come from a state.
Giorgio Gaja, In What Sense was There an "Armed Attack"?, European Journal of
International Law Discussion Forum, at http://www.ejil.org/forum (last visited Nov. 11,
2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also Fr6d6ric M6gret, "War"?
Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 361, 379 (2002) (noting that
"self-defence was clearly only ever meant to be against states"). One immediate exception
to the interstate requirement is the fact that armed attacks can occur in internal civil war,
as organized insurgency movements can initiate armed attacks against a state government.
See Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional
Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 8 (2002). Moreover, the certainty of the traditional
assumption of the Charter's limitation to the interstate context may be clouded by the fact
that Article 51 mentions armed attacks, not armed attacks by a state.
86. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 195
(June 27) (the ICJ held that the nature of the acts that can be treated as constituting
armed attacks covers both action by regular military armed forces and also the sending of
armed bands or groups by or on behalf of a state); Cassese, supra note 40, at 596 (noting
that unless the attack is a state act then there can be no question of forcible response to it);
Gregory M. Travalio, Terrorism, International Law and the Use of Military Force, 18 Wis.
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attacks, three actors need to be distinguished: (1) the terrorists, who
are individuals from several countries; (2) the al-Qaeda terrorist
organization, which is a non-state actor; and (3) the Taliban, which
was the government of Afghanistan87 and at the relevant time had
control over most of the territory of Afghanistan. 88 The terrorists and
their umbrella organizations do not constitute a state, nor did they
formally govern one. If a transboundary armed attack can only be
initiated by a state, and no state initiated the September 11 attacks,
then, technically, they might not be the kind of attacks that can be
repulsed through the use of force in self-defense. 89 To be sure, it can
(and has) been argued that the actions of al-Qaeda, although those of
a non-state actor, are attributable to Afghanistan, a state actor. This
attribution, which is discussed in great detail infra, strengthens the
notion that the attacks were traditional armed attacks. More novel,
though, is the argument that international law now recognizes that
the provision of support by an organization to individual terrorists,
who then engage in a wide-scale pattern of destruction, can also
constitute an armed attack.9" This suggests an expansion in the type
of action that can constitute an armed attack. Although not formally
within the intended scope of the Charter, it would make sense, as
INT'L L.J. 145, 148-80 (2000) (discussing the circumstances under which a state may
employ military force against a terrorist organization located within the borders of another
state). However, other scholars have suggested that armed attacks could be committed by
non-state actors. See Thomas M. Franck, When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force
Without Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 51, 55 (2001);
Ruth Wedgwood, Responding to Terrorism: The Strikes Against bin Laden, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 559, 564 (1999). The Caroline incident, discussed infra notes 98 and 158, arguably
involved the use of force in self-defense against non-state actors (but this took place in
1837, in a world devoid of international organizations).
87. At the time of the attacks, the Taliban controlled approximately 90% of
Afghanistan. See John F. Burns, Taliban Opponent Reported to Have Died, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 15, 2001, at B2. The remainder of the country was controlled by the Northern
Alliance, a loose confederation of anti-Taliban militia whose leader, Ahmed Shah
Massoud, had been assassinated in an attack that occurred a few days before the
September 11 attacks. Id.
88. Although the Taliban had de facto control of Afghanistan (and under
international law was the government of Afghanistan), there is a noteworthy wrinkle to
(3). Prior to the terrorist attacks, the Taliban was recognized only by a handful of other
governments (Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia) as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan. Moreover, "[t]he [rebel] Northern Alliance control[led]
Afghanistan's U.N. seat and all of its forty-odd embassies, except for the one in Pakistan,
which [was] run by the Taliban." Jon Lee Anderson, A Lion's Death, NEW YORKER, Oct.
1, 2001, at 54, 54.
89. Gaja, supra note 85 (noting that "terrorist acts have been traditionally
distinguished from armed attacks").
90. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51
of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41, 42 (2002).
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Professor Nico Schrijver suggests, to interpret the Charter as a living,
breathing document "in order to meet new concerns in present day
circumstances ... if these words are to retain a relevance to new
forms of violence." 91
However, although the preambular paragraphs to Security
Council Resolutions 1368 and 1371 flag the existence of an inherent
right of self-defense, these same resolutions fail to call the attacks
"armed" attacks, but instead, call them "terrorist" attacks.92 This is
unlike the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, which clearly was called an
"armed attack. ' 93 The Security Council is a political organ. As such,
it is not like a common law court, which is bound by principles of
stare decisis. However, some importance can inductively be ascribed
to prior conduct as an ingredient of certainty and stability for the
international community. In this vein, the U.N. General Assembly
previously had linked terrorism to criminality, and not armed attacks,
when in a 1985 Resolution it "unequivocally condemn[ed], as
criminal, all acts ... of terrorism." 94
As is well-known, the thrust of the U.S. position is that the
September 11 attacks constituted an armed attack, thereby enabling
the use of force in self-defense.95 This is a grounded position, albeit
91. Schrijver, supra note 49, at 285.
92. M6gret, supra note 85, at 374 ("The existence of a right of self-defense is noted in
their preambles, but in rather general and abstract terms: one is merely reminded, as it
were, that a right to self-defense exists."); see also Stahn, supra note 43 (observing that the
Security Council did not mention a specific state as the holder of the right to self-defense,
nor a concrete author of the attacks).
93. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2932nd mtg. at 19, U.N. Doc. S/Res/660
(1990).
94. G.A. Res. 61, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 301, U.N. Doc 40/61
(1985).
95. See Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces
Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing the President to use "all necessary
and appropriate force," aimed at preventing "any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States" and invoking the right of self-defense); see also Letter Dated 7
October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the
United Nations Security Council Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2001/946 (2001) (satisfying the reporting requirement of Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter and informing the Security Council that the United States had initiated the
exercise of its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense following the
September 11 armed attacks). The United States never officially declared war on
Afghanistan. See Patrick E. Tyler, After Afghanistan: Where Bush Takes Global War on
Terror Begins to Raise Some Unsettling Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2001, at Al. The
United States had invoked Article 51 of the Charter and the right to self-defense as the
legal basis for its 1998 cruise missile strikes against Afghanistan and the Sudan in the wake
of the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, which also were
linked to bin Laden. See Letter Dated 20 August 1998 From the Permanent Representative
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one whose grounding is arrived at by somewhat smudging pre-
existing understandings of what exactly constitutes an "armed
attack."96 If, instead, the attacks are categorized as falling short of the
threshold of armed attacks-for example, as criminal attacks, which is
also a grounded position-then formally they would fall within the
machinery of normal judicial processes such as the criminal and civil
law. The use of force against Afghanistan would then be more
problematic, particularly if the government of Afghanistan did not
exercise effective control over the criminals. These concerns do not
mean, however, that the use of force is impermissible. In fact, it
might be possible to legitimize the use of force by demonstrating that
there was no other way to defend against future terrorist criminal
attacks or, alternately, no other way to obtain custody over alleged
criminals.97 After all, the 1837 Caroline exchange of letters, often
of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1998/780 (1998). At that time, the United States fired over
seventy cruise missiles at guerrilla training camps reportedly operated by bin Laden in
Afghanistan. See Barry Bearak, Taliban Plead for Mercy to the Miserable in a Land of
Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A18.
96. To be sure, the legal parameters of "armed attacks" were not static prior to the
events of September 11. In fact, these parameters had become somewhat unhinged from
their traditional moorings in the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia. See Slaughter & Burke-White, supra note 85, at 7-8.
97. The use of force had been mandated to secure the arrest of suspected criminals in
Somalia. See SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 121-22 (2001) (commenting on S.C. Res. 837,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3229th mtg. at 83, U.N. Doc. S/Res/837 (1993)). In this vein, the
United States and United Kingdom could argue that they waited three weeks before
initiating the strikes. During this time period, Afghanistan did not satisfy demands to turn
over bin Laden or shut down the terrorist camps. Accordingly, attempts to peacefully
resolve this dispute were unsuccessful, therefore leaving no recourse but the use of force.
However, as shall be discussed infra, it is possible that the government of Afghanistan may
not have had effective control over bin Laden or the camps (or, at least, insufficient
control to capture him). Moreover, Afghanistan may actually have attempted to comply
with these demands, and may have conveyed that intent to the United States and United
Kingdom in such a manner that the use of force arguably could have been deferred. The
Security Council has for a number of years been pressuring the Taliban to turn over bin
Laden. For example, the Security Council demanded that "the Taliban turn over Usama
bin Laden without further delay to appropriate authorities in a country where he has been
indicted," S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 4051st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (1999)
[hereinafter Resolution 1267], and that the Taliban "stop providing sanctuary and training
for international terrorists and their organizations," S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. SCOR, 3952nd
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (1998), and "take appropriate effective measures to ensure
that the territory under its control is not used for terrorist installations and camps." S.C.
Res. 1333, U.N. SCOR, 4251st mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1333 (2000). Moreover, the
Security Council noted that the failure of the Taliban to comply with Resolution 1214's
obligation of cooperation to bring indicted terrorists to justice constituted a threat to
international peace and security, thereby making Chapter VII applicable. Resolution
1267, supra, at 2. Does this history of non-compliance support the use of force? By
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cited as an authoritative initial definition of the contours of national
self-defense, involved non-state actor insurgents.9 However, there is
cause for concern if armed force has become legally permissible for a
simple refusal to extradite a suspect to a requesting state. Given the
number of extradition requests regularly made and refused, such legal
permissiveness could presage the extensive use of force.
In the end, though, the post-September 11 world is one in which
distinctions between armed attacks, criminal attacks, and terrorist
acts are becoming blurred. The most telling indicia of this blurring is
state practice that largely accepts the U.S. characterization of the
attacks as an armed attack.99
The law regarding the use of force-the jus ad bellum-is
predicated on the assumption that disputes, armed conflicts, and
attacks occur among states or those that act on their behalf.
Nonetheless, non-state actors present significant threats to
international peace and national security. Indeed, the number and
influence of non-state actors has increased in recent decades. To be
sure, these are not entirely new entities. For example, there was a
time when pirates terrorized the high seas, and international law
developed doctrines related to piracy."° However, these doctrines
did not treat piracy as an armed attack, but, rather, individual
criminal behavior.101  But modern terrorists possess sophisticated
pursuing bin Laden and the terrorists, did the U.S/U.K. strikes simply give effect to these
Security Council resolutions? In a question that is now surfacing with Iraq, is it
appropriate to exercise national force to compel compliance with Security Council
Resolutions? Or, on the other hand, is this further evidence that this was properly a
matter for the Security Council and, as a result, that it was for the Security Council
explicitly to authorize the use of force?
98. See Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An Emerging
Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 190-91 (1984) (identifying the source
of the customary right of anticipatory self-defense in the Caroline case). The Caroline
case emerged from an unsuccessful rebellion by Upper Canadians in 1837 against British
rule. British forces had captured an American ship used to supply the rebels on the
Canadian side of the Niagara River. The British set the ship on fire and sent it over
Niagara Falls. Subsequent discussions between the United States and United Kingdom
established the parameters of self-defense. The Caroline exchange of letters took place in
a world essentially devoid of international organizations; today's context is very different.
As such, the Caroline case's precedential value is diluted by the changed facts and
circumstances of the global community.
99. See Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 248.
100. DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 7, at 1316.
101. Id. ("For hundreds of years there have been some crimes under customary
international law for which individuals could be tried and, if convicted, punished in
national courts. Piracy and slave trading are time-honored examples."); see also United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.62/122, art. 101, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1287 (1982) (defining piracy as an
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weaponry, political agendas, and use the language of war to justify
their acts, which differentiates them from the pirates of yesteryear.
This also suggests that, although in a formalistic sense observers could
balk at classifying al-Qaeda's conduct as constituting an armed attack,
international law certainly is revisiting the positivistic and state-
centered notion of what, exactly, constitutes "war," "armed attacks,"
and "armed conflict."
On the other hand, it may be prudent for self-defense not to
expand so rapidly that it erases the preclusion of unilateral recourse
to armed force. After all, as Professor Schachter observed, "[t]he
absence of binding judicial or other third-party determinations
relating to the use of force adds to the apprehension that a more
permissive rule of self-defense will open the way to further disregard
of the limits on force."'12 Too elastic an understanding of self-defense
could give rise to chaos. Might India now be able to use force against
Pakistan given suspected Pakistani links to terrorism committed in
India (for example, attacks against the Indian Parliament undertaken
by Kashmiri terrorists)? °3 What about Russian activity in Chechnya,
where, in the past, squashing insurrection has led to allegations of
systemic human rights abuses? 1t n In the post-September 11 world
order, is there broader license to use force to crush insurgency
movements that may be stigmatized as terrorist? Along with Russia,
a number of countries are "now characterizing their own internal
struggles as battles against terrorism."' 15 Does Slobodan Milosevic
now have some traction to argue that he was going to war defending
his nation from the terrorist conduct of a non-state actor, the Kosovo
Liberation Army, which was able and willing to use lethal force?
individual, private act and not referencing state liability or armed conflict); DAMROSCH
ET AL., supra note 7, at 404 (explaining that international law has prosecuted individuals
responsible for piracy, which is labeled as criminal conduct, in national courts).
102. OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 145
(Developments in International Law Series, Vol. 13, 1991).
103. See William Safire, Oh, You '02, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2001, at All.
104. Sharon LaFraniere, Chechens Describe Russian Atrocities, INT'L HERALD-TRIB.,
July 1, 2002, at 5. Russia is adopting a pre-emptive approach to terrorism and now is
"prepared to strike at international terrorist groups in whatever country harbored them."
Steven Lee Myers, Putin Vows Hunt for Terror Cells Around the.World, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2002, at Al. President Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair support the new Russian
approach. Id.
105. Michael P. Scharf, Book Review, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 277 (2002) (reviewing
NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, REBEL WITH A CAUSE: THE MINDS AND MORALITY OF
POLITICAL OFFENDERS (2000)); see also Chien-peng Chung, China's "War on Terror":
September 11 and Uighur Separatism, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2002, at 8, 8 ("Beijing
now labels as terrorists those who are fighting for an independent state in the
northwestern province of Xinjiang ... ").
[Vol. 81
2002] VICTIMHOOD IN OUR NEIGHBORHOOD 33
Who will defend the world if the use of self-defense becomes
opportunistic and colorable? In this vein, Professor Scharf suggests,
"America's response to the September 11 attacks is encouraging
other countries to pursue repressive policies that will fuel terrorism
rather than quench it."
106
2. Assuming an Armed Attack: Other Concerns
The conclusion that September 11 constitutes an armed attack
meriting repulsion through the use of force does not end the inquiry.
In fact, this finding simply triggers many other questions relating to
the malleability of international law's treatment of self-defense.
There is a pressing need to identify and discuss this malleability and
predict its long-term effects.
a. Did the Security Council Address the Issue?
Self-defense is not a never-ending blank check. It can only be
exercised temporarily until the Security Council has taken measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security.1"7 These
measures can include peace-enforcement, authorization of the use of
force, or judicial intervention through criminal tribunals and
reparations procedures. 108
The use of force against Afghanistan was initiated after the
Security Council had twice addressed (by way of resolution) the issue
of international peace and security occasioned by terrorism. Does
this mean that the window of opportunity in which self-defense could
be exercised had closed before October 7? Even if the Security
Council acts ineffectively following an armed attack that threatens
international peace and security, does the mere fact the Security
Council has "acted" extinguish the ability of a state temporarily to
engage in self-defense? Surely, this would be a troubling result. It
would seem nonsensical to deny a state the inherent ability to defend
itself simply because the Security Council procedurally has
considered the issue. In this vein, the United States might ask: What
exactly did the Security Council do to protect the United States in the
106. Scharf, supra note 105, at 277.
107. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Whether the procedural limitations regarding Security
Council intervention discussed in this sub-part apply to the freestanding customary
international law of self-defense is unclear. See Silliman Comments, supra note 40.
108. The creation by the Security Council of a special court by treaty with Sierra Leone
was preceded by a determination that the conflict in Sierra Leone constituted a threat to
international peace and security in the region. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 4186th
mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).
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wake of the September 11 attacks? If Security Council responses
were ineffective while the terrorist threat remained extant, then it
would seem ridiculous to foreclose self-defense simply because the
Security Council had turned its mind to the issue. Moreover,
interpreting the Charter in this way likely would prompt states to
question the benefit of remaining within the U.N. framework.
A correlated argument is that the strikes ought to have ceased
once the Security Council took measures. Again, this appears to put
a heavy procedural limitation on the inherent right of self-defense.
Professor Franck puts it well: "It is a reductio ad absurdum of the
Charter to construe it to require an attacked state automatically to
cease taking whatever armed measures are lawfully available to it
whenever the Security Council passes a resolution invoking economic
and legal steps in support of those measures."'' 01 In the case of the
September 11 attack, the Security Council did nothing following the
initiation of the strikes that in any way suggested the superceding of
any initial claim of self-defense by the United States or United
Kingdom. In the end, it appears that self-defense is permissible even
after the Security Council has spoken if the Security Council has
failed to deal effectively with the threat to international peace and
security.
b. Afghan State Responsibility
If it can be shown that the terrorists or al-Qaeda were actual
subjects of state authority, were deeply intermingled with a state
government, or operated with the encouragement (or, perhaps, willful
blindness) of a state, then their actions could be attributed to a state.
This showing would trigger state responsibility and arguably convert
the attacks into the type of armed attacks contemplated by the
Charter. This conversion would legitimize the strikes even under a
traditional, interstate reading of the jus ad bellum.
Immediately after the September 11 attacks, President George
W. Bush constructed the argument that Taliban conduct in relation to
bin Laden's activities implicated the state of Afghanistan; he also
reiterated this argument in his October 7, 2001 speech following the
initiation of military strikes.110 The President "named Afghanistan's
109. Thomas Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 839,
842 (2001).
110. See Bush's Remarks on U.S. Military Strikes in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2001, at B6. Bush also adopted this position in his remarks to the U.N. General Assembly
on November 10, 2001. See President Bush Speaks to United Nations, Office of the Press
Secretary (Nov. 10, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-
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Taliban as a perpetrator, saying the regime itself has committed
murder by supporting the terrorists.""' Could the President view as
indistinguishable the terrorists who committed these acts and those
who harbored them? The initial Security Council resolutions
"refrain[ed] from expressly attributing the 11 September attacks to
the Taliban regime."'1 2 However, five weeks after the strikes began,
the Security Council shifted gears. In Resolution 1378, it mingled the
Taliban, al-Qaeda, and the state of Afghanistan by condemning the
Taliban "for allowing Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export
of terrorism by the A1-Qaida network ... and for providing safe
haven to Usama Bin Laden, Al-Qaida and others associated with
them .... 113
States can be responsible for international wrongs." 4 However,
states are not strictly liable for all wrongs that emanate from their
territory. "5 When the actors in question are non-state actors, the
classic legal test determining responsibility is whether the state had
"effective control" over the wrongdoers." 6 The International Court
of Justice ("ICJ") established this test in 1986 when it was called upon
to assess U.S. responsibility for the acts of the contra rebels in
Nicaragua." 7 The United States had argued for a high threshold of
state responsibility. It was successful in this regard. The ICJ held
3.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("The allies of terror are equally
guilty of murder and equally accountable to justice. The Taliban are now learning this
lesson-that regime and the terrorists who support it are now virtually
indistinguishable.").
111. Oliver Moore, Defiant Taliban Won't Surrender bin Laden, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto) (Sept. 21, 2001), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
112. Stahn, supra note 43, at 5. This silence can be contrasted with prior resolutions on
Afghanistan, in which the Taliban was explicitly mentioned. Id. (concluding that it is
"difficult to regard the S.C. Res. 1373 (2001) as a Chapter VII based authorization of self-
defense by the United States and its allies").
113. Resolution 1378, supra note 58.
114. JENNINGS & WATTS, supra note 84, at 502.
115. Id. at 502-03.
116. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 115 (June
27); Diplomatic and Consular Staff (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, $ 58, 74 (May 24)
(determining that state responsibility over militants was engaged by virtue of a variety of
state acts and omissions). The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia recently modified this Lest for the purposes of its own
jurisdiction to an "overall control" standard. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal Judgment, Case
No. IT-94-1-A, $ 137-38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia App. Chamber July 15,
1999), at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (finding that the Bosnian Serb armed forces were acting on
behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
117. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14.
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that, although the United States helped finance, equip, organize, and
train the contra rebels,"8 this level of involvement did not "warrant[ ]
the conclusion that these forces [were] subject to the United States to
such an extent that any acts they have committed are imputable to
[the United States]."" 9
Whether the Taliban, as the government of the state of
Afghanistan, exercised effective control over bin Laden, the
terrorists, and al-Qaeda is thus a question of fact. 2 ' Security Council
resolutions and state practice demonstrate an understanding that the
Taliban did have control over al-Qaeda. Some commentators
disagree, 2' including Afghan President Hamid Karzai, 2 a but this
appears to be a minority position. In the least, it can be asserted that
the Taliban and bin Laden may be meshed into a web that cannot be
disentangled: partners in governance, symbiotically, and inextricably
intertwined with close personal relationships between elite actors.
Regardless, September 11 appears as a moment that has diluted
the "effective control" test (notwithstanding that the facts are more
compelling than those of the 1986 Contras case). Although the
118. Id. T 115.
119. Id. 116.
120. Taliban pronouncements regarding control over bin Laden have varied. See, e.g.,
John F. Burns, Taliban Say They Hold bin Laden, for his Safety, But Who Knows Where?,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at B3 (quoting Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the Taliban
ambassador to Pakistan, as stating that bin Laden is under the Taliban's control days after
the Taliban claimed that it did not know of bin Laden's location); John Stackhouse, One
Million Afghans at Risk as Humanitarian Crisis Looms, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept.
28, 2001, at Al (reporting that a Taliban official confirmed that bin Laden had received a
message from Afghan authorities recommending that he leave Afghanistan).
121. These commentators posit that bin Laden may have controlled the Taliban. They
then question what the Taliban could ever have done to obtain custody over bin Laden or
shut down his camps. See, e.g., Jeffrey Bartholet, Inside the Mullah's Mind, NEWSWEEK,
Oct. 1, 2001, at 30, 32 (quoting Elie Krakowski, a senior fellow at the American Foreign
Policy Council); Jeffrey Bartholet, Method To the Madness, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 2001, at
54, 58 (quoting a U.N. official as stating that "[a]s bin Laden and the Arabs controlled the
[emir's] office, they controlled Afghanistan from behind the scenes"); Nicholas Lemann,
What Terrorists Want, NEW YORKER, Oct. 29, 2001, at 36, 38 ("[Bin Laden] may have
already achieved control of one nation, Afghanistan; the picture of the Taliban as a
separate entity that merely 'harbors' him has begun to seem quite inaccurate."). "A state
that is so weak that it literally cannot control terrorist activity emanating from within its
borders can hardly be said to have acted at all .... [T]he impotence of a state to control
international terrorist organizations would not be an armed attack against another state
..... Travalio, supra note 86, at 153.
122. As part of a "pitch for reconciliation," Karzai stated at the loya jirga, "I know
many Taliban .... And they were taken over, hijacked by the foreign people. Those
people were against Afghanistan. Those who were responsible for the massacres, those
who were responsible for the burning were foreigners." Afghan Assembly Names Chief,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (June 13, 2002) (internal quotations omitted), at http://www.
globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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"effective control" standard remains authoritative in form,2 3 recent
state and international organization responses, together with Security
Council Resolution 1378, scholarly writing, 24 and the work of
eminent jurists12 5 suggest that it is moving to a lower threshold. 26 At
123. See Duffy, supra note 52, at 21.
124. See Cassese, supra note 40, at 599; Travalio, supra note 86, at 154.
125. Modifications undertaken in 2001 to the International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on State Responsibility evidence changes to the "effective control" test and the
entire process of attributing the conduct of non-state actors to state actors. These changes
essentially preceded September 11, although they were formalized after September 11.
Whereas the provisional text entering the 2001 sessions of the International Law
Commission established a fairly high nexus between the state and the individual or non-
state actor in order for the state actor to be responsible for the acts of the non-state actor,
the draft finally presented to the Sixth Committee of the U.N. General Assembly in
November 2001, where it was favorably received, lowered this threshold. Compare Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, U.N. GAOR Int'l Law Comm'n, 48th Sess., at art. 8, U.N.
Doc. A/51/10 (1996), at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/archives/statfra.htm [hereinafter 1996
Draft Articles] (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review),
with Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N.
GAOR Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 10, at art. 5, U.N. Doc. A156/10 (2001), at
http://www.un.orgllaw/ilc/textslState-responsibility/responsibilityfra.htm [hereinafter 2001
Draft Articles] (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
The 1996 Draft Articles stated:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall also be considered as an act of
the State under international law if: (a) it is established that such person or
group of persons was in fact acting on behalf of that State; or (b) such person or
group of persons was in fact exercising elements of the governmental authority in
the absence of the official authorities and in circumstances which justified the
exercise of those elements of authority.
1996 Draft Articles, supra, at art. 8.
The conduct of a person or a group of persons not acting on behalf of the State
shall not be considered as an act of the State under international law. [This
determination] is without prejudice to the attribution to the State of any other
conduct which is related to that of the persons or groups of persons ....
Id. art. 11; see also id. art. 14(1) ("The conduct of an organ of an insurrectional movement
which is established in the territory of a State or in any other territory under its
administration shall not be considered as an act of that State under international law.").
In contrast, the 2001 Draft Articles stated: "The conduct of a person or entity
which is not an organ of the State ... but which is empowered by the law of that State to
exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State
under international law .. " 2001 Draft Articles, supra, at art. 5.
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State
under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising
elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official
authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the exercise of those elements
of authority.
Id. art. 9; see also id. art. 11 ("Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the
preceding articles shall nevertheless be considered an act of that State under international
law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges and adopts the conduct in question as
its own.").
126. The deployment of an "overall control" test in the jurisprudence of the ICTY in
1999 also suggests a watering down of the classic "effective control" test that preceded the
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81
the same time, the consequences of breaches arising out of a failure to
control effectively have expanded sharply, permitting not just
financial reparations or countermeasures, but even the extensive use
of deadly force leading to the destruction of the government in
question. Extending effective control doctrine from its traditional
homes of state responsibility and criminal liability to the uncharted
waters of self-defense should be undertaken with prudence.
These shifts in the law become clearer when a comparison is
made with international response to strikes made by Israel in 1985
against Tunisia. The facts are different, but comparative analysis still
is of probative value.'27 In 1985, the Security Council rejected Israel's
argument that harboring, supplying, and assisting non-state actors
should be sufficient to attribute the acts of those non-state actors to a
state.'28 Israel had accused Tunisia of harboring individuals who had
committed terrorist acts in Israel. Then Israel initiated military
strikes against Tunisia, in particular, an air attack on PLO
headquarters. Security Council Resolution 573 condemned the
strikes as an "act of armed aggression. .. against Tunisian territory in
flagrant violation of the Charter." '129 However, in an important
departure from Resolution 573, the Security Council's resolutions on
September 11 attacks. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
IT 137-38 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia App. Chamber July 15, 1999), at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.pdf (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). It is unclear, however, whether the "overall control" test is
applicable to the attribution to a state of the conduct of non-state actors other than
organized armed forces or organized paramilitary forces. Quaere whether al-Qaeda falls
within this scope. Furthermore, it is unclear whether "overall control" is a standard
applicable outside of the general context of individual criminal responsibility. After all,
the ICTY was considering the specific question whether the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was an international or non-international armed conflict for the purposes of
prosecuting an individual for war crimes.
127. See Said Mahmoudi, Comment on Fox Addendum, ASIL INSIGHTS (Sept. 24,
2001), at http://www.asil.org/insights.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
("The Security Council is now obviously faced with a situation that profoundly differs
from the situation in 1985 when Palestinian groups carried out individual attacks on Israeli
targets, normally with limited casualties.").
128. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 2615th mtg. at 1, S/RES/573 (1985) [hereinafter
Resolution 573]. See generally Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law: Resort to War and Armed Force, 80 AM. J. INT'L L.
165 (1986) (discussing the U.N. Security Council's condemnation of Israel's air attack
against the Palestine Liberation Organization headquarters in Tunisia).
129. Resolution 573, supra note 128. The fact that Resolution 573 condemns Israel's
attack as contrary to the Charter implies that no justification based on self-defense was
found. Self-defense also was rejected by states as justification for the United States'
bombing of Tripoli (for a terrorist bomb in a Berlin nightclub) and the 1993 bombing of
the Iraqi Secret Service (after an assassination attempt was made on former President
George H.W. Bush in Kuwait). See Byers, supra note 55, at 407.
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Afghanistan explicitly mention the right of individual and collective
self-defense and do not contain any condemnation of the military
strikes.
Given the dangers posed by terrorism, broadening state
responsibility and imposing severe punishment for breaches are
understandable. An attenuated standard may be particularly
appropriate when the non-state actor is known by all to be highly
dangerous and readily capable and willing to initiate attacks. In such
a situation, responsibility might well be triggered when the state in
question knowingly tolerates the responsible parties, encourages
them, or fails to do anything about them. But, caution may be in
order, else it may become too easy to impute responsibility and follow
up with the lethal use of force. Instability may leak into the world-
order when the law becomes too porous.
Difficult questions continue to spiral one from the other. If
liability is to be imputed to Afghanistan for Taliban behavior, where
does this imputation end? What about other regimes that, in the past,
have offered support for or acquiesced to the Taliban (for example,
Sudan,130 Pakistan,' and Saudi Arabia'32)? What about regimes such
130. Rod Nordland & Jeffrey Bartholet, The Mesmerizer, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001,
at 44, 45. Bin Laden went to Sudan for a number of years after being expelled from Saudi
Arabia. While under protection from the Sudanese government, bin Laden established
training camps and opened businesses that funded and provided cover for al-Qaeda
activities. See Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Questions and Answers, at http://
www.terrorismanswers.com/sponsors/sudan.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
131. See Dexter Filkins, The Legacy of the Taliban is a Sad and Broken Land, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 31, 2001, at Al (reporting that Pakistani intelligence officers funneled arms,
money, and supplies to the Taliban, as well as military advisers to guide them in their
internal armed conflicts).
132. Saudi Arabia's link to bin Laden is tumultuous. Saudi Arabia had expelled bin
Laden and had stripped him of citizenship. But Saudi Arabia's relationship to terrorism is
more nuanced. Fareed Zakaria reports that the Saudi regime has tried to "bolster its
faltering legitimacy in the past two decades by fueling a religious revival in the Arab
world." Fareed Zakaria, The Allies Who Made Our Foes, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 1, 2001, at 34,
34. The Saudi regime has espoused Wahhabism, "a rigid, puritanical version of Islam"
that "views the outside world and modernity with hostility." Id. Almost all of bin Laden's
aids and bodyguards are Saudis. Id. Fifteen of the nineteen September 11 hijackers were
Saudis. See Evan Thomas & Christopher Dickey, The Saudi Game, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 19,
2001, at 32, 33. Every major terrorist attack perpetrated against the West in recent years
has been conducted by those who espouse Wahhabism. See Zakaria, supra; see also
Seymour M. Hersh, King's Ransom, NEW YORKER, Oct. 22, 2001, at 35, 35 (reporting that
the Saudi regime "channell[ed] hundreds of millions of dollars in what amounts to
protection money to fundamentalist groups" and that "by 1996 Saudi money was
supporting Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in Afghanistan,
Lebanon, Yemen, and Central Asia, and throughout the Persian Gulf region"). What
responsibility does Saudi Arabia have for deliberate choices by its monarch to construct
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as the USSR (to which the Russian Federation is the successor in
international law), whose military aggression in Afghanistan
prompted the emergence of the mujahedeen 33 and brought Osama
bin Laden there in the first place? In the end, it is unclear who judges
responsibility, under what evidence, and who then judges that initial
judgment. What is clearer, though, is the potential for increased
instability.
c. Self-Defense, Internal Regime Change, and Broad Horizons
The use of force by the United States and United Kingdom
included equipping, supporting, and facilitating a rebel armed faction,
the Northern Alliance, in its multi-year quest to take over power.
The Northern Alliance triumphantly entered Kabul in November
2001.3 As such, U.S. and U.K. involvement has far exceeded the
destruction of al-Qaeda bases. Accordingly, it may well be that self-
defense instantly has expanded to include facilitating the armed
takeover of a state by an internal insurrectionary group.'35 This may
well signal an important change in the scope of self-defense as
understood by international law. Without a principled basis to
control this sort of support, little would remain of the doctrine of non-
intervention.'36 U.S. armed intervention has moved toward attacking
non-Taliban and non-al-Qaeda militia factions who oppose the
transitional Afghan government also, which demonstrates a further,
and even more greatly unprecedented, expansion in the breadth of
self-defense under international law.
137
There is evidence of serious human rights abuses committed by
the Northern Alliance. 138  One example involves the alleged
domestic legitimacy through Wahhabism that, in turn, provides so much of the fuel for
international terrorist activity? What responsibility should it bear for any funding of bin
Laden's terror networks?
133. For more information on the mujahedeen, see infra notes 345-57 and
accompanying text.
134. See Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 250.
135. See, e.g., Schrijver, supra note 49, at 290 (writing prior to the overthrow of the
Taliban regime that "targeting the overthrow[] of the Taliban regime would be beyond the
scope of self-defence and hence unlawful").
136. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7) ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to
settlement under the present Charter ... ").
137. John F. Burns, In a Shift, U.S. Uses Airstrikes to Help Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
2002, at Al.
138. See David Rohde, Executions of P.O.W.s Cast Doubts on Alliance, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 13, 2001, at Bi (reporting on lootings and executions by Northern Alliance forces as
they moved toward Kabul); Alessio Vinci, "Hundreds Killed" After Mazar-e Sharif
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suffocation of 1000 surrendered Taliban fighters in truck containers
under the watch of Northern Alliance General Abdul Rashid
Dostum.139 If the Northern Alliance is under the "effective control"
of the United States and United Kingdom, this might place state
responsibility on the United States and United Kingdom for
violations of the law of war committed by the Northern Alliance.
Could self-defense justify pursuing terrorists through armed
intervention in other nations if connections to September 11 are
found? 4 ° In his communication to the Security Council, Ambassador
Negroponte wrote that the United States "may find that [its] self-
defense requires further actions with respect to other organizations
and other states." '41 At what point would self-defense end and the
unjustified use of force (or threat thereof)-both of which contravene
the U.N. Charter 14 and may amount to the crime of aggression-
begin? Can this sort of self-defense legitimize a multi-year, multi-
pronged "war on terrorism" in many theaters of operation? 43 How
can an end to this war be determined? These are important questions
not only for clarity regarding the use of force, but also for how long
detainees can be held. Can detainees captured in Afghanistan be
held after the war in Afghanistan ends, but the war on terrorism-for
Takeover, CNN NEWS (Nov. 13, 2001), at http://www.CNN.com/2001WORLD/asiapcf/
central/11/13/ret.afghan.mazare/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(reporting that Northern Alliance fighters killed as many as 600 people after seizing the
northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif).
139. See General Suggests Extending U.S. Campaign to Afghan Neighbors, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 25, 2002), at http://www.nytimes.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(reporting that U.S. special forces were said to be with General Dostum at the time the
fighters were transported).
140. See, e.g., Thom Shanker & James Risen, Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts by
Military Units, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2002, at Al (reporting that the United States is
considering the use of American Special Operations forces to capture or kill al-Qaeda
leaders worldwide, even if such intervention is on a covert basis and even if the local
government remains uninformed of this intervention).
141. Christopher Wren, U.S. Advises U.N. Council More Strikes Could Come, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at B5.
142. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
143. However, some allies do not appear supportive of the prospect that self-defense
could justify unilateral intervention in this expanded theater of operations. See Shawn
McCarthy, Limit War on Terror, PM, Putin Tell U.S., GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 15,
2002, at Al (reporting that Canada and Russia have warned the United States not to act
unilaterally against Iraq); Patrick E. Tyler, Europeans Split With U.S. on Need for Iraq
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2002, at A5 (reporting that "American talk of overthrowing
Saddam Hussein by military force is raising alarms in European governments"). But only
a little protest resulted from the Negroponte letter, prompting Professor Byers to suggest
that the international law of anticipatory self-defense also may be changing. Byers, supra
note 55, at 411.
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which the administration does not see an "end ... in sight"-
continues?144
Regardless of the existence of Iraqi connections to the
September 11 attacks, the United States, citing Iraq's capacity to use
weapons of mass destruction, has asserted that self-defense could
legitimize anticipatory intervention against Iraq.'45 Self-defense, it is
suggested, also fuels the need for internal "regime change" in Iraq
and U.S. support of such change. 46 At the time of writing, the United
States has successfully encouraged the U.N. Security Council
unanimously to pass Resolution 1441 mandating weapons inspections
and disarmament by Iraq. Were this resolution to be breached by
Iraq, this could constitute a threat or breach of the peace for which
the Security Council then explicitly could authorize military
intervention. 147 However, if compliance with the resolution is unclear,
or explicit authorization absent, the United States might justify armed
intervention on its inherent right of self-defense. Such an assertion
would extend self-defense to a preemptive or anticipatory form.
Although the legality of anticipatory self-defense is to be assessed in
its own right, such legality may be facilitated by the changes to self-
defense prompted by the September 11 attacks. In this regard, state
practice may have set the tone for the legitimacy of anticipatory self-
defense, although it is yet unclear whether state practice would
support the operationalization of such self-defense through the use of
force against Iraq.
In sum, following September 11 self-defense may have
metamorphosed into something more elastic and fuzzy, where there is
greater ambiguity regarding how self-defense is to be undertaken,
144. Toni Locy, Pentagon Issues Tribunal Rules, USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2002, at 4A,
(quoting William Haynes, the Defense Department's general counsel).
145. Traditionally, anticipatory or preemptive self-defense has not been favored under
international law. See Byers, supra note 55, at 410. However, the notion of preemptive
"counter-proliferation" forms an important part of the new U.S. national security strategy.
See Bush's National Security Strategy, supra note 76.
146. The United States has affirmed it will provide "lethal assistance" in the form of
military training and arms to Iraqi opposition volunteers and Kurdish fighters in Iraq.
Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Britain Drafting Resolution to Impose Deadline on Iraq, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A14; see Preston & Schmitt, supra note 73 (reporting that the
CIA has begun covert operations in the Kurdish area of northern Iraq with a view to
fomenting an uprising in Iraq).
147. U.N. CHARTER arts. 39, 42. A plain reading of Resolution 1441 suggests another
Security Council meeting in the event of an Iraqi breach, at least to discuss the inspectors'
report, at which point the use of force could be authorized. On the other hand, the use of
fuzzy and ambiguous language could be read as supporting the notion that the Security
Council is allowing individual states greater interpretive latitude in deciding when force
can be used.
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against whom, and for how long. This suggests that the concept of
self-defense has expanded in both time and space. Just how far it
shall expand remains unclear, although state practice regarding the
Iraqi situation constitutes a bellwether.
d. Were Peaceful Means Exhausted?
Whether the use of force is lawful is a question that only should
arise when there are no peaceful means available to settle the dispute
or, more realistically, when peaceful means have been exhausted or
proven ineffective or unsuccessful. It is thus a question of fact
whether all peaceful means to resolve the dispute between
Afghanistan and the United States/United Kingdom were exhausted
before the initiation of the use of force. Much more complex, though,
is how to determine that question of fact. A rigorous standard that
disregarded national sovereignty would suggest the necessity for
Afghanistan immediately and fully to comply with President Bush's
request to shut down the terrorist camps and turn over bin Laden. A
more incremental standard deferential to national sovereignty might
permit partial compliance to defuse the immediacy of the threat
necessary to justify self-defense strikes.
Afghanistan delayed and hesitated in the face of U.S. requests.
It first delivered Osama bin Laden its edict (fatwa), asking him
voluntarily to leave the country, but then did nothing to achieve that
result.'48 Then it expressed skepticism regarding the evidence that
implicated bin Laden. This skepticism manifested itself in
Afghanistan's request that the United States provide evidence of bin
Laden's involvement as a condition for him to be turned over.
149
148. White House Rejects Clerics' Recommendation, CNN NEWS (Sept. 20, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/central/09/20/ret.afghan.clerics/index.htmi (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). The Taliban previously had maintained that
bin Laden had gone missing and, consequently, that they could not deliver him the fatwa.
See John Ibbitson, Bin Laden Gone? U.S. Doubts It, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 24,
2001, at Al. This was met with immediate skepticism by U.S. officials. Id.
149. John F. Burns, Clerics Answer "No, No, No!" and Invoke Fates of Past Foes, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2001, at B3. But the evidence adduced against bin Laden soon proved to
be convincing to U.S. allies, including Pakistan. See Britain's Bill of Particulars: "Planned
and Carried out the Atrocities," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at B4; John F. Burns, Pakistan
Finds U.S. Charges Good Enough for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2001, at B5; Suzanne
Daley, NATO Says U.S. has Proof Against bin Laden Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at
Al; Patrick E. Tyler, British Detail bin Laden's Link to U.S. Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2001, at Al. Providing evidence prior to initiating strikes is an issue that concerns some
international legal scholars. For example, Jonathan Charney emphasizes that the United
States "should have disclosed the factual bases for its claim of self-defense against the
terrorist attacks before engaging in military action," but failed to do so. Charney, supra
note 13, at 836. The ICJ has ruled that any claim of self-defense must be supported by
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Then, in the week before the strikes, the Taliban did affirm that it was
ready for negotiation and would try to find bin Laden.15°
Subsequently, on the eve of the strikes, it announced that it would try
bin Laden in an Afghan court under Islamic law.'51 Should this
conduct have sufficed to defer the strikes? Should a declaration by
Afghanistan that it was ready to discuss the issue and negotiate over
bin Laden have postponed any finding that Afghanistan breached an
international obligation? Although this declaration might satisfy an
incremental standard, it is unclear whether it would meet the
requirements of the rigorous standard.
In a similar vein, the United States and United Kingdom may
have had a legal obligation to discontinue the strikes. At the
beginning of the second week of the strikes, a senior Taliban official
stated that there was room to discuss the surrender of bin Laden to a
neutral third-party country for legal adjudication.'52  Although
President Bush previously had indicated a willingness to reconsider
the use of force if the Taliban would have surrendered bin Laden,"'
the President rejected this offer, remarking that the surrender would
have to be unconditional as "he was not interested in discussing Mr.
bin Laden's innocence or guilt."'54 Once again, the question arises
whether these offers sufficed to relieve Afghanistan of any dereliction
of international law and instead pointed to the sustained use of force
as an infringement of international law, even if initially permissible as
credible evidence of an armed attack and of the identity of the attacker. Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 230-34, 248-49 (June 27). If the
currency of anticipatory self-defense increases, it will become necessary to specify what
evidence is needed to justify preemptive strikes.
150. See John Stackhouse, U.S. Strikes Back, Canada Gears Up, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Oct. 8, 2001, at Al. The United States retorted that it was too late for any
negotiations. See id.
151. See U.S. Rejects Taliban Offer to Try Bin Laden, CNN NEWS (Oct. 7, 2001), at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/l0/07/ret.us.taliban/index.html (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). This was not the first time the Taliban had raised the idea of
trying bin Laden in Afghanistan. As early as mid-September, the press reported that the
Taliban had suggested bin Laden could be turned over to a third-party court if that court
included at least one Muslim judge. See John F. Burns, Taliban Refuse Quiet Decision
Over bin Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18,2001, at Al.
152. Terrorist Attacks, supra note 3, at 248; Elisabeth Bumiller, President Rejects Offer
by Taliban for Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al.
153. Patrick E. Tyler & Elisabeth Bumiller, President Hints He Will Halt War if bin
Laden Is Handed Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at Al.
154. Elisabeth Bumiller, President Rejects Offer By Taliban For Negotiations, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 15, 2001, at Al. The United States stated that there could be no amnesty for
leaders of bin Laden's network even if these individuals surrender. See Al-Qaeda Talks
Surrender Amid U.S. Air Strikes, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Dec. 12, 2001), at
http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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self-defense to armed attacks. On the other hand, if negotiations
would have created a risk that suspects could have escaped or that
further terrorist acts could have been perpetrated, that could
legitimize the necessity of continuing the strikes. All of this suggests
that the international community needs to reflect soberly on the
procedural limitations to the use of force and the relevance of these
limitations to national security concerns in this time of terrorism. But
lawmaking is proceeding reactively, instead of thoughtfully.
e. Proportionality and Necessity
Expansion in the jus ad bellum, permitting the use of force in
self-defense to warlike attacks by non-state actors, poses tremendous
challenges for the law regarding how war is to be conducted, the jus in
bello. In all cases, self-defense must satisfy the principles of
proportionality and necessity.155
The principle of proportionality requires that a response cannot
involve excessive force.'56 Excessive force includes that which
indiscriminately targets civilians and military personnel.157 The
necessity requirement derives from and is defined by the celebrated
Caroline exchange, which provides that "self-defense must be
confined to cases in which the necessity of self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation." '158 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the necessity
element to self-defense presumes some sort of ongoing armed attack
or imminent threat thereof. It may thus have been somewhat
misplaced for Prime Minister Tony Blair to speak of self-defense as
the basis for U.K. involvement in the military intervention, but then
remark that "there was 'no specific credible threat' that he knew of to
Britain." '159 In a similar vein, does the fact that the United States and
155. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 176, 194
(June 27); Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996
I.C.J. 226, IT 40-42 (July 8).
156. John W. Head, The United States and International Law After September 11, 11
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 4 (2001).
157. Id. at 4-5.
158. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620,
1634-35 (1984) (citing the exchange of diplomatic correspondence in the celebrated
Caroline case of 1837). The "instant and overwhelming necessity" requirement has since
been affirmed many times by numerous international entities. YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR,
AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENCE 219 (3d ed. 2001); JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED
NATIONS AND THE CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL VIOLENCE: A LEGAL AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17-18 (1982).
159. Alan Cowell, Blair Depicts the Airstrikes as Act of Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2001, at B6. If Prime Minister Blair were referring to collective self-defense this
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United Kingdom waited three weeks after the initial attacks to launch
strikes reveal that those strikes were not necessary to defend against
an imminent threat? 16  On the other hand, bin Laden's post-
September 11 videotaped exhortations to attack Americans-along
with other members of the world community-at any opportunity
could well establish the ongoing necessity of continued strikes and
ground forces.' 61  This is particularly the case given al-Qaeda's
connection to numerous terrorist acts committed prior to and
following the September 11 attacks. 62
statement might be less ironic. After all, a state's interests need not be directly affected in
order to exercise collective self-defense, provided that the injured state requests
assistance. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, at J1 199, 210-11. But see id. at T 545
(dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings) (distinguishing self-defense from "vicarious
defense," and remarking that "there should, even in 'collective self defense,' be some real
element of self").
160. Another challenge to the necessity requirement involves credible reports that,
shortly following the attacks, 150 to 200 members of bin Laden's core following had
slipped out of Afghanistan. Melinda Liu, Inside "People Smuggling," NEWSWEEK, Nov. 5,
2001, at 52, 52. If core members of al-Qaeda had already left the country before October
7, does this attenuate the necessity of bombing Afghanistan in self-defense (or to capture
alleged perpetrators or conspirators)? More Taliban and al-Qaeda members fled
Afghanistan following the initiation of the strikes. See Amy Waldman, New Leaders Set to
Assume Power in Tranquil Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2001, at Al (commenting that
after the Taliban effectively was ousted, some senior al-Qaeda leaders may have escaped
to Pakistan).
161. David E. Rosenbaum & David Johnston, Ashcroft Warns of Terror Attacks Soon
Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2001, at Al; see also Franck, supra note 109, at 840
(noting that "Osama bin Laden has specifically promised to continue attacks on the
United States"); James Dao, Taliban and Qaeda Believed Plotting Within Pakistan, N.Y.
TIMES, May 28, 2002, at Al (reporting that al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders now in Pakistan
were plotting terrorist attacks, including car and suicide bombings, to disrupt the selection
of the new Afghan national government); Patrick E. Tyler & Elaine Sciolino, As U.N.
Meets, bin Laden Tape Sets Off Alarms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at Al (reporting on bin
Laden's second videotape, in which he threatened the United Nations and various world
leaders).
162. In December 2001, an Islamic extremist was stopped from detonating explosives
on a Paris-Miami flight; officials subsequently established some links to al-Qaeda. Denise
Lavoie, Shoe-bomb Suspect Indicted, Accused of al-Qaida Links, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Jan. 17, 2002, at 4A. The accused, a British national, has been indicted by a
federal grand jury in Boston. Id. Also, operations of the U.S. Embassy in Yemen were
suspended after the receipt of evidence that al-Qaeda militants plotted an attack. See
Ahmed al-Haj, Bomb Plot in Yemen Closes U.S. Embassy, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Jan. 17, 2002, at 4A. The FBI has issued warnings regarding more terrorist attacks, with
links to Yemen. Blast in Yemen Kills Suspect, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2002, at
A16. A planned attack against the U.S. embassy in Rome was averted in late February
2002. Tom Zeller, Terror Diaspora, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5;
see also Dexter Filkins, 4 in Pearl Murder Are Found Guilty in Pakistan Court, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2002, at Al (documenting the kidnapping and murder of journalist Daniel
Pearl as the first in a series of attacks linked to al-Qaeda that have been launched against
Westerners in Pakistan in 2002); Chris Hedges, Tunisian Killed in Synagogue Blast Was
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On a broader note, is it possible for traditional requirements of
proportionality and necessity to apply when military operations are
used to hunt down, ferret out, kill, or capture individuals that are part
of a shadowy, hidden terror network? This scenario is particularly
vexing when such operations proceed covertly or without the
knowledge of local governments.163 If the use of force in such cases
cannot be tailored or made proportionally effective, then it may never
be in accord with the jus in bello.I6
Although the Bush Administration recognized the principle of
proportionality and carefully focused the strikes on Taliban military
structures and al-Qaeda terrorist camps,'65 realistically it may be very
difficult to adhere to standards of proportionality when intervening
militarily (especially when the intervention is orchestrated through
aerial and missile bombardment and aggressive special operations
intervention) on a regular basis to locate and destroy individual
criminal networks. 6 6  Nor can the use of devices for a military
Unlikely Convert to Militancy, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 1, at 22 (reporting that a
terrorist attack against a synagogue in Tunisia, which killed 19 people on April 11, 2002,
could be linked to al-Qaeda); Seth Mydans, Car Bomb Explodes Outside U.S. Office in a
Pakistani City, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2002, at Al (citing the White House as calling the car
bomb a "vivid reminder" of the dangers that Americans face in the war on terrorism);
Risen & Filkins, supra note 74 (reporting on al-Qaeda's involvement in attacks committed
within Afghanistan, including the attempted assassination of the Afghan President); Karl
Vick & Kamran Khan, Al Qaeda Tied to Attacks in Pakistan Cities, WASH. POST, May 30,
2002, at Al (reporting that al-Qaeda has been connected to kidnapping, grenade attacks,
and car bombings that have occurred in Pakistan in 2002).
163. Such is the case with a proposal to capture or kill al-Qaeda "worldwide" discussed
at high levels of the U.S. government. Shanker & Risen, supra note 140; see also Thom
Shanker & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Moves Commandos to Base in East Africa, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2002, at A20 ("The Pentagon is even now drafting potential tactics for covert
missions against terrorists where there is no responsible local government or where the
local authorities would object to American action."). Clandestine operations conducted
without the approval of the government controlling the territory on which the operations
take place would infringe the principle of non-intervention.
164. See Coalition Troops Launch Operation Condor, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (May
17, 2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(reporting that locals have complained about mistakenly targeted bombing campaigns
they allege to have killed civilians); Carlotta Gall & Craig S. Smith, Afghan Witnesses Say
G.l.s Were Duped in Raid on Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at Al (reporting on U.S.
forces killing Afghans believed to be Taliban supporters, but who actually were supporters
of the Karzai government, many of whom allegedly were found shot with their hands tied
behind their backs and some of whom, it is alleged, were killed without having a chance to
surrender); Carlotta Gall & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Forces Kill 5 in an Afghan Raid that Raises
Doubts, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2002, at A10 (reporting that U.S. Special Operations forces
may have killed and detained individuals with no connection to the Taliban or al-Qaeda).
165. See O'Hanlon, supra note 10, at 55.
166. See Barry Bearak, Uncertain Toll in the Fog of War: Civilian Deaths in
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at Al (describing the difficulty in assessing the
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campaign, such as cluster bombs, readily be used in the pursuit of
individual criminals without serious risk to civilians.'67 There are,
therefore, reasons to be concerned over the seemingly incipient
legalization of the use of interstate force in response to individual or
non-state actor attacks.
C. Paradigm Shifts, Fits, and Misfits
Warlike behavior by non-state actors is a threat to international
peace and security that was not contemplated by the drafters of the
Charter. Nor was the Charter intended to cover the privatization of
violence within international networks that may run outside of the
control of states. It is for this reason that the need to categorize the
September 11 attacks as either armed attacks or criminal attacks is an
awkward-albeit for the moment seemingly inevitable-exercise.
This awkwardness may reveal the inadequacy of the architecture of
public international law. 6 ' It also exposes the somewhat unregulated
position of non-state actors.
169
number of civilians killed during air raids); see also Pamela Constable & Bradley Graham,
Afghan Officials Decry U.S. Airstrike, WASH. POST, July 2, 2002, at Al (reporting a
mistaken U.S. military assault on several villages on July 2, 2002, that killed forty
civilians); James Dao, G.l.s Mistakenly Attack Friendly Afghan Soldiers, Killing 3, N.Y.
TIMES, June 1, 2002, at A4 (reporting that American special forces troops mistakenly fired
on a group of friendly Afghan soldiers thought to be al-Qaeda fighters, killing three and
wounding two); Carlotta Gall, Released Afghans Tell of Beatings, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2002, at Al (reporting deaths and beatings of prisoners inflicted by Americans following a
raid thought to be on Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters but actually taking place against
supporters of the transitional Afghan government); Doug Struck, Casualties of U.S.
Miscalculations, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al (reporting that as the United States
continues to hunt for the "enemy ... Americans do not really know [at whom] they are
aiming").
167. The United States has used cluster bombs in its campaign in Afghanistan. See
Radio Warns Afghans Over Food Parcels, BBC NEWS (Oct. 28, 2001), at http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media-reports/1624787.stm (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
168. Not all observers and scholars agree on the inadequacy of the architecture of
public international law:
While today's terrorist organizations could be taken as the ultimate threat by
nonstate entities against the fundamental organizing system of territorial states,
there are no grounds for concluding that the state-based system cannot meet the
challenge. Consequently, one should not presume that the system established by
the UN Charter is incapable of dealing with this problem.
Charney, supra note 13, at 838.
169. Non-state actors are not entirely unregulated by international law, but they are
weakly regulated. See, e.g., DAMROSCH ET AL., supra note 7, at 385, 421 (discussing
international law's limited regulation of non-governmental organizations and
transnational corporations). But the fact that the Security Council acted against al-Qaeda
suggests that the institutions created by the interstate U.N. Charter system are in fact
capable of acting against non-state actors. Examining non-state actors as subjects of
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The events of September 11 tore open a regulatory gap in
international law. The question is whether the use of force paradigm,
the criminal law paradigm, or both should regulate this gap. The
reality is that the use of force paradigm is prevailing. International
law may be changing such that Security Council authorization can
impliedly be read, that state responsibility for non-state actors
increased, that a right of self-defense to terrorist acts can be squeezed
out of the Charter, and that self-defense might substantiate
preemptive lethal force. These changes may carry with them
consequences for legalism in international relations and rule of law in
the world-order. These consequences are positive in the short-term
sense that the al-Qaeda leadership is being crushed by armed force,
but negative in the long-term sense that it may become difficult to
control the number of states using such force, the amplitude of the
force that is used, and the objects of the use of that force.
The fact that the strikes may clash with traditional precepts of
public international law, and that public international law quickly
may be changing as a result of the strikes, may increase the challenge
of constructing antiterrorism norms among individuals in places
where such norms need to be constructed. Prosecuting alleged
terrorists might be a more viable method to construct long-term anti-
terrorism norms than launching armed attacks against states
(particularly failed states) that harbor terrorists, especially when the
launching of such attacks is becoming unencumbered from important
scaffolding hitherto provided by international law. There is evidence
that, although the military intervention decimated the apex of the al-
Qaeda network, "it might have complicated counterterrorism efforts
by dispersing potential attackers across a wider geographic area."'170
international law occupies an important place in international environmental law
scholarship. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime, in
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 95, 114-15 (Urs
Luterbacher & Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001) ("While traditionalist views of international
law rarely acknowledge nonstate actors-and the dominant approaches to international
relations are similarly state-centric-the rising empirical importance of nonstate actors
within international environmental cooperation has brought about greater theoretical
attention to their impact and power vis-A-vis states."). For the most part, non-state actors
undertake a constructive part in international law and policymaking. For example, non-
state actors, such as epistemic communities and non-governmental organizations, have
played a key role in international environmental governance.
170. Qaeda's New Links Increase Threats From Far-Flung Sites, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2002, at Al (reporting conclusions from classified investigations by the FBI and CIA of
the al-Qaeda threat, in particular that "the war in Afghanistan failed to diminish the threat
to the United States"). "A group of midlevel operatives has assumed a more prominent
role in Al Qaeda and is working in tandem with Middle Eastern extremists across the
Islamic world, senior government officials say." Id.; see also Rod Nordland et al., How Al
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Although such evidence is, by its very nature, speculative and
incorporates significant second-guessing, it suggests that there are
definite limits to the role of armed force in vanquishing the terrorist
threat. The tragic fact that terrorist acts have since proliferated in the
Philippines, Indonesia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Russia, and Yemen may
delineate these limits quite starkly.
On a broader note, calling an act an "armed attack" confers a
legitimacy that calling an act a "crime" does not convey.
Furthermore, language that labels the September 11 tragedy an act of
war'71 tends to justify extremists' notions that the attacks were part of
some sort of holy mission or just war. Rather, the perpetrators of the
attacks are outlaws and criminals, not warriors. Professor Howard
puts it well: "To declare war on terrorists or, even more illiterately,
on terrorism is at once to accord terrorists a status and dignity that
they seek and that they do not deserve." '172 Cloaking the fight against
terrorism in the language of criminal justice may make it easier to
continue to enlist the active support of coalition partners in the mid-
to long-term, whereas such partners may be reluctant to wage war
indeterminately and in perpetuity.'73 Also, if the United States is
embroiled in a war with al-Qaeda, then U.S. military installations and
personnel could be legitimate targets for al-Qaeda (even if resulting
in "collateral damage" to civilians), so long as lawful methods of
warfare were used. These kinds of attacks could be permissible,
instead of subject to criminalization.
Qaeda Slipped Away, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 19, 2002, at 34, 35 (reporting on the escape of
1000 al-Qaeda operatives from Afghanistan and suggesting that al-Qaeda is developing a
horizontal structure that is "no less deadly and even more difficult to combat"). This
information may support the necessary precondition to the use of force in self-defense,
although this does not mean that the ongoing use of such force is the most effective way to
deal with these threats.
171. See, e.g., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States
Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 37 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOc. 1347,
1347 (Sept. 20, 2001) ("On September 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war
against our country."); Elaine Sciolino, Long Battle Seen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at
Al (quoting President Bush as stating, "We're at war. There's been an act of war declared
upon America by terrorists ...."); Pellet, supra note 64 (discussing the politically
legitimate, but legally false, slogan, "We are at war"). One observer describes the use of
the term "war" by the President and the U.S. administration as a "misnomer." See
Cassese, supra note 16, at 993.
172. Michael Howard, What's in a Name? How to Fight Terrorism, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan.-Feb. 2002, at 8, 8.
173. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Tougher Than Terror, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 28,
2002, at 22 (arguing that strong international relations and a stable crininal justice system
are the best weapons in the fight against terrorism).
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Furthermore, treating the detainees as accused. criminals entitled
to internationally accepted standards of due process obviates the
need for the heated, distracting, and time-consuming discussion of
whether the detainees are prisoners of war or, as the United States
characterizes them, "unlawful combatants." '174 If the U.S./U.K.
position is that the military intervention in Afghanistan is a necessary
response to armed attacks, then it would follow that many Afghans
captured in Afghanistan readily could be classified as legal
combatants or prisoners of war. 75 If so classified, these individuals
would be entitled to the substantive protections of the Geneva
Conventions on the Law of War.'76 These entitle such individuals to,
inter alia, the right to be free from forcible transfer from occupied
territory regardless of motive, the right for those accused of offenses
to be detained in occupied territory, and the right to procedural due
process protections at any trial. A failure to respect these rights can
constitute a violation of the law of war.'77 It is unclear whether the
United States can logically maintain that this is an armed conflict for
the purposes of justifying the strikes, but then back away from the
consequences of that position (namely that those captured be entitled
to the protections of prisoners of war or, at least, a determination by
an impartial tribunal of their status as prisoners of war, prior to which
they are to be treated as prisoners of war) when the United States
seeks to prosecute captured individuals. In fact, international law
experts, such as Justice Richard Goldstone, view the category
"unlawful combatants" as unrecognized by international law.'
Recognition of this category may increase ambiguity within the law of
armed conflict. "Hard cases," such as September 11, may make "bad
law;" in any event, legalism is weakened.
II. AVENUES FOR PROSECUTION
U.S. authorities have arrested hundreds of individuals, mostly
immigrants, present in the United States.179 Some of these individuals
174. See sources cited supra note 24 (discussing prisoners of war and the Geneva
Conventions).
175. See sources cited supra note 24.
176. See sources cited supra note 24.
177. See sources cited supra note 24.
178. Clare Dyer, "PoWs or Common Criminals, They're Entitled to Protection,"
GUARDIAN (Manchester) (Jan. 30, 2002), at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/story/0,3605,
641436,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The term "unlawful
combatant" does not appear in the Geneva Conventions.
179. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Announces a Crackdown on Visa Violators, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2001, at Al (reporting that the Justice Department has detained over 1,000 people
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have since been deported or released, yet some remain in custody. 180
Also, hundreds of alleged Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters have been
captured in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 8' at times by bounty
hunters. 8 ' At the time this Article went to press, five hundred sixty-
four fighters were being held at Guant~inamo Bay.183 Suspected
terrorists also have been detained in over seventy other countries,
including throughout Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East.1" A
total of 2700 known or suspected al-Qaeda operatives have been
since the September 11 attacks); Neil A. Lewis & Don van Natta, Jr., Ashcroft Offers
Accounting of 641 Charged or Held, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at Al (citing
approximately 600 people in custody in the United States whose identities are withheld).
The exact number of arrests are unclear. See Neil A. Lewis, Judge Orders U.S. To Release
Names of 9/11 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2002, at Al. On August 2, 2002, a federal
judge ruled that the U.S. government had no right to conceal the identities of these
individuals. Id. This order was subsequently stayed in light of an appeal filed by the U.S.
government. Judge Stays Order on Identifying Detainees, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 2002, at
A5. At the time of the order, it was reported that 1,200 people had been "picked up"
since September 11, a number higher than previous estimates. Id.
180. Press reports indicate that, as of June 13, 2002, seventy-four individuals remained
in custody. See Lewis, supra note 179. On August 26, 2002, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the press and public must be allowed to witness deportation hearings
for suspects detained in relation to the September 11 attacks; previously these hearings
had been ordered closed by the Department of Justice. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,
303 F.3d 681, 683, 711 (6th Cir. 2002). On October 8, 2002, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that such hearings could lawfully be closed. Adam Liptak & Robert Hanley,
Appeals Court Upholds Secret Hearings on Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,2002, at Al.
181. See David Johnston & James Risen, U.S. Seeks a DNA Database of All Captives in
Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at Al. Pakistan alone has picked up
approximately 400 suspected fighters, 300 of whom have been turned over to U.S.
authorities. Dexter Filkins, Pakistan Holds Terror Suspects; Cites U.S. Ties, N.Y. TIMES,
June 13,2002, at Al.
182. Gutman et al., supra note 11, at 36.
183. Id. at 35.
184. See Al Qaeda Is Still a Threat, C.IA. Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2002), at
http://www.nytimes.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Raymond Bonner,
Singapore Announces Arrest of 21 Terror Suspects Linked to Planned Attacks on U.S.
Targets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A17; Frank Bruni, 15 Suspected Qaeda Members
Are Being Held by Italian Police, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2002, at A12; Steven Erlanger,
Germans Say Figure Linked To Sept. 11 is in Syrian Jail, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at A8;
Germany Arrests Suspect Linked to Sept. 17 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2001), at
http://www.nytimes.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Tim Golden,
Spain Arrests 3 Suspects; Tapes of U.S. Sites Seized, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at A14; Neil
MacFarquhar, Saudi Arabia Arrests 13 Men Tied to Attack on a U.S. Base, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 2002, at A8; Spain Arrests Suspected al-Qaida Financial Chief, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto) (Apr. 14, 2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); David Stout, Spain Pledges Support to U.S. on Terrorism,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at A4, available at LEXIS, News Library, News
Group File; Robin Toner, Civil Liberty vs. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at Al.
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detained or arrested world-wide.185 Eventually, these individuals will
have to face some sort of judicial procedure. Assuming that
uncaptured al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, such as bin Laden and
Mullah Omar, are alive and eventually are captured, they, too, may
face proceedings, although there is some indication that they simply
may be destroyed.'86 But, even if bin Laden and Taliban leaders are
not put on trial, a growing number of senior members of al-Qaeda
have been detained. 87
Thorny questions thus arise as to how to prosecute alleged
terrorists. Complexities are increased by virtue of the fact that there
is no precisely agreed upon international definition of terrorism as a
185. See Risen & Filkins, supra note 74.
186. Early on in the conflict, Prime Minister Blair stated that putting bin Laden on trial
was a "bit of an academic question," given that his death in a bombing raid or special
forces assault on his hideout would be the most likely outcome. Blair: bin Laden Trial
"Unlikely," CNN NEWS (Oct. 25, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/2001WORLD/europe/10/
25/ret.blair.interview/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also
Bob Woodward, CIA Told to Do "Whatever Necessary" to Kill bin Laden, WASH. POST,
Oct. 20, 2001, at Al (reporting that President Bush has signed an intelligence order
directing the CIA to destroy Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda network). Mohammed
Atef, a key lieutenant to Osama bin Laden who ran the training camps, was killed in a
U.S. airstrike. James Risen, Bin Laden Aide Reported Killed by U.S. Bombs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2001, at Al. So, too, was Ayman al-Zawahiri, a top aide to bin Laden who is
reputed to have been the mastermind behind the September 11 attacks. See John Kifner
& Tim Weiner, An Anti-Taliban Commander Says bin Laden's Top Aide is Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at B3. Other al-Qaeda leaders also are reported to have been killed.
See James Risen, Bombs Have Killed 3 Qaeda Leaders, U.S. Now Believes, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2001, at Al. But cf Elisabeth Bumiller, Military Tribunals Needed in Difficult
Time, Bush Says, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2001, at B5 (quoting President Bush as stating that
military tribunals were needed as an option "should we ever bring one of these Al Qaeda
members in alive"); William Glaberson, U.S. Faces Tough Choices if bin Laden is
Captured, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at B5 (reporting that "Mr. Bush and other officials
have suggested that they would place Mr. bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders on trial if
they were captured alive" and that "[i]f Taliban leaders were caught, they, too, could be
tried, on charges perhaps of giving support to terrorists or conspiring with them");
President Pledges Broader Battle Against Sponsors of Terrorists, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 8, 2001,
at 13 (quoting President Bush that the purpose of the strikes was to bring the terrorists to
justice).
187. See Kathy Gannon, Karzai Promises to Find, Arrest Omar, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Jan. 7, 2002, at A12 (reporting that Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, the former
Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, had been captured); High-Ranking Taliban in Custody,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Jan. 6, 2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting the capture of Ibn AI-Shaykh al-Libi, who ran
some of bin Laden's training camps); John Ibbitson, Al-Qaeda Official Could Hold the
Key, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 3, 2002, at A9 (reporting the capture of Abu
Zubaydah, al-Qaeda's chief of operations); David Johnston & David Rohde, Terrorism
Suspect Taken to U.S. Base for Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at Al (reporting
the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh)
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crime. 8 8  Stricto sensu, this means that terrorism per se cannot be
found to constitute an international crime.'89  Nonetheless,
international and national criminal law symbiotically-and
collaterally in conjunction with civil remedies and military
institutions-establish several avenues to pursue individuals
implicated (including as abettors and conspirators) in the September
11 attacks.
A. Prosecution in U.S. Courts Under Domestic U.S. Law
Under the territoriality principle, the United States has a basis
for its courts to have jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate the
September 11 attacks. The domestic statutory regime contains an
array of anti-terrorism legislation.90 If the accused are located in
foreign countries, then they could be extradited to face trial in the
United States. As a general rule, there is no right to extradition in the
absence of an extradition treaty. 9'
B. Prosecution in Foreign National Courts
Foreign officials may investigate and prosecute individuals within
their jurisdictions who engaged in the planning, organizing, or
abetting of the September 11 attacks. Afghans in particular may have
an interest in prosecuting terrorists-as well as the Taliban for a
broad array of non-terrorist crimes-in Afghanistan itself. These are
the kind of trials that may play an important role in nation-building in
188. See, e.g., Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Edwards, J., concurring) (determining that there is no agreement on the definition of
terrorism as an international crime under customary international law and, thus, as an
offense it does not attract universal jurisdiction); Cassese, supra note 16, at 994 (discussing
the possibility that terrorism may come to be defined as crimes against humanity); William
C. Smith, Legal Arsenal, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2001, at 43, 44 ("[T]he international community
has yet to settle on a single definition of 'terrorists' or 'terrorism' .... "). When some
states proposed that terrorism be considered as one of the international crimes to be
subjected to the jurisdiction of the ICC, many states (including the United States) opposed
this proposal. See id. There is, however, some indication that state practice recently is
moving toward some agreement on the general definition of international terrorism.
Salvatore Zappala, Do Heads of State in Office Enjoy Immunity from Jurisdiction for
International Crimes? The Ghaddafi Case Before the French Cour de Cassation, 12 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 595, 608 (2001).
189. Schrijver, supra note 49, at 288.
190. See, e.g., Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-519, sec. 132, 104 Stat. 2240,
2250 (1990) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339C (2000)) (setting forth a
cause of action for terrorist crimes, the jurisdiction, venue and limitations of such a cause
of action, and the remedies available under that action). For a discussion of subsequent
amendments, see infra note 238.
191. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933).
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Afghanistan and could proceed under the aegis of tribunals assisted
or administered by the United Nations (as is currently the case in
Kosovo and East Timor). Some interim Afghan leaders have
affirmed an intention to hold trials in Afghanistan itself.192 In fact, the
negotiations in Bonn, Germany, that preceded the establishment of
transitional rule in Afghanistan contemplated a tribunal with
jurisdiction to investigate all acts of war crimes.1 93 Such a tribunal
could form an important part of the political settlement that could
provide stable, multi-party rule for Afghanistan.
C. Prosecution in Signatory States Under International Conventions
The Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure
of Aircraft obliges all signatory states to create jurisdiction to arrest
offenders present within their territory, and then prosecute such
offenders or extradite them to a state that will prosecute based on its
own connection to the offense. 94 Similar conventions include the
1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses Committed on Board an
Aircraft,195 the 1971 Montr6al Convention for Unlawful Acts Against
Civil Aviation, 96 and the 1997 International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (which criminalizes and creates
jurisdiction for, inter alia, unlawfully and intentionally detonating an
explosive in a public place and covers those participating in the acts as
accomplices or organizers or directors).197 But, arguably, an atrocity
192. Hilary MacKenzie, War Crime Will be Punished, Afghan Assures, GAZETTE
(Montreal), Dec. 27, 2001, at BI (reporting that Abdullah Abdullah, the "public face of
Afghanistan's interim government," has assured that every warlord who committed war
crimes would be brought to justice).
193. CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 37, at 723; MacKenzie, supra note 192.
194. Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16,
1970, 21 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971) (deeming aircraft hijacking as an offense, and
applying to accomplices as well as the hijackers themselves). Both Afghanistan and the
United States are parties. List of Parties to The Hague Convention, at http://www.icao.int/
icao/en/leb/Hague.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
195. Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 2946, 704 U.N.T.S. 219, 228. Both Afghanistan and the
United States are parties. List of Parties to the Tokyo Convention, at http://www.icao.int/
icao/en/leb/Tokyo.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
196. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177. Both the United States and
Afghanistan (with a reservation) are parties. List of Parties to the Montreal Convention,
at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/LEB/Mtl71.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
197. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Bombings, G.A. Res.
165, U.N. GAOR, 52 Sess., Supp. No. 7, at 389, U.N. Doc. A/52/164 (1997) (entered into
2002]
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in which a hijacked aircraft is used as a lethal weapon resulting in the
deaths of thousands of persons exceeds the scope of these
hijacking/air offenses conventions.
D. Prosecution in U.S. Military Commissions
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a military order
enabling the establishment of military commissions to try non-U.S.
citizens accused of terrorism or war crimes.'98 The President
determines who is an accused terrorist and therefore subject to trial
by the commission.199 Once an individual becomes subject to the
military commission, the commission will have exclusive jurisdiction
with respect to offenses by that individual.2 0 Following Presidential
direction, non-citizens can be detained indefinitely pending trial.
Accused terrorists could include members of al-Qaeda, those
suspected of engaging in acts of international terrorism (including
aiding or abetting), or those who have knowingly harbored a
terrorist.2 1 Moreover, prisoners could be brought before the military
commissions without specific evidence that they engaged in war
crimes, so long as there is proof that they are senior members in an al-
Qaeda unit.202 The death penalty is a possible sentence.2 3
force on May 23, 2001). The United States has signed this treaty. The Senate gave its
Advice and Consent on December 5, 2001, subject to the reservations and understandings
proposed by the executive branch. 147 CONG. REC. S12464 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 2001). The
United States became a party on June 26, 2002. List of Parties to the New York
Convention, at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/Status/Chapter -xviii/treaty9.asp (last
visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Afghanistan is not a
party. See id.
198. See Presidential Order, supra note 5, § l(e). Creating a military commission is an
unusual, although not unprecedented, act for a President. In 1942, for example, President
Roosevelt created a military commission to try eight German saboteurs who had secretly
landed in the United States with the goal of spreading terror domestically. After trial by
this military commission, six of the saboteurs were executed. The U.S. Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the military commission procedure as well as the President's
constitutional authority to establish it. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942).
However, an earlier U.S. Supreme Court ruling had held that military trials for civilians
are barred if access to civilian courts is available. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
2, 127 (1866).
199. Presidential Order, supra note 5, § 2.
200. Id. § 7(b)(1).
201. Id. § 2.
202. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. is Seeking Basis to Charge War Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2002, at Al.
203. Presidential Order, supra note 5, § 4(a); Rules, supra note 19, § 6(G).
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Rules detailing the operation of the commissions were issued in
March 2002.214 The commissions largely would be open to the public
and defendants could hear the evidence against them. 25  The
commissions could operate extraterritorially and do not provide
appeal rights to a court (even for a decision to execute) but to
another military panel, to which civilians temporarily can be
appointed as military officers.20 6 Moreover, appeal panels are to
"disregard any variance from procedures specified ... that would not
materially have affected the outcome.
27
Judges and prosecutors are to be U.S. military officers, reporting
to the President as Commander in Chief. Judges would operate as
triers of both fact and law.208 The Rules stipulate that defendants are
to be presumed innocent and that guilt must be established beyond a
reasonable doubt.209 The commissions do not require adherence to
rules of evidence generally used in the United States. 210  The
Presidential Order states that "it is not practicable to apply ... the
principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases .... ,211 An affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
204. See Rules, supra note 19. In the event of a conflict between the Rules and the
Presidential Order, the Presidential Order governs. Id. § 7(B).
205. This would not be the case if opening the commissions to the public would
disclose classified information or if the discussion could endanger national security. Rules,
supra note 19, § 6(B)(3); see also Mintz, supra note 21 (reviewing the rules for the military
tribunals).
206. Neil A. Lewis, Rules on Tribunal Require Unanimity on Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at Al; see also Presidential Order, supra note 5, § 7(b)(2) (denying
the privilege to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to
have any such remedy or proceeding sought on an individual's behalf in any court of the
United States or any State thereof, any foreign court, or any international tribunal). The
final say, in terms of approving any verdict or sentence, is the President's. It is also
unclear whether a habeas corpus petition may be requested in favor of a non-citizen within
the jurisdiction of the commissions, particularly if the commissions are located outside of
the United States. See Presidential Order, supra note 5, § 7(b)(2). A habeas corpus
petition entitles an individual access to a court in order to demand that the government
either justify the detention or free that individual.
207. Rules, supra note 19, § 6(H)(4).
208. Presidential Order, supra note 5, § 4(c)(2); Rules, supra note 19, § 4(A)(3).
209. Rules, supra note 19, §§ 5(A), 6(D)(1).
210. Evidence is to be admitted if "in the opinion of the presiding officer of the military
commission [it would] have probative value to a reasonable person." Presidential Order,
supra note 5, § 4(c)(3); Rules, supra note 19, § 6(D)(1). Hearsay and evidence that a
civilian court may deem illegally obtained could therefore be admissible. Moreover,
defendants could be barred on national security grounds from seeing the evidence
proffered against them. It must be noted that many U.S. evidentiary and constitutional
rules that protect defendants (for example, those regarding hearsay, trial by jury, double
jeopardy, and search-and-seizure protections) are not found in international criminal
process.
211. Presidential Order, supra note 5, § 1(f).
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commission members is required for conviction and sentence,
although a unanimous verdict will be required to impose a death
penalty.212  Defendants would have military defense lawyers
appointed at government expense, but would be able to hire civilian
defense lawyers at their own expense.213
In the end, the commissions have a lower due process standard
than the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"),21 4 which
governs the rules of court-martial, insofar as the UCMJ requires a
three-fourths majority for any sentence exceeding ten years, abides by
civil court evidentiary rules, permits an accused a say in the
composition of the panel of judges, is reviewable by a civilian court
and, ultimately, by the United States Supreme Court, and permits a
more generous standard of appellate review.215
Although these commissions appear to be supported by the
American public, they have engendered some criticism.216 Critics
have questioned the President's authority to authorize the
commissions,"' and some have legally challenged this authority, albeit
without success.218 International lawyers also have been critical,
212. Id. § 4(c)(6); Rules, supra note 19, § 6(F).
213. Rules, supra note 19, § 4(C)(3); Lewis, supra note 202.
214. Laura A. Dickinson, Military Commissions, International Tribunals, and the Rule
of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 8-9, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
215. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-946 (2000). The Uniform
Code of Military Justice, Military Rules of Evidence, and the Rules for Courts-Martial are
available at http://www.jag.navy.mil (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
216. George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1-14, 2002, at
26; George Lardner, Jr., On Left and Right, Concern Over Anti-Terrorism Moves, WASH.
POST, Nov. 16, 2001, at A40; Jerry Seper, Leahy Challenges Bush on Military Tribunals,
WASH. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
217. See News Tip: Military Tribunals Lack International Credibility of Other Options,
Duke U. News Service (Nov. 14, 2001), at http://www.dukenews.duke.edu/law/lawtip.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (citing Professor Scott Silliman, who
questions the President's ability to proceed without Congress's amending existing
legislation given that the September 11 attacks may not have constituted a violation of the
laws of war as they may not have been undertaken as part of an armed attack or conflict);
see also Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1266-67 (2002) (arguing that the military tribunals
jeopardize the separation of powers and constitutionally protected rights).
218. See Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Ability of Detainees in Cuba to Obtain Federal Habeas Corpus Review, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
481, 481 (2002); William Glaberson, Groups Gird for Long Legal Fight on New Bush Anti-
Terror Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at Al; John Ibbitson, Prison Camp Faces
Rights Challenge, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 22, 2002, at Al; see also Rasul v. Bush,
215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (considering habeas petition as a challenge to unlawful
custody of aliens at Guant~namo Bay). Rasul held that aliens outside the sovereign
territory of the United States do not have rights to access U.S. courts to enforce the U.S.
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particularly on the issue of whether the planned operation of the
commissions would comply with international humanitarian law and
international human rights law. 19 Some international lawyers have
pointed out that a military commission cannot prosecute war crimes
unless the September 11 attacks can be shown to be armed attacks,
sufficiently similar to armed attacks, or committed in connection with
armed attacks such that an armed conflict existed at that time.220
Professor Sadat remarks: "To charge an individual with war crimes,
the existence of an armed conflict.., must be established. Moreover,
the armed conflict has to exist at the time the crime is committed, not
after the fact. '22' Although an international armed conflict between
the United States and Afghanistan unequivocally was initiated on
Constitution. Id. at 65, 72. Rasul also held that Guantinamo fell outside the sovereign
territory of the United States. Id. at 72. The court also noted that although Guantinamo
detainees do have international rights, the way to enforce these would be through
diplomatic channels. Id. at 56-57.
219. See supra notes 24-25 (describing international humanitarian law and
international human rights law). On February 25, 2002, a request for precautionary
measures was filed against the United States with the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights claiming violations of international human rights law on the part of the
United States related to the treatment of detainees. Letter from Juan E. Mdndez,
President, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, to Organization of American
States (Mar. 13, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The Commission
decided to ask the U.S. government to take necessary urgent precautionary measures to
have the legal status of the detainees at Guant~namo Bay determined by a competent
tribunal. Id. The United States' response has been negative. See Dodds, supra note 21
(reporting that the United States has asked the Commission to rescind its request,
claiming that the commission has no jurisdiction in the case and lacks standing to apply
international humanitarian law).
220. See, e.g., E-mail from Jordan Paust, Law Foundation Professor, University of
Houston, to Mark A. Drumbl, Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University
School of Law (Dec. 31, 2001, 15:45:34 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (arguing that the attacks were acts of terrorism and not acts of war); E-mail from
Leila Sadat, Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis School of Law, to Mark
A. Drumbl, Assistant Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law
(Dec. 31, 2001, 17:44:37 EST) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Sadat E-mail] (explaining that bin Laden was not a leader of state and no ongoing war
existed until President Bush declared one). "The concepts of 'attack' and 'armed conflict'
are distinct and independent." Gu~nael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the
Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 237, 245 (2002). That the creation of the military
commissions proceeded in isolation of many international law considerations reflects a
troubling disconnect between international law, on the one hand, and national law and
domestic policy, on the other. International law and national law ought to be
sedimentarily integrated, not separately compartmentalized in parallel universes.
221. Sadat E-mail, supra note 220.
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October 7, for reasons discussed in Part I, some observers question
whether an armed conflict existed prior to that point.2
E. Prosecution as a Crime Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity are defined by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court as including murder or inhumane acts of
a similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or to mental or physical health, when "committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population with knowledge of the attack. 22  The Rome Statute
further defines "attack directed against any civilian population" as "a
course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts ...
pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to
commit such attack. '224 Thus the requirement of a state connection is
not absolute, so long as an "organizational policy" can be established
(it can safely be assumed that al-Qaeda-an avowedly political and
somewhat structured entity-has an "organizational policy"). 225
Moreover, the non-isolated nature of the September 11 attacks on
New York and Washington can be established by linking together a
number of terrorist acts in which al-Qaeda has been directly or
indirectly implicated, including bombings in 1993 of the World Trade
Center, in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996, of U.S. embassies in Africa
in 1998, and the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000.226
Alternately, the widespread nature of the attack can be determined
from the number-the "multiplicity"-of victims. 227 The fact that the
222. Id. The subsequent existence of an armed conflict cannot be used retroactively to
create a war crime. The Security Council has not categorized the September 11 attacks as
war crimes.
223. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7. Although the ICC cannot have jurisdiction
over the attacks, the language of the Rome Statute represents a harmonized,
comprehensive, and current treatment of procedural and substantive international
criminal law generally. Panel, The International Criminal Court: Contemporary
Perspectives and Prospects for Ratification, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 505, 511 (2000)
(citing comments by Dr. Roy Lee).
224. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 7(2)(a).
225. See Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes, Report of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Criminal Court, 2000 U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for the
Int'l Crim. Ct., at 9, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 ("The acts need not constitute a
military attack. It is understood that 'policy to commit such attack' requires that the State
or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian
population.").
226. See Diana Elias, Bin Laden Group Tape Claims Cole Attack, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, June 20, 2001, at 7A; supra note 95 and accompanying text; infra note 300.
227. Mettraux, supra note 220, at 260.
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overwhelming majority of the victims were civilians corresponds with
the intended scope of crimes against humanity.
Recent decisions by the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") have reaffirmed that crimes
against humanity can be disconnected from armed conflicts, allowing
crimes against humanity to be prosecuted outside of an armed
conflict, particularly an international armed conflict.228 In other
words, crimes against humanity can occur during peacetime. Given
the absence of certainty that the September 11 attacks constitute
armed attacks, the fact that crimes against humanity can be
committed outside of armed conflict is relevant to the prosecution of
those attacks.229
If this atrocity is a crime against humanity,23 ° the jurisdiction to
prosecute offenders may be universal, although some offenders, for
example Heads of State or senior Ministers, might be covered by
228. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 1 141 (Int'l Crim Trib. for Former
Yugoslavia App. Chamber Oct. 2, 1995), at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-
e/51002.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("It is by now a settled rule of
customary international law that crimes against humanity do not require a connection to
international armed conflict. Indeed ... customary international law may not require a
connection between crimes against humanity and any conflict at all."); see also Mettraux,
supra note 220, at 246 (noting that military operations carried out against civilian
populations during peacetime may constitute crimes against humanity); Duffy, supra note
52, at 31 ("While crimes against humanity originated as an extension of war crimes, the
idea that such crimes can only be committed in times of war has been unequivocally
rejected through developments since Nuremberg.").
229. This absence of certainty could present an obstacle to prosecuting the attacks as
war crimes or as the crime of aggression. Although still undefined, the crime of aggression
basically involves the use of armed force by a state against another state in a manner
inconsistent with the Charter. But if aggression eventually can be extended to non-state
actors or implied to failed states, this might comfortably capture al-Qaeda's conduct.
However, the international community is as of yet unable to agree upon a definition of the
crime of aggression in the context of interstate conduct, so contemplating its possible
expansion to non-state actors or failed states is at best highly speculative.
230. The United States and Russian Federation have asserted that the attacks
constitute a crime against humanity. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, The
White House, Joint Statement on Counterterrorism by the President of the United States
and the President of Russia (Oct. 21, 2001), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/10/20011022-11.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Others who
have defined the attacks as crimes against humanity include U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan and U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson. See Cassese,
supra note 16, at 994; Schrijver, supra note 49, at 289. So, too, has the Sixth Committee
(Legal) of the United Nations. See Summaries of the Work of the Sixth Committee, 56th
Sess., Agenda Item 164 (Nov. 2001), at http://www.un.org/law/cod/sixth/56/summary.htm
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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immunities."' If jurisdiction is universal and charges cannot be
opposed by claims of immunity, then, in theory, any country can
prosecute or must extradite the accused to a country connected to the
offense that will prosecute. Accordingly, trials for crimes against
humanity could take place at the national level in national courts232 or
through specially structured transnational courts (as was the case for
the Lockerbie incident).233
International institutions also are possible fora. Given that the
International Criminal Court ("ICC") , which came into existence on
July 1, 2002, only has prospective jurisdiction, no permanent
international institution is available to prosecute these offenders for
crimes against humanity. Possible fora thus include: (1) a new ad hoc
international tribunal or adjudicatory body; (2) a tribunal previously
created by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N.
Charter (i.e., for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") or Rwanda
("ICTR")) if the mandate of one of these pre-existing tribunals is
expanded; (3) special institutions negotiated between the United
Nations and the afflicted country (as is the case for Sierra Leone and,
prior to abandonment by the United Nations, was intended for
Cambodia); (4) U.N.-administered tribunals operating at the national
level (for example, in East Timor and Kosovo); or (5) international
military commissions established by the United States and allies.
234
F. Prosecuting the Financiers of the Al-Qaeda Network
There is evidence that al-Qaeda's financing is global in origin and
proceeds in part through traditional, undocumented banking practices
known as hawala.235 Prosecuting financiers and launderers can be
231. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v.
Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121, at 18 (Feb. 14) (holding that international law recognizes "full"
immunity for sitting Ministers of Foreign Affairs from prosecution for war crimes and
crimes against humanity through the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts).
232. The United States unequivocally would have jurisdiction to prosecute and
adjudicate crimes against humanity that occur within its own borders. Note that Zacarias
Moussaoui, currently facing trial in federal court regarding the September 11 attacks, is
not charged with crimes against humanity. See David Johnston & Philip Shenon, Man
Held Since August Is Charged With a Role in Sept. 11 Terror Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2001, at Al.
233. For more discussion on the legal response to the Lockerbie incident, see infra
notes 243-45 and accompanying text.
234. For discussion of an international military commission, see Dickinson, supra note
214 (manuscript at 57).
235. See Douglas Frantz, Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 3, 2001, at B5 (describing hawala as a method to transfer money without its actually
crossing borders or moving through electronic transfer systems).
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conjoined with whichever of the methods is chosen to prosecute the
terrorists. The International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism, concluded in 1999, requires signatories to
prosecute those who finance terrorist activity.2 36 This treaty entered
into force several months after the attacks (and largely as a result of
the attacks). The Bush Administrationhas implemented measures to
freeze U.S. assets held by suspected terrorist groups and to prohibit
transactions with groups linked to terrorism.237
G. Civil Suits Against Terrorist Networks or Governments That
Condone Them
A variety of legislation permits individuals, whether U.S. citizens
or not, access to U.S. courts to file damages claims for violations of
international law, including those occasioned by terrorist acts. These
claims may be filed against foreign individuals, possibly against non-
state actors and, in some cases, governments.2 38 This is not a trivial
236. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, U.N.
GAOR 6th Comm., 54th Sess., Agenda Item 160, at 408, U.N. Doc. A/54IPV.76 (1999).
The United States signed this Convention on January 10, 2000. 2000 Multilateral Treaties
Deposited With the Secretary General 132, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/19. The Senate
gave its advice and consent on December 5, 2001, subject to the reservations and
understandings proposed by the executive branch. 147 CONG. REC. S12464 (daily ed.
Dec. 5, 2001). The United States became a party on June 26, 2002. International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, at http://untreaty.un.org/
ENGLISH/Status/Chapterxviii/treatyll.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). Afghanistan is not a party: See id.
237. See David E. Sanger & Joseph Kahn, Banks "On Notice," N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,
2001, at Al. These measures have met with some success. See Jeff Gerth & Judith Miller,
U.S. Makes Inroads in Isolating Funds of Terror Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2001, at Al
(reporting on discussions undertaken with the United Arab Emirates). The Bush
Administration also threatened foreign banks with sanctions if they fail to seize assets of
suspected groups. Id.
238. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
sec. 221(a), 110 Stat. 1214, 1241-43 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2000)) and Flatow
Amendment (U.S. courts may exercise jurisdiction, including for punitive damages for
personal injury or death to a U.S. national from an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, or hostage-taking perpetrated directly.by a foreign state designated by
the United States or by a non-state actor receiving material support or resources from that
foreign state); Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (granting jurisdiction in the
federal courts to aliens who allege a tort violative of the law of nations); Torture Victim
Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, § 2, 106 Stat. 73, 73 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 note (2000)) (providing that "[ajn individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation ... subjects an individual to torture shall,
in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual"). Some civil claims have been
filed. See Mark Hamblett, Bin Laden Named in Suit, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 22, 2001, at A4
(reporting on a lawsuit filed in federal court by the widow of a victim against Osama bin
Laden, Afghanistan, and the Taliban leadership); $116 Trillion Lawsuit Filed by 9/11
Families, CNN NEWS (Aug. 16, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/15/attacks.suit
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exercise; damage awards can bankrupt organizations, provide victims
some reparation, and prompt symbolic justice. However,
jurisdictional problems abound; so, too, do obstacles to the
enforcement of judgments. In the case of al-Qaeda and other
terrorist networks, defendants must be brought within the jurisdiction
(at least for the service of process). Jurisdictional problems would be
overcome were the defendants already to be in the United States for
purposes of a criminal trial.239 It is unclear whether detention at
Guantfinamo Bay, Cuba meets these jurisdictional requirements.
Difficulties regarding the execution of judgments could be mitigated
if assets are frozen on an expedited basis. To some extent, Osama bin
Laden is a deep pocket.2 40 Moreover, the government of Afghanistan
might be a possible defendant, although it is unclear whether the U.S.
government would favor such lawsuits or would support lifting
Afghanistan's sovereign immunity, given the effects such lawsuits
could have on the solvability of the new Afghan government. Saudi
Arabia also might be a defendant (although the legal causality may
not be sufficiently proximate and both sovereign immunity and
comity issues arise). Following a 1996 amendment, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act does not protect a foreign sovereign
identified by the U.S. State Department as a sponsor of terrorism
from lawsuits involving terrorist behavior.24' Sudan, for example, has
been identified as such a sponsor and, as a result, loses its sovereign
immunity. In the end, these types of claims could offer some sort of
reparative or restorative justice for the families of victims of the
September 11 tragedy.242
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting a lawsuit filed by relatives of
September 11 victims against the Sudanese government and Saudi officials, banks, and
charities). It is unclear from the report whether this suit is proceeding under domestic
Antiterrorism Act or under common law of tort and/or other statutory remedies.
239. If they were being prosecuted in an international forum, then transfer
arrangements could be made.
240. Jeffrey Toobin, Suing bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Oct. 1, 2001, at 40, 40-41.
241. Ved P. Nanda, Human Rights and Sovereign and Individual Immunities (Sovereign
Immunity, Act of State, Head of State Immunity and Diplomatic Immunity)-Some
Reflections, 5 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 472 (1999). At the time of the attacks,
neither Afghanistan nor Saudi Arabia were on the annually compiled list of identified
states (comprised of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Cuba, North Korea, and Sudan). 22 C.F.R.
126.1(d) (2002).
242. Congress has created a compensation fund for victims. See Diana B. Henriques &
David Barstow, Fund for Victims' Families Already Proves Sore Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2001, at Al. In order to participate in the fund, victims waive their right to sue the airline
industry. David Barstow, U.S. May Approve More Aid for Kin of Sept. 11 Dead, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 5, 2002, at Al. It is unclear how litigation involving the terrorists, their
network, or the government of Afghanistan would interface with Congress's fund.
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III. CONSTRUCTING THE ATTACKS AS RADICAL EVIL
In the past, the United States has responded to terrible terrorist
attacks largely through the paradigm of the criminal law. For
example, in the wake of the 1988 Lockerbie terrorist attack, in which
a Pan Am flight exploded over Scotland, killing 270 individuals, the
United States did not declare "war" on Syria, Iran or Libya, all of
which (particularly Libya) were suspected of organizing or carrying
out the operation . 43  This refusal to declare "war" persisted even
though the Security Council called the impugned conduct "acts of
international terrorism" that constituted "threats to international
peace and security. '' 244 Instead, the case was treated as criminal and
the United States patiently waited to prosecute alleged offenders.
Together with the United Nations, the United States used multilateral
economic sanctions for nearly a decade to pressure Libya to extradite
the terrorist suspects to face trial before a specially constructed
Scottish court.245 Moreover, domestic federal courts were used as the
venue to convict and sentence those responsible for prior al-Qaeda
terrorist attacks.246 Also pertinent is the fact that domestic criminal
trials exclusively are used for domestic terrorists, such as Timothy
McVeigh. 47
243. An official Libyan connection was found in the verdicts (one acquittal, one
conviction) of the two individuals who were extradited to face trial for the Lockerbie
incident. The conviction was upheld on appeal. See Lockerbie Bomber Heads for UK Jail,
CNN NEWS (Mar. 14, 2002), at http://europe.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/03/14/
lockerbie/appeal/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
244. See S.C. Res 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748
(1992); S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3033d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (1992).
245. See Mark A. Drumbl, Legal Issues, in A GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE THE
56TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS 278-80 (Diana Ayton-Shenker &
John Tessitore eds., 2002); Henry Weinstein, A Trial Too Big For Us?, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
26,2001, at Al.
246. Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L.
337, 337 (2002).
247. Domestic criminal trials also are used for some U.S. citizens accused of supporting
al-Qaeda (notwithstanding that all al-Qaeda operatives are deemed to be unlawful enemy
combatants). See supra note 23 (discussing John Walker). Following the Walker guilty
plea, the chief prosecutor in the case stated that "this case proves that the criminal justice
system can be an effective tool in the fight against terrorism." Larry Margasak, Lindh
Admits Guilt to Two Charges, WASH. POST (July 15, 2002), at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/articles/A6499-2002Jul15.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
It is unclear why the effectiveness of the criminal justice system is limited to U.S.
nationals. As an aside, Richard Reid, the alleged "shoe-bomber" and a British national
with al-Qaeda connections, was brought before a federal court in the United States instead
of a military commission or extrajudicial interrogation. Reid has plead guilty. See Pam
Belluck, Shoe Bomber Plea, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2002), at http://nytimes.com (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
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In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the United States has
lurched from this pole to a different one that views the terror attacks
foremost as armed attacks, but for which domestic criminal or special
military prosecutions are to be implemented for those who are
brought back alive, thereby taking these individuals (unilaterally
determined to be "unlawful combatants") out of the protections
normally accorded to those involved in armed attacks. Moreover, the
fact that some individuals will face military justice instead of criminal
justice denies them the protections that ordinarily inhere in the
criminal justice process. Thus, these individuals have been placed in
orbit outside criminal justice, where they float about, unmoored, in
their capacity as sub-defendants. But, then, if these individuals are
acquitted by the commissions, they apparently evolve back into
combatant status so that they can remain in detention until the end of
the war on terrorism generally (and not just the war in Afghanistan).
Even further removed, in an outer orbit, are those individuals
captured and turned over to interrogators in Egypt, Pakistan, and
Syria;24 8 'or otherwise detained at heavily guarded, undisclosed
locations;249 or locked up in Afghan prisons.2 0 The end result is a
muddied self-help response that obfuscates, and even distorts,
important legal categories. There is reason to worry about the long-
term effects of this new precedent on international rule of law, peace,
and security.
This confused response is understandable since the attacks have
left us reeling. No matter how much the September 11 attacks are
intellectualized, and no matter how much they are compartmentalized
as crimes, they do feel like more than merely crimes. Frankly, one
reason they make us feel this way because we are targeted as victims.
Our victimization leaves many of these criminal law options,
particularly domestic ones, as somewhat hollow. According to
Professor Lan Cao, finding the attacks to be "just" criminal may
insufficiently assess their heinousness, or may feel wrong, or may be
248. Gutman et al., supra note 11, at 37 (reporting that such individuals then are
"questioned by local intelligence officers," who "use whatever methods are necessary to
help get the job done").
249. See, e.g., Philip Shenon & James Risen, Terrorist Yields Clues to Plots, Officials
Assert, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at Al (reporting that Abu Zubaydah, a former
lieutenant to Osama bin Laden, has been subject to 100 sessions with CIA and FBI
interrogators at a "heavily guarded, undisclosed location ... overseas").
250. See John F. Burns, Foreign Prisoners Becoming a Problem for Karzai, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2002, at A3 (reporting that from 2000 to 4000 prisoners remain locked up
in Afghanistan following the Taliban's collapse, another 1500 having died soon after
capture).
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"unsatisfactory" at a gut-level.2 1 After all, it is almost trivially true
that the attacks were criminal; they involved murder, injury,
hijacking, and property destruction. But describing them this way
literally denudes them of their true nature. And prosecuting and
punishing accused individuals under domestic criminal law almost
sanitizes their conduct as that of the ordinary, common criminal we
read about on a daily basis in the newspapers. This may be one
reason why military commissions have such popular appeal. Whether
capable of logical elucidation or not, it does seem that al-Qaeda
terrorists are somehow "different" than perpetrators of domestic
terrorism such as Timothy McVeigh.
But there is another option. This option recognizes both the
criminal as well as warlike nature of the attacks and provides a basis
for verdicts and trials to have more world-wide legitimacy than if
conducted domestically (particularly militarily). This is international
criminal law, through which the international community has elected
to criminalize acts of the ultimate despicability-veritable "radical
evil," including genocide and crimes against humanity-in a manner
that is decidedly not trivializing.
The United States solidly has stood behind this approach. For
example, following World War II, the United States pushed for an
international military tribunal when some allies urged captured Nazi
leaders summarily to be executed.252 More recently, the United
States, together with the international community, has strongly
supported the prosecution of individuals before international
tribunals for mass atrocity in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
and, in the case of Cambodia, before a hybrid tribunal.253 In Rwanda,
251. See E-mail from Lan Cao, Cabell Professor of Law, College of William & Mary,
Marshall-Wythe School of Law, to Mark A. Drumbl, Assistant Professor of Law,
Washington & Lee University School of Law (Oct. 22, 2001, 09:17:00 EST) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review).
252. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 29-32
(1992) (observing that Stalin had proposed that 50,000 German General Staff Officers
should be executed and that Churchill favored executions for a short list of the most
prominent German war criminals, but that under Truman, the United States clearly
opposed summary execution and pushed instead for a tribunal to try the German leaders).
253. The United States and other Western nations consistently have threatened to
withhold foreign aid to the FRY unless the FRY transfers indictees to the ICTY. See Alan
Freeman, UN Seeks Other War-Crime Suspects, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 30, 2001,
at A10; see also infra note 394 (discussing the United States' support for the extradition of
Milosevic). The United States also has been a supporter of mixed international and
national prosecutions for Khmer Rouge leaders; Senator John Kerry, in fact, proposed a
detailed plan of what such prosecutions should look like. See Drumbl, supra note 245, at
267-69.
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there are an estimated 800,000 victims;254 Cambodia, 1.7 million;255
and "[wiell over" 200,000 people were killed in armed conflict in the
former Yugoslavia. 6
Given these developments, prosecuting al-Qaeda operatives in
some sort of international criminal tribunal for the most serious
crimes against the world community may not be that ill-fitting at all,
nor would it trivialize the evil of the attacks. International criminal
law captures conduct that is much more than simply criminal. Thus,
the September 11 attacks may not be a matter best left entirely to
domestic criminal law or domestic military commissions. Rather, the
warlike nature of the attacks suggests that they be recognized as
being among the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole and, accordingly, be addressed at least in part
by international institutions. Moreover, nationals of eighty-one
countries perished in the attacks; although U.S. nationals were the
principal victims, the breadth of victimization may make this crime
one in the interests of all of humanity to prosecute.25 7
254. In the case of Rwanda, the international community strongly resisted the notion
that the genocide was collapsible within the armed conflict between the Rwandan
government and the Rwandese Patriotic Army. The existence of an "armed conflict"
often is proffered as a justification or explanation for the necessity or inevitability of
genocide or crimes against humanity. For example, Slobodan Milosevic has answered his
indictments by insisting that what he ordered was legal on the basis of the right to national
self-defense. See New War Charges Rejected by Milosevic, supra note 78.
255. Drumbl, supra note 75, at 241. In February 2002, the United Nations gave up its
efforts to create an international tribunal to prosecute former leaders of the Khmer Rouge
after five years of often intense negotiations with the Cambodian government, during
which the United Nations consistently pushed for an international presence and
international due process standards. See Seth Mydans, Khmer Rouge Trials Won't Be Fair,
Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2002, at A12.
256. Ian Fisher, Trial of Milosevic Will Peel Layers of Balkan Guilt, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2002, at Al.
257. Letter from John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to
Richard Ryan, President of the U.N. Security Council (Oct. 8, 2001), reprinted in United
States Officially Informs United Nations of Strikes, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at A14,
available at 2001 WL 4163856. Threats by bin Laden subsequent to September 11 also
have implicated nations other than the United States-Russia, for example-as well as the
United Nations. See Patrick E. Tyler & Elaine Sciolino, As U.N. Meets, bin Laden Tape
Sets Off Alarms, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2001, at Al. In December 2001, members of an al-
Qaeda cell were arrested in Singapore after plotting to blow up the U.S., Israeli, British,
and Australian embassies. See William K. Rashbaum, Captured Qaeda Member Gives
Details on Group's Operations, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2002, at A8. Moreover, thousands of
Muslims have been killed in terrorist violence since what is widely seen as the first modern
terrorist act by Islamic extremists, the assassination of Anwar Sadat of Egypt some twenty
years ago. See Neil MacFarquhar, Sadat's Killers are bin Laden Stalwarts, GAZETrE
(Montreal), Oct. 6, 2001, at Bi. Terrorist violence in non-Western nations following the
September 11 attacks also has been connected to al-Qaeda. See Philippines Bomb Suspect
Probed for al-Qaeda Link, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Oct. 31, 2001), at http://www.
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To be sure, there are certain apparent advantages to proceeding
through an abridged military process, for example, expediency,
control, and security. However, the military commissions may not
develop a comprehensive narrative or record of terrorist conduct and
may not expose publicly the full reprehensibility of this conduct.
Moreover, military commissions likely will be perceived as lacking in
credibility, fairness, legitimacy, and legality.25 s Military commission
verdicts may be expedient because they truncate due process and
attenuate public access. However, due process and public access help
trials become venues where competing narratives clash and are
evaluated, thereby leading to an overarching narrative. If the trial
process is viewed as credible, this overarching narrative will itself
have some legitimacy. Building such legitimacy takes time and may
pose inconveniences.
By abridging the trial process, military commissions also abridge
the creation of the discord, discussion, and debate that leads to
overarching narratives that terrorism is an unacceptable crime against
all of humanity. Moreover, military commissions could prompt an
externalization of those debates into uncontrolled political fora, such
as the Islamic media, where exhortations of injustice to Muslims and
the imperiousness of the United States may resonate, unchecked, on
the very public that must view terrorism as criminal and cancerous in
order for it to be stamped out. In the end, summarily prosecuting
hundreds of individuals through military commissions may smack of
victors' justice, have little deterrent effect, and perhaps stimulate new
generations of martyrs. Moreover, even though the U.S. government
has promulgated Rules that make the commissions seem slightly
more like courts,259 it is doubtful that these modifications will do
much, if anything, to cast off the perceptions of unfairness that attach
to the commissions. This is ironic, given that, at the same time, these
Rules eliminate the vaunted strategic advantages for which the
commissions initially were created.26°
In addition to the fact that international criminal process better
captures the evil of the attacks and provides the opportunity for
globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); see also supra notes
161-62, 226 and accompanying text (discussing the ongoing nature of al-Qaeda's violence
and reporting on terrorist attacks outside the United States against non-U.S. nationals).
258. Aryeh Neier, The Military Tribunals on Trial, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 14, 2002, at
11. These perceptions probably will persist regardless how unassailably fair or principled
the officers staffing the commissions actually are.
259. See Rules, supra note 19.
260. For a more detailed discussion on other states' perceptions of the Rules, see Koh,
supra note 246, at 342.
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universal cross-cultural condemnation, it also presents a number of
strategic advantages over proceeding domestically. Prosecuting
through international criminal tribunals may allay the fears of those
concerned with the national security implications of prosecuting in
domestic courts. For example, U.S. courts provide defendants with
extensive discovery rights to the evidence compiled against them.
Ruth Wedgwood has suggested that this could "provide terrorists
with a road map to the country's intelligence sources ... giving them
an advantage in the continuing battle against terrorism.
261
International criminal law, on the other hand, has more limited
discovery procedures 262 and provides "for the strict protection of
confidential and classified information. '263  Although a military
commission established by the United States also may limit discovery
rights for the accused, it would be open to considerable skepticism
regarding its legitimacy in many parts of the world.26
There also are security implications to proceeding with trials; for
example, the lives of witnesses, personnel, and jurors could be
endangered. Most federal courthouses are located in the center of
large cities, therefore, terrorism to courthouses poses a threat to
innocent civilians. These security implications were one reason for
the creation of military commissions and the ability to locate them
away from U.S. population centers on military bases or ships at sea.
However, the same can be said for the international tribunal. It, too,
could be located in a neutral, isolated, and secure third-party location.
Moreover, there are no juries under international criminal process,
261. William Glaberson, U.S. Faces Tough Choices If bin Laden Is Captured, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at B5 (discussing comments made by Ruth Wedgwood); see also
Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A18
(noting that the criminal court system is ill-equipped to handle trials against international
terrorists).
262. See Michael Scharf, Comments at the Association of American Law Schools
Annual Meeting for the Section on International Law (Jan. 5, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Scharf Comments].
263. Abraham D. Sofaer & Paul R. Williams, Doing Justice During Wartime, 111
POL'Y. REV. 3, 9 (Feb./Mar. 2002), available at http://www.policyreview.org/FEB02/
sofaer._print.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Sensitive information
thus could be controlled; moreover, the enabling statute creating the tribunal (or a
memorandum of understanding conducted between the tribunal and the United States)
could explicitly provide for the protection of certain security information and intelligence
intercepts.
264. "[M]ilitary trials in the United States would present exceptionally negative optics
to international audiences, particularly in the Islamic world. A U.S. military trial could
embolden extremists to lash out at the militaristic character of the trial." DAVID
SCHEFFER, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, SPECIAL REPORT: OPTIONS FOR PROSECUTING
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS 7 (2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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and witnesses can testify through voice and image altering
technology.
International tribunals judging mass, atrocity in the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have had some success in controlling the
politicization of the trials conducted (and, in the case of Slobodan
Milosevic, ongoing) before them.265 International tribunals also may
be better equipped to deal with thorny, questions of command
responsibility that would arise in any prosecution of al-Qaeda leaders
and certainly of Taliban leaders. 66 Furthermore, if prosecuted in
national courts, Taliban senior ministers may be able to raise defenses
of immunity to the criminal charges,267 and perhaps also to civil
lawsuits. International prosecutions could be engineered to do away
with these immunities (as is the case for the Rome Statute and the
Statutes for the ad hoc tribunals). Although the process has not
always been easy, international tribunals have demonstrated some
265. This is not to deny the existence of politicization (at times considerable). See
Fisher, supra note 256 (reporting that the fact that those nations who effected the 1999
NATO bombing against Serbia are underwriting the Milosevic trial casts doubt on its
perceived fairness); New War Charges Rejected by Milosevic, supra note 78. However,
politicization would likely be even greater were Milosevic to be tried by those peoples he
victimized, namely Croats, Kosovo Albanians, or Bosnian Muslims. Although proceeding
through trials by victims could better satisfy the deontological needs of the victim
community, the utilitarian and consequential effects of such trials within the aggressor
Serb community likely would be thin. The Serb community must see the tribunal as fair or
else any trial plays directly into the Serb "martyr complex." See Elizabeth Neuffer,
Comments at the American Branch of the International Law Association, International
Law Weekend (Oct. 27, 2001) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Trying al-
Qaeda leaders, Taliban officials, and individual terrorists in domestic U.S. court likely
would trigger similar politicization and skepticism.
266. See Scharf Comments, supra note 262.
267. See Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr. 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belg.),
2002 I.C.J. 121, at 18 (Feb. 14) (holding that international law recognizes "full" immunity
for Ministers of Foreign Affairs for war crimes or crimes against humanity committed in
their official capacities if prosecuted through the exercise of universal jurisdiction by
national courts). If the United States prosecutes the now surrendered Taliban Minister of
Foreign Affairs (or, hypothetically by logical extension, Mullah Omar or other Taliban
Ministers) for war crimes/crimes against humanity (or conspiracy therein) committed
during the exercise of official powers, this recent ICJ decision might well allow issues of
immunity to arise. Indeed, this holding is fairly narrow (restricted to immunities that limit
the exercise of universal jurisdiction by national courts against incumbent Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and not for the crime of terrorism, although that does not yet appear to be
an international crime per se) and deviates from emerging customary international norms,
but a real question now exists whether such immunities might apply to the exercise of
national jurisdiction based on territoriality (i.e., United States) or passive personality (i.e.,
for other countries whose nationals perished on Sept. 11). In all cases, these immunities
inure to the benefit of the state and can be waived by the state. Thus, in the case of the
Taliban, the Karzai regime arguably could waive these (or simply not raise them in
opposition to prosecutions). But that is a separate question.
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ability to deal with extremely complex cases involving organizers,
abettors, and administrative responsibility;268 moreover, international
criminal law is more parsimonious in permitting individuals access to
the "obedience to orders" defense and other such defenses than is
U.S. law.269 International criminal law prescribes direct criminal
responsibility for those who order, plan, instigate, aid, or abet the
crime, or who act in a common criminal enterprise with those who
actually commit the offense.2 °  This means that "[t]hose directly
responsible are not only those who hijacked the planes, who killed
themselves in the process, but also the full networks of persons who
assisted in various ways. 
' 271
Additionally, it would be difficult to find a jury in the United
States that would not be seen to have a bias against terrorist
defendants, and this bias would be yet another factor contributing to
skepticism in the Muslim world regarding the legitimacy of the
trials.272 On the other hand, proceedings coordinated under and
through international criminal law and institutions may carry more
weight in those countries where disaffected individuals may be
inspired to join terror networks.273  To be sure, prosecutions
undertaken in those countries by nationals of those countries may
carry the most legitimacy, and this is one option that the international
tribunal should be careful not to squelch entirely.
International tribunals have rendered lengthy, comprehensive
decisions that, in the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
have authenticated findings of fact and complex historical narratives,
have established important truths, and have gone some way to refute
myths of ethnic, religious, and gender superiority. To be sure,
international tribunal decisions have not always been well-received in
these countries and there have been disconnects between the work of
the international tribunals and the afflicted societies they were
designed to assist.274 However, with regard to September 11, when
268. Such has been the case in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.
269. Scharf Comments, supra note 262.
270. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 25.
271. Duffy, supra note 52, at 35.
272. It has not escaped attention that the Eastern District of Virginia was deliberately
chosen as the venue to prosecute Moussaoui in part because juries in that area are
believed to be supportive of the death penalty. John Gibeaut, Prosecuting Moussaoui,
A.B.A. J., July 2002, at 36.
273. Neier, supra note 258, at 14.
274. See generally Jos6 E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from
Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999) (postulating the existence of such disconnects
between the work of the ICTR and the Rwandan population); Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu,
Image and Reality of War Crimes Justice: External Perceptions of the International
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contrasted with the perfunctory verdict issued by a jury or military
commission, international tribunals offer a greater possibility for
discussion, discord, and neutral evaluation. 275 All of these comprise
essential factors in the process of harmonizing competing
understandings as to why the attacks took place and ensuring that
those convicted of the attacks are not perceived as suffering political
victors' justice but, rather, are perceived as guilty of a universal crime
against the international community at large. These perceptions are
integral elements in building a transnational anti-terrorism consensus.
International prosecutions also offer the benefit of coordination.
Arrests have been made not only in the United States, but also
throughout Europe and the Middle East. Some European nations,
for example, Italy,276 Spain,27 and the United Kingdom,278 are
initiating their own domestic prosecutions. So, too, may a number of
Muslim nations. 79 Checkerboard domestic prosecutions may result in
haphazard, anarchic enforcement. Moreover, a question is raised as
to what extent evidence used in one national proceeding can be
admissible in a proceeding in another nation. There is considerable
evidence of the highly fluid and transnational nature of al-Qaeda's
activities. The September 11 attacks involved perpetrators of
multiple nationalities and was planned in multiple locations with a
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 26 FLETCHER WORLD AFF. 21, 29 (2002) (reporting "a
significant strain of skepticism about the ICTR in Rwanda"); David Tolbert, The
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and
Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER WORLD AFF. 7, 8 (2002) (discussing disconnects
in the case of the ICTY). This particularly is the case when the international tribunal
externalizes justice for what essentially is an internal conflict, which is the case in Rwanda
and, to a lesser extent, in the former Yugoslavia. However, the September 11 terrorist
attack is not an internal conflict, but a transnational one which, given the broad panoply of
victims, aggressors, and participants, quite readily can be cast as a global crime.
275. See Neier, supra note 258, at 14 ("[T]he worldwide credibility achieved by the
tribunals for ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda is very high.").
276. Small Bomb Blast Rocks Rome, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Feb. 26, 2002), at
http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting on
the detention of Moroccans and Tunisians suspected to have terrorist links, possibly to al-
Qaeda).
277. Spain has charged and detained eight men with complicity in the attacks. See
Stout, supra note 184. On April 14, 2002, Spain arrested another individual. See Spain
Arrests Suspected al-Qaida Financial Chief, supra note 184.
278. See Alan Freeman, U.K. Charges 2 Algerians with al-Qaeda Link; 11 Others Held,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 18, 2002, at A12 (reporting that two individuals have been
charged and eleven others arrested under the United Kingdom's Terrorism Act).
279. See James Risen, Morocco Detainee Linked to Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002,
at A8 (reporting that Morocco broke up a plot by al-Qaeda to attack American and
British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar and has charged three Saudis in connection with this
plot).
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multi-national cast of aiders, abettors, and accomplices.280  An
international response can reduce the transaction costs of
coordinating a series of domestic proceedings. It can also reduce
important impediments caused by unilateral domestic action, for
example, differential human rights standards among prosecuting
countries. Although some allies, such as Spain and France, may not
cease cooperation should their nationals already detained in the
United States be subject to military commissions or death sentences,
it is foreseeable that they may balk at extraditing new detainees in
their territories to the United States under such circumstances.281
Other allies, such as Canada and the United Kingdom, also are
discussing these differences but are not hesitating to cooperate with
U.S. initiatives.282 The end result is confusion, differential sentences
based on place of prosecution, and the very real possibility that there
may be fewer terrorists to try. Finally, a coordinated international
approach can also lay the groundwork for a global intelligence
network to combat terrorism, as well as a transnational, anti-
terrorism police unit.
There are, of course, drawbacks to international prosecutions.
For example, the number of possible defendants could overwhelm the
280. Thirty-nine nationalities are represented among those detained at Guantinamo
Bay, Cuba. See Gutman et al., supra note 11, at 35.
281. Neier, supra note 258 (reporting that the European Convention on Human Rights,
a treaty binding the forty-three member states of the Council of Europe, may in fact
preclude transfers to military commissions regardless of political volition); Matthew
Purdy, Bush's New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 25, 2001, at Al (reporting that "Spanish officials told the United States last week that
they would not extradite eight men suspected of involvement in the Sept. 11 attacks
without assurances that their cases would be kept in civilian court."); Stout, supra note 184
(reporting on Spain resisting extradition of suspects unless they are tried in a civilian
court). For a discussion of France, see infra notes 386-87 (reporting on the Moussaoui
case).
282. Ibbitson, supra note 218 (reporting that Prime Minister Blair has dismissed
concerns about the alleged mistreatment of detainees held at Guantbnamo Bay, as has the
Australian government); Daniel LeBlanc, Eggleton Changes his Story, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Jan. 31, 2002, at Al (reporting the revelation that Canada had turned over
prisoners to the United States, which refuses to give captives the status of prisoners of
war); Jill Mahoney & Mark MacKinnon, Blankets to Hide Uniforms, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Jan. 19, 2002, at A8 (reporting that the Canadian government will permit
Canadian troops to hand over to U.S. custody prisoners taken in Afghanistan); Cuba
Britons "Held Humanely," BBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/
uk-politics/1764128.stm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting that the
United Kingdom will not cease transferring captured fighters to U.S. custody); cf. Bosnia
Suspects Headed for Cuba, BBC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2001), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/
europe/1767554.stm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting that six
terror suspects have been handed over by authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will be
moved to Guant~namo Bay in Cuba).
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capacity of international tribunals. In addition, funding could be
prohibitively expensive. One response could be to adopt a
sedimentary approach to prosecutions, in which terrorist leaders are
prosecuted internationally, and individuals of lesser organizational
culpability are prosecuted in national proceedings. 83 This is, in fact, a
model that has been implemented in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Indeed, this approach has triggered tension, particularly in
Rwanda, where there has been competition between the international
tribunal and national courts for custody over individuals.284
International tribunals have exercised their primacy, at times to the
detriment of national prosecutions, transitional governance, and the
nation-building opportunities such prosecutions present.
These are important dangers to guard against in Afghanistan.
After all, it is not to be assumed that in all cases Afghanistan
necessarily would welcome international prosecutions. This welcome
would have to be earned through a consultative, inclusive process.
Mandating international prosecution, and according primacy to that
prosecution over national proceedings, may prevent Afghanistan
from instituting its own domestic prosecutions. There has been talk
that Afghanistan may put in place courts administered by the United
Nations; this is an approach that has been undertaken in East Timor
and Kosovo.285 There also has been discussion of revitalizing the
domestic court system. 86 Such prosecutions could serve a vital role in
building national reconciliation, promoting multi-ethnic nation-
building, and fostering constructive dialogue regarding the violence
283. Although these sorts of hybrid solutions could attenuate the strain on an
international tribunal, they do not necessarily shorten the time that it would take to
establish such a tribunal, to obtain consensus on whether terrorism ought to be prosecuted
independently from crimes against humanity, and to select judges and prosecutors. Should
it take too long to organize a tribunal, then the impetus to stamp out terrorism could lose
momentum; moreover, this would in and of itself constitute a human rights issue for those
individuals currently detained and awaiting potential prosecution before such a
hypothetical international tribunal.
284. See Alvarez, supra note 274, at 442. Regarding the FRY, the conflict involved the
transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY to face trial for alleged crimes (war crimes and
crimes against humanity) committed in Kosovo, which the ICTY consistently has insisted
upon since Milosevic's indictment in 1999. See Press Release, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia, All Indicted Persons Must Be Surrendered to and Judged by the
International Tribunal (Mar. 8, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p572-
e.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). FRY President Kostunica initially
was reluctant to turn Milosevic over, insisting that he be tried (at least first) by an FRY
court in the FRY itself. However, Milosevic has since been transferred to the ICTY. Id.
285. See Laura Dickinson, Comments at the Association of American Law Schools
Annual Meeting for the Section on International Law (Jan. 5, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
286. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
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that has plagued an entire generation of Afghans . 87  Here, it is
important not to repeat another mistake from Rwanda: namely
pumping millions of dollars into the ad hoc international tribunal
while the national judicial system (in the case of Rwanda, prosecuting
over 100,000 defendants, to the ICTR's prosecution of approximately
fifty) remains strapped for funding and infrastructure. 88 But what is
clear is that a cosmopolitan, international tribunal could more easily
be attached to and assist domestic proceedings and investigations
289
than could national or military trials held far away from Afghanistan
where justice would, from the Afghan perspective, be even more
externalized.
It also may be important to treat prosecutions for al-Qaeda
differently than Taliban prosecutions. Although the United States
may assert a strong interest in domestically prosecuting al-Qaeda
operatives who commit attacks within the United States (and
European nations may assert an interest regarding al-Qaeda members
operating within their jurisdictions), the place with the greatest
interest in prosecuting Taliban leaders may be Afghanistan itself.
After all, giving succor to terrorists is only one of many egregious
crimes allegedly committed by the Taliban.29° Other alleged crimes
include291  forced deportation, ethnic massacres,292  extrajudicial
287. For a general discussion of trials in the process of nation-building, see MARK
OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW 36-47 (1997)
(discussing ability of trials to create "civil dissensus," namely constructive conversations
among citizens in which contentious questions are deliberated and discussed); see also Jose
E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the Tadic Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031,
2108-12 (1998) (concluding that civil disagreements, channeled by the law, may constitute
a route to national reconciliation, particularly when undertaken at the national level and
involving national participation).
288. Drumbl, supra note 35, at 1233, 1288. A very similar criticism has been noted in
the former Yugoslavia:
[The ICTY] has made scant contribution to the prosecution of war crimes and
crimes against humanity ... in the courts of the states of the former Yugoslavia.
Thus, the irony may be that despite the millions of dollars spent on building a
judicial infrastructure in The Hague, there is virtually no effective enforcement
of these important laws in the courts that ultimately matter most, i.e., the region's
domestic courts.
Tolbert, supra note 274, at 8.
289. The transitional Karzai government has established a human rights commission.
Carlotta Gall, Killings From Taliban's Era Still Haunt a Valley, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2002,
at Al.
290. 2 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998: Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on Int'l Operations and Human Rights, 106th Cong. 1847-48 (1999) (discussing
other crimes).
291. See id.; Resolution 1378, supra note 58; AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN 73-74, 78
(2001).
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executions, torture, disappearances among prisoners, persecution of
Shia Muslims, politicide, gender crimes (some would say sexual
apartheid 293), rape, crimes against cultural property (i.e., the
destruction of the ancient Bamiyan Buddhas, and the destruction of
objets d'art in the National Museum in Kabul 294 and the Herat
Museum),295 and narcotics trafficking. Some of these crimes may
constitute violations of customary international law. Many constitute
gross human rights offenses, namely serious violations of
international humanitarian law and international human rights law
that, in turn, qualify as crimes under international law.
This broad array of alleged criminal conduct ought not to be
overlooked in the drive to bring terrorists and the role of the Taliban
in facilitating that terrorism to book. True accountability would
oblige the Taliban to answer to these charges in addition to
complicity in the September 11 attack. The international community
did not intercede in Afghanistan while these "other" crimes were
occurring. Early intervention to protect suffering Afghans may have
impeded the symbiotic growth of al-Qaeda and Taliban power.
Accountability should not be spared for those who have victimized
Taliban members and civilians both during and following Taliban
rule, for example, individual members of opposition and rebel forces
within Afghanistan, such as the Northern Alliance. 296  Failing to
prosecute war criminals of the Northern Alliance or other entities
would create an imbalance in the implementation of justice.
One final sticking point for any international tribunal could be
the fact that, based on prior precedent, the United Nations would
resist the death penalty as a sanction. This has caused controversy in
292. Afghan Graves Reveal Slaughter of Hazaras, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Feb. 11,
2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Gall, supra note 289.
293. Guglielmo Verdirame, Testing the Effectiveness of International Norms: UN
Humanitarian Assistance and Sexual Apartheid in Afghanistan, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 733, 734
(2001).
294. See Murray Campbell, A Nation's Holy War on History, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), Mar. 1, 2001, at Al. International law does not criminalize the destruction of
cultural property outside of armed conflict (i.e., as a war crime), although there may be
some room to classify such destruction as a crime against humanity. See STEVEN R.
RATNER & JASON ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109-10 (2d ed. 2001).
295. Christopher de Bellaigue, The Lost City, NEW YORKER, Jan. 21, 2002, at 32.
296. See More Mass Graves Found in Afghanistan, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (May 7,
2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(citing a doctor with Physicians for Human Rights as stating that "[t]here are no clean
hands in Afghanistan, certainly at the leadership level"); Taliban May Have Killed 500
Civilians, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 20,2001, at All.
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the past. For example, this was one of the reasons why Rwanda
initially was opposed to the ad hoc tribunal judging perpetrators of its
1994 genocide.297 Although terrorists convicted in U.S. courts for the
1993 World Trade Center bombing and the 1998 African embassy
bombings were given life sentences, there is reason to believe that not
seeking the death penalty for those responsible for the September 11
attacks would draw opposition in the United States. Moreover,
classic Islamic law readily permits the death penalty for the serious
kinds of crimes with which terrorists would be charged. 98 However,
there is no principled reason to treat this opposition any differently
than how the Rwandan opposition was treated. The United States
was one of the major proponents of the ad hoc tribunal for Rwanda,
which lacks the jurisdiction to impose the death penalty.
In the end, there may be reason to be frustrated with the need
binarily to characterize warlike, terrorist violence into either the
"armed attack" or "criminal attack" categories. International
criminal law, however, provides a bridge between these two
categories. This bridge is multi-faceted, and can be built on
utilitarian, communitarian, and deontological struts.
IV. GAVELING JUSTICE AND BUILDING SOCIAL NORMS
Why apprehend and prosecute terrorists, including organizers,
planners, accomplices, conspirators, and abettors? One obvious
motivation is to get the guilty off the "international streets." Outside
of that immediate effect, there are generally two justifications for
trials: (1) a deontological justification-namely to prosecute and
punish because the act committed merits prosecution and
punishment, regardless of the broader repercussions thereof;299 and
(2) a utilitarian or consequentialist justification-to prosecute and
punish because doing so deters future crime. A shortcoming, in
particular for proceedings undertaken in the United States, but also
for Western-style international prosecutions, is that they may satisfy
the deontological but not the utilitarian aspects of punishment. In
297. Rwanda was the only member of the Security Council to oppose the ICTR. See
ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED 406 (2000). This is somewhat ironic, given that
the ICTR was created to effect justice for Rwandans. See id. In addition to concern
regarding the death penalty, Rwanda was unhappy with the ICTR's temporal mandate
(limited to the calendar year of 1994). Madeleine H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent
Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 349, 353-57 (1997).
298. Vogel, supra note 36, at 63-64.
299. The deontological justification often is coupled with a punitive rationale-namely
that justice's priority is to punish past transgressions.
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other words, they may do little to deter since they may have little
legitimacy to affect social norms or behavior patterns in societies
from where terrorism emerges. After all, the September 11 attacks
come on the heels of the trial for the 1998 African Embassy
bombings3°° and appeals in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
cases.301 Judgments of a U.S.-based international military commission
likely would have even less meaning; in fact, they may prompt
skepticism.3 °2
Building legitimacy will be an uphill (although certainly not
insurmountable) struggle,3 3 particularly given the instant legality of
the October 7 strikes, the history of Western-Muslim relations, the
Islamic perceptions of geopolitical exclusion, and the difficulties
ordinary criminal measures experience in capturing "radical evil."3"
Accordingly, it is important for international trials not to be
cosmetically cross-cultural, but genuinely cosmopolitan. The
legitimacy of trials of the Taliban and of the terrorists will be
heightened if these trials take into account Islamic law, involve
Islamic jurists, judges, and prosecutors, and take place in mixed fora
situated in Islamic countries (or administratively connected to UN-
assisted courts in Islamic countries, in particular Afghanistan).3 5
There is an important need for international justice to operate
contextually in conjunction with local practices, and for international
law to mediate, but not dictate, appropriate procedures and
300. See 4 Bin Laden Followers Get Life, CBS NEWS (Oct. 18, 2001), at http://www.
cbsnews.comlstories/2001/10/18/national/main315078.shtml (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). The bombings occurred at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Bin Laden was indicted as a defendant but failed to appear;
four other individuals were convicted. See id.
301. Man Convicted in Trade Center Bombing Loses Appeal, AP. WIRE, June 19, 1999,
available at WESTLAW, Newswires.
302. This was the conclusion of the American Bar Association. See American Bar
Association Task Force on Terrorism and the Law, Report and Recommendations on
Military Commissions, 13-14 (Jan. 4, 2002), available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/
military.pdf (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The American Bar
Association subsequently voted that any military tribunals should follow the established
rules for courts-martial, including the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. See Lawyers'
Group Backs Tribunals With Conditions, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 5, 2002, at 2A.
303. See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Tries to Sway Worldwide Opinion in Favor of War,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2001, at Al ("[Tjhe [Bush] administration is involved in an uphill
battle with much of Islamic public opinion, including opinion inside Afghanistan.").
304. Criminal law is predicated upon punishing deviant behavior. Radical evil often is
not perceived as deviant in the places where it originates. See NINO, supra note 1, at vii-
viii.
305. The attacks could be prosecuted as a variety of crimes under classical Islamic law.
See Vogel, supra note 36, at 58-61.
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structures.306 A failure to mediate effectively but instead to dictate
has, in the past, resulted in gaps between the work of international
tribunals and local communities.3"7 These gaps have triggered
perceptions of international criminal justice as globalitarian and
imperial. On a broader note, holding trials far away from the Muslim
world, under foreign proceedings and in foreign national courts, may
lead to a meaningless externalization of justice in those places whose
nationals perpetrated the atrocities. In the case of Afghanistan,
meaning also must be constructed in light of local tribal practices °8 as
well as procedures.3 9 Creating meaning is important because it is
only when these places shame terrorist elements that future terrorism
may become discredited ex ante. Local, culturally contoured justice
mechanisms may be more effective in creating shame than the
306. See Alvarez, supra note 274, at 370.
307. Id.
308. Pashtun tribal practices influence Taliban understandings of Islam. See KAMAL
MATINUDDIN, THE TALIBAN PHENOMENON 34 (1999); RASHID, supra note 291, at 89-
90. The Taliban government largely consisted of Sunni Muslims of the Pashtun ethnic
group that lives in both southern Afghanistan as well as northern Pakistan. Pashtun codes
of behavior are governed by the Pashtunwali, a set of customary laws supervising the day-
to-day relations of the Pashtuns. The Taliban initially relied on parts of the Pashtunwali
that involve treatment of invited foreign guests as a basis to resist bin Laden's ejection
from the country (he was considered to be such a "guest"). See Geoffrey York, Taliban
Rebuffs Bid for "Guest," GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Sept. 18, 2001, at A10. Twenty
different ethnic groups exist in Afghanistan; as many as forty languages are spoken. See
JASON ELLIOT, AN UNEXPECTED LIGHT 51 (2001); see also id. at "A Note on
Languages." The Taliban's rise to power represented the consolidation in power of the
Pashtun group (roughly forty percent of the Afghan population). See RASHID, supra note
291, at 2. The Pashtuns speak Pashto. Other groups include the Tajiks (of Persian
descent), who speak Dari, the Afghan version of Farsi, which also is the official national
language; the Nuristanis; the Uzbeks; and the Hazaras (largely Shia Muslims). See
ELLIOT, supra, at 52-53. According to Elliot, the Hazaras are at the "bottom of the social
ladder," preceded by the Nuristanis, and the Tajiks. Id. at 53. "[T]he Pushtuns consider
themselves rightful rulers of the country." Id. The Northern Alliance is dominated by
ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks. The politics of Afghanistan cannot be disentangled from the
ethnic tensions that undergird the country. See, e.g., Pamela Constable, Cracks in a
Warlord's Armor, WASH. POST, July 10, 2002, at Al (reporting that "[o]f the many factors
that threaten the stability of post-Taliban Afghanistan, few have proved as difficult to
overcome as the factional and ethnic rivalries that have broken the country into regional
fiefdoms"); Mark MacKinnon, Afghanistan's Grand Council to Pick New Government,
GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), June 10, 2002, at A10 (discussing how the transitional
administration in Afghanistan is Tajik-dominated).
309. Disputes as to the implementation of the Pashtunwali are resolved through the
jirga, an ad hoc tribal council that operates on every social level (ranging from nationally
to the village). See RASHID, supra note 291, at 112; Isabel Hilton, The Pashtun Code,
NEW YORKER, Dec. 3, 2001, at 61, 61-62 ("The Pashtun draw their identity from Islam-
they believe they are direct descendants of Qais, a companion of Muhammad-but their
interpretation of Islamic law arises out of their own tribal code.").
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external imposition of guilt from faraway courts, tribunals, and
commissions.3 10
Constructing antiterrorism social norms is an important and
urgent task. Thomas Friedman chillingly observes that the terrorists
''are crazy and evil but ... reflect the mood in their home countries
more than we might think. '31  Fareed Zakaria remarks that popular
support of Islamic movements throughout the Middle East is such
that democratic elections "would simply bring more Talibans into
power. '31  The Afghans I taught3 13 had divided loyalties; although
most deride the Taliban and condemn al-Qaeda, these same
individuals may have some empathy for the causes these entities
adumbrate. Moreover, the secular dictatorships of the Muslim world
are often brutally repressive and spawn violent opposition in the form
of Islamic sympathies.314 Arab secular dictatorships have sought to
quash Islamic terrorists, but have never delegitimized terrorist
behavior as un-Islamic.35 Although public opposition in the Muslim
world to the U.S.IU.K. strikes was much less than initially feared31 6
310. For a discussion of the differences between guilt and shame, and the greater
power of shame in preventing future violence, see Drumbl, supra note 35, at 1256-60.
Cosmopolitan international trials are more effective at creating shame among the accused
than trials held extraterritorially under foreign procedures. Local trials held under
familiar proceedings are likely more effective at shaming than cosmopolitan international
trials, although the deontological and communitarian goals of punishing terrorist leaders
may militate in favor of cosmopolitan international trials for such accused. Id.
311. Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Hama Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2001, at A35;
see also Fouad Ajami, The Sentry's Solitude, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 2,
available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20011101facomment5770/fouad-afami/the-sentry
-s-solitude.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting that terrorists
"fed off a free-floating anti-Americanism that blows at will and knows no bounds, among
Islamists and secularists alike."); Elaine Sciolino, Who Hates the U.S.? Who Loves It?,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1 (reporting a deep sense of
ambivalence about the United States throughout the Muslim world).
312. Zakaria, supra note 132, at 34.
313. See supra note 30.
314. See Friedman, supra note 311.
315. Id. One account describes the cycle that results from the unsuccessful efforts to
defeat the Islamic terrorists:
The states respond[] by crushing or expelling the Islamists, but without ever
trying to reform the Islamic schools ... or the political conditions that keep
producing angry Islamist waves. So the deadly circle that produced bin
Ladenism-poverty, dictatorship and religious anti-modernism, each reinforcing
the other-just gets perpetuated.
Thomas L. Friedman, Breaking the Circle, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2001, at A25.
316. See, e.g., SIMON W. MURDEN, ISLAM, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE NEW
GLOBAL HEGEMONY 84 (2002) ("Bin Laden struck a chord that has resonated wider than
most Western and Muslim governments were prepared to admit."); Shanker & Risen,
supra note 140 (reporting that the CIA "paid off local warlords in order to obtain their
cooperation with the American-led military campaign against al-Qaeda and the Taliban");
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(and Taliban defections much more numerous than anticipated),3"7
this does not erase the important need to cull public support in favor
of stunting the conditions precedent to terrorist violence. Although
there was limited opposition to U.S./U.K. military intervention, there
was even more limited support for that intervention.318 Indeed, much
of the al-Qaeda hierarchy and leadership may have been eliminated,
but al-Qaeda, now diffuse and dispersed, remains as an ideological
movement. This calls for an effective and principled counter-
ideology.
Yet, the West continues to do business with these secular
dictatorships through expediently and conveniently arranged
alliances. In fact, most of Western foreign policy toward the Muslim
world is based on alliances of convenience, rather than a more
principled approach.319 The warm relationship with the Northern
Alliance constitutes one such example.32° Although the Northern
Alliance may be "less bad" than the Taliban, it would be naive to
assume them to be democrats propounding a culture of human rights.
Hardened by Afghanistan's culture of war, it is unclear whether the
Northern Alliance would be able to control terrorist extremists.32" '
Fareed Zakaria, Let's Spread the Good Cheer, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 2001, at 50 ("Radical
Muslim 'leaders' have tried to rally their people, but the people have chosen to say
home."). "This is not to say that there isn't plenty of anti-American sentiment in [Muslim]
countries." Id.
317. See, e.g., John F. Burns, Reports Swirl Out of Afghanistan of Panic and Taliban
Defections, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at Al (reporting on shifting loyalties among Taliban
members and soldiers).
318. See Michael Scott Doran, Somebody Else's Civil War, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb.
2002, at 22, 41; see also David Hoffman, Beyond Public Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 2002, at 83, 83 ("Osama bin Laden apparently still enjoys widespread public approval
in the Muslim world. ); Jane Perlez, Anger at U.S. Said to Be at New High, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2002, at A23 (reporting that what is seen as the United States' misguided
policies on dealing with terrorists, along with its behavior toward Iraq, contributes to
anger at the United States, which is at an "unparalleled high across the Arab world");
Elaine Sciolino, A Desert Kingdom Takes the Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, § 4
(Week in Review), at 1 (reporting that sympathy for bin Laden "runs high" in Saudi
Arabia). Support for the military strikes, a central element in the apparent legality of
those strikes, emanates from state practice. In the Arab world, for the most part, state
practice is determined by the unrepresentative and unelected elites that control the state
apparatus.
319. See Scharf, supra note 105, at 277 ("In the modern war against terrorism, the
defining characteristic appears to be support for any regime, no matter how undemocratic
or repressive, that will side with the United States against Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
other terrorist-supporting governments. .. ").
320. "The Northern Alliance, once scorned as a ragtag bunch of misfits, is now spoken
of with awe and affection." Zakaria, supra note 316, at 50.
321. See Milton Bearden, Afghanistan, Graveyard of Empires, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-
Dec. 2001, at 17, 29.
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Moreover, in the conflict against the Taliban, the Northern Alliance
committed human rights abuses, extrajudicial killings, infringements
of the law of war, and gratuitous violence. 322  Northern Alliance
leaders, likened by some to warlords, 323 have made prior attempts to
govern Afghanistan, each of which has been "savagely bad. '3 24  In
fact, "[tihe galaxy of warlords who tore Afghanistan apart in the early
1990's ... are back on their thrones, poised to exercise power in the
ways they always have. 3 25 The Revolutionary Association of Women
of Afghanistan (which worked secretly yet unfailingly for the rights of
women under the Taliban rule) remarks: "The world should
understand that the Northern Alliance is composed of some bands
who did show their real criminal and inhuman nature when they were
ruling Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996.326
The U.S.-Pakistani relationship presents another example of an
alliance of convenience. In exchange for important Pakistani
322. See supra notes 138-39. There also is evidence of systemic abuses inflicted against
Pashtuns in northern Afghanistan, who are "fleeing their villages by the thousands now,
telling tales of murder and rape and robbery." Dexter Filkins & Barry Bearak, A Tribe Is
Prey to Vengeance After Taliban's Fall in North, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at Al.
323. See Jane Perlez, The Corrupt and Brutal Reclaim Afghan Thrones, Evoking Chaos
of Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at B4.
324. Stephanie Nolen, Is This the End of the Taliban?, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
Nov. 14,2001, at Al. For example, former Northern Alliance leader Massoud was defense
minister in the 1992 government of Burhanuddin Rabbani. Barry Bearak, Taliban
Opposition Confirms Death of Its Battle Commander, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at A26.
This was a Tajik-dominated government under whose rule Kabul became a "war zone."
Id.
325. Perlez, supra note 318 (discussing Ismail Khan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar). There is a great deal of fear in Afghanistan:
Many people [in Kandahar] expressed worry that anarchy and warlordism would
succeed the Taliban, just as they had preceded the mullahs' rule. The warlords
who ruled before the Taliban have returned to power here and in northern
Afghanistan .... So hated were the pre-Taliban warlords that their possible
permanent return made some residents here bemoan the Taliban's departure.
Norimitsu Onishi, Taliban Gone, But Fear Lingers in Kandahar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
2001, at Al; see also Afghans Gather to Mourn for Qadir, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (July
7, 2002), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(reporting on the assassination of Vice president Abdul Qadir, appointed as part of the
June 2002 loya jirga, and noting that Qadir joined the opposition Northern Alliance after
having "welcomed Osama bin Laden to Afghanistan in 1996," when Qadir was governor
of Nangarhar region).
326. RAWA: The People of Afghanistan Do Not Accept Rule by Northern Alliance,
COUNTERPUNCH WIRE (Nov. 15, 2001), at http://www.counterpunch.org/rawal.html (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Three top members of the Northern Alliance
were implicated in the assassination of Abdul Rahman, a Minister in the transitional
Afghan government, in February 2002. See Karzai Says Minister Assassinated; Points
Finger at Afghan Officials, CNN NEWS (Feb. 15, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/
WORLD/asiapcf/central/02/15/afghan.minister/index.html (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
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cooperation, the United States lifted sanctions against Pakistan it
imposed in 1998 when Pakistan illegally tested and detonated nuclear
weapons.3"7  Furthermore, by allying itself with the Pakistani
government in the war against terrorism, the United States actually
may be siding with a military dictatorship328 that has not been averse
to backing insurgency, at times taking the form of terrorism, in its
own conflicts with India regarding Kashmir.32 9 Also, there is evidence
that the Pakistani intelligence service had an "indirect but
longstanding relationship with Al Qaeda ... even us[ing] Al Qaeda
camps in Afghanistan to train covert operatives for use in a war on
terror against India .... 330
Although there may be important short-term gains in these
alliances of convenience, they create an impression that the United
States is a "companion of shallow sincerity 33' and the "lesser evil.
332
And, at times, alliances of convenience later turn into Faustian
bargains. This arguably was the case with initial alliances with
Saddam Hussein of Iraq,333 General Noriega of Panama,334 and the
mujahedeen freedom fighters.335
327. See Bush Freezes bin Laden Assets, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24,2001, at Al.
328. See, e.g., Douglas Jehl, U.S. is in Talks on Handing Over of Suspect in Reporter's
Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, at Al (reporting that the chief suspect in the murder of
U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl is a leader of the Army of Muhammad, "one of the militant
organizations nurtured in the past by Pakistan's main intelligence agency"); Amir Zia,
President of Pakistan Dismissed, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETITE, June 21, 2001, at 7A
(reporting how General Musharraf, who seized power in a coup in 1999, later dismissed
the President and took the position for himself and also dissolved the National Assembly,
Senate and the four provisional assemblies).
329. Barry Bearak, In Pakistan, a Shaky Ally, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,2001, at Al.
330. James Risen & Judith Miller, Pakistani Intelligence Had Links to Al Qaeda, U.S.
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at Al.
331. Bearak, supra note 329.
332. Miro Cernetig and Geoffrey York, U.S. is "The Lesser Evil," Pakistani Leader
Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Oct. 16, 2001), at http://www.globeandmail.com (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
333. See Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Human Rights in the Arab World: A Regional
Perspective, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 701, 725 (2001).
The Arab public wondered about Western support of Iraq during eight years of
war with Iran, despite Iraq's gross and systematic violations of human rights and
humanitarian law throughout that period, in contrast to Western determination
to uphold international law at the cost of starving the people of Iraq and
destroying a whole generation of their children so many years after Iraq was
expelled from Kuwait.
Id.
334. See Alan Berman, In Mitigation of Illegality: The U.S. Invasion of Panama, 79 KY.
L.J. 735, 740 (1991).
335. See infra notes 345-57 and accompanying text.
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Given that the best deterrent of terrorism is self-policing among
336those states and societies from which terrorists presently emerge,
the creation of a legal and social norm that condemns terrorism is a
necessary mid- to long-term project. A long-term culture of non-
vituperative moderation needs to be fostered within secular and
religious constituencies of Muslim society. Anti-terrorist policy
initiatives will be more successful if these constituencies view the
terrorists as fundamentally anti-Islam, not as holy warriors in a
nihilistic world where secular dictatorships-frequently perceived as
the puppets of the West-rule with an ad hoc iron fist without any
deeper inkling of legitimacy. Within Afghanistan itself, a failure to
construct such social norms may mean that the country easily could
slide back into chaos, thereby posing a serious threat to U.S. security
interests. Intervention, whether judicial or military, can never
substitute for prevention.
By taking a firm stand in favor of a truly cosmopolitan tribunal to
prosecute those behind the September 11 attacks, the United States
and United Kingdom could take an important watershed step in favor
of securing justice but would do so in a principled, rule-based
manner.337 In the end, a specially constructed cosmopolitan tribunal
(carefully negotiated among all implicated nation-states and not
ordered through Security Council fiat or victors' justice) may strike
the best balance between the deontological need to punish egregious
breaches of international law, the utilitarian need to deter future
breaches, the protection of national security interests, the promotion
336. See Kenneth L. Woodward, A Peaceful Faith, A Fanatic Few, NEWSWEEK, Sept.
24, 2001, at 67, 68.
337. Moreover, there is a need for Western implementation of human rights also to
proceed in a principled manner instead of being manipulated as a tool of foreign policy.
Here, two important tensions emerge: (1) apparent Western focus on individual political
and civil rights and diffidence toward collective social, economic, and developmental
rights; and (2) Western blindness even to systematic infringements of political and civil
rights when a greater foreign policy good is present. On this latter point, Leti Volpp
remarks:
The United States aided General Zia of Pakistan-whose government adopted
the notorious hudood ordinances that among other provisions criminalized
extramarital sex, so that women who accuse men of rape or become pregnant risk
punishment for adultery .... Feminists in the United States need to think
critically about the relationship of this aid to states with policies inimical to
women's concerns, instead of abstractly condemning Islam as the font of
patriarchal oppression.
Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1207 (2001); see
also RASHID, supra note 291, at 109 (commenting on the serious problem of child soldiers
in Afghanistan's internecine conflicts, and how the United States opposed an international
effort to limit the age of soldiers to eighteen, in which it was joined by Pakistan, Iran, and
the Taliban government).
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of legitimate multi-ethnic governance in Afghanistan, and the
mediation of local justice initiatives. After all, "[t]he future of the
international legal order rests ultimately on its ability to identify and
reflect in its prescriptions and procedures the common interests of all
members of the world community. ' 338  Such a tribunal also may
promote an efficient, collective model of anti-terrorism enforcement
instead of a unilateral and anarchic cacophony.
To be sure, the reticence of policy makers to accept international
criminal law as the corpus of law applicable to the terrorist attacks is
such that the cosmopolitan tribunal appears as a fanciful, if not
idealistic, policy goal. Skeptics of such a tribunal are actually making
two arguments.
First, a practical argument: policy makers are not and will not
push for international institutions because of "tribunal fatigue," a
reluctance to incur political costs, an absence of political resolve,
sovereignty concerns, the opposition of some permanent members of
the Security Council, a reinvigoration of the nation-state as the
appropriate actor to defend security interests, and too much red
tape.339 Abetting this reluctance is the fact that international
institutional options for the terrorist attacks for the most part tepidly
and tentatively have been presented to the global body politic. But it
is not too late to reconsider the merit of a cosmopolitan criminal
tribunal as an important element of an overarching anti-terrorism
agenda. Ironically, such a discussion might be more politically
palatable now that the al-Qaeda leadership has been destroyed, so
many individuals incapacitated, and a significant number detained.
Second, a much more powerful argument: that a cosmopolitan
tribunal harmonizing Islamic law, local custom, and international law
is a jurisprudential impossibility.3 40 According to this argument, even
338. Sarvenaz Bahar, Khomeinism, The Islamic Republic of Iran, and International
Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 145, 189-90 (1992).
339. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 246, at 343 ("I am skeptical about the international
community's ability to overcome existing political obstacles and create a fair international
tribunal quickly."). On a different but related note, it is interesting that there is no serious
international discussion in favor of creating an international tribunal to prosecute Saddam
Hussein for his crimes committed domestically. If Saddam Hussein was indicted by such a
tribunal, the use of force may be permissible to enforce an indictment. The Bush
Administration has discussed the use of war-crimes trials as part of a U.S. military
occupation of Iraq. See Preston & Schmitt, supra note 73.
340. Professor Dickinson has noted,
One of the most potent critiques of using an international proceeding to try those
responsible for the September 11th attacks (or indeed other acts of terrorism) is
rooted in the concern that the divisions between the United States and the rest of
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if the political reticence is overcome, a cosmopolitan tribunal will
accomplish little given the enormity of the divides it portends to scale.
The work of the tribunal would, therefore, be akin to the labors of
Sisyphus. In response, it is undeniable that the international
community is riven with discord, dissension, and dissonance. But,
"the international realm does not have a monopoly on social conflict
and dissension. Serious conflicts exist within societies as well; yet
such social rifts do not make law and legal process impossible." '341
Here, a deeper inquiry needs to be made regarding the social
constructivist and communitarian effects of legal process. Just as such
process creates some measure of commonality between seemingly
incommensurable divides within domestic communities (whether
between individual litigants or constituencies), it, too, can build
jurisprudential consensus internationally. Law can mediate trans-
culturally. Professor Dickinson's approach is apposite:
Even if one accepts that greater division exists among
nation-states than within any one of them, the difference
might be better seen as one of degree rather than of kind.
The existence of social divisions should not itself be a bar to
efforts to set up an adjudicatory process involving
communities on both sides (or multiple sides) of the
divide-otherwise, even domestic legal proceedings would
be impossible and illegitimate.342
V. COLLECTIVE, FOREIGN, AND INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
Tribunals only can judge the guilt or innocence of the accused
individual. Individual criminal sanctions may deflect responsibility
away from international organizations and institutions, foreign
governments, as well as collective complicity and passive
acquiescence in human rights abuses. Because true justice requires
an assessment of this deeply rooted level of responsibility, tribunals
can form only one small-albeit important-part- of an overarching
response.
A. Collective Afghan Complicity
Many Afghans actively or passively supported the Taliban.
These levels of active and passive support-not to mention complicity
the world, in particular the Arab-Muslim world, run too deep for an international
proceeding to work.
Dickinson, supra note 214 (manuscript at 79).
341. Id. (manuscript at 80).
342. Id.
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in human rights abuse and terrorism-must be examined to establish
rule of law and a culture of humanity. As I have argued elsewhere,
criminal institutions may not be well-suited to flesh out broad levels
of passive complicity.343 Instead, restorative justice initiatives may be
more appropriate mechanisms for such pursuits.3" Broad complicity
and passive acquiescence often constitutes an important structural
condition that allows human rights abusers (whether state or non-
state actors) to perpetrate their abuses. As such, future violence
proves difficult to deter without exposing this broad complicity and
passive acquiescence. This is not to say that the Afghan people
should be punished for the conduct of the Taliban or al-Qaeda.
Rather, the Afghan people may benefit from a national dialogue and
narrative that explores questions of responsibility for why the Taliban
and al-Qaeda were able to do what they did. Being punished for the
Taliban's actions vastly differs from exploring responsibility for the
Taliban's actions.
B. Foreign and International Involvement
Individual criminal sanctions also may deflect responsibility away
from international organizations and institutions, as well as foreign
governments. Given that sustained foreign involvement in
Afghanistan facilitated the emergence of the Taliban, this
involvement must be exposed and appraised as it carries with it
important issues of justice and responsibility that should not remain
unaddressed. Exposure and appraisal of foreign involvement is
particularly necessary if justice is to be perceived as legitimate and
capable of constructing social norms.
In 1979, the Soviets illegally invaded Afghanistan to prop up a
faltering communist regime. Militant Islamic fundamentalists, called
the mujahedeen,345 vigorously fought the Soviets. In the 1980's, the
United States supported mujahedeen operations, initially through
weapons purchases.3 46  At this point, Osama bin Laden arrived in
Afghanistan. The United States was aware of his presence. 347 Bin
343. See generally Drumbl, supra note 35 (questioning the ability of national and
international trials following the 1994 Rwandan genocide to promote peace and punish
perpetrators and advocating flexible, polycentric responses to mass atrocity).
344. Id.
345. The name means "those who struggle," but is often translated in the West as "holy
warriors." ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 31.
346. Bearden, supra note 321, at 20-21.
347. "[T]he CIA certainly was pleased that a wealthy Saudi had appeared on the scene
to help finance the anti-Soviet jihad. In 1986, bin Laden helped build the Khost tunnel
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Laden's network first emerged during, and as a result of, these anti-
Soviet activities. In fact, many of these mujahedeen training bases
subsequently evolved into bin Laden terrorist training bases.
Beginning in 1986, U.S. involvement increased. The United States
provided Stinger missiles to these "freedom fighters." '348 The CIA
committed its support to "recruit radical Muslims from around the
world to come to Pakistan and fight with the Afghan Mujaheddin ....
Between 1982 and 1992 some 35,000 Muslim radicals ... would pass
their baptism under fire with the Afghan Mujaheddin. ' 349 Zbigniew
Brzezinski, former U.S. National Security Adviser, opined in the
early 1990's: "What was more important in the world view of history?
The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few stirred-up
Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold
War?"350
For nine years, the invading Soviet forces were subject to dogged
resistance by the mujahedeen. From one to two million Afghans
were killed, 50,000 Soviet troops perished, and one-third of the
Afghan population fled the country.3 1 But, as soon as the Afghans
drove out the Soviets, the United States lost interest in
Afghanistan, 352 its principal foreign policy goal (Soviet containment)
having been achieved.353 This sparked a deep sense of frustration,
betrayal, and disappointment among Afghans. Afghans, including
our students in Peshawar, look upon their casualties in the war
against the Soviets "as an unrewarded gift to the West. '354 They see
themselves as having expedited the demise of the Soviet Empire, but
complex, for instance, which the CIA was also funding as a major arms depot, training
facility and medical center." Nordland & Bartholet, supra note 130, at 44, 45.
348. RASHID, supra note 291, at 129.
349. Id. at 129-130 (noting also that "[nione of the players reckoned on these
volunteers having their own agendas, which would eventually turn their hatred against the
Soviets on their own regimes and the Americans").
350. Id. at 130 (quoting Zbigniew Brzezinski).
351. See ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 30, 32, 160; Afghanistan-Country Profile, at http://
www.irinnews.org/profiles/afghanistan.asp (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
352. ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 24 ("The Americans had washed their hands of
Afghanistan in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal and left ordinary Afghans with a
widespread feeling of having been abandoned.").
353. "America [is] blamed for enthusiastically pouring arms and strategists into the
Soviet conflict and then failing to come up with the magnanimous healing gesture that
might have prevented the slide into civil war." Jason Goodwin, Beyond the Back of
Beyond, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, § 7 (Magazine), at 10 (reviewing JASON ELLIOT, AN
UNEXPECTED LIGHT (2001)).
354. ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 160.
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then just left to rot in their ruined country."' This is unsurprising,
given that "CIA officials vowed to 'fight the Soviets to the last
Afghan.' "356 Moreover, many of these disaffected Afghan war
veterans became the kernel of bin Laden's network.357
The immediate withdrawal of foreign attention following the
Soviet exit created a sense of anomie that facilitated the rise of the
Taliban (whose soldiers largely were drawn from madrassas355 in
Pakistan).35 9 With the dissolution of the communist government in
Afghanistan in 1992,360 fighting became extensive.361 The Taliban
stepped into this power vacuum and culture of war. In fact, the
Taliban's grip on power in Afghanistan was derived from a society
with a starkly negative view of the outside world, due to the cycle of
intervention and abandonment by the Soviets, the United States, and
355. See ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 181; RASHID, supra note 291, at 208-09; see also
ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 327 ("Conversation led to the old sentiment that the Amerikha
had said they would help rebuild Afghanistan after the war, but never did."). English
journalist Jason Elliot describes the emptiness and betrayal felt by the Afghans,
[They] felt utterly abandoned by America. Here there were two analogies
describing people's feelings towards their former allies in the jehad: one of a fire
(war) having been put under a pot (Afghanistan) and left to boil long after the
water had disappeared (the Russian withdrawal); the other of a man helped to
the top of a tall building (the jehad won with American aid to the mujaheddin)
then having had the stairs removed from under him, leaving him stranded. A
crippled victim of the cold war, in other words. Once, America had been
perceived as a far-off but benevolent father figure who had the power to
influence and resolve conflicts; but how could a father abandon its young? The
mujaheddin had ruined their own land in the belief that America would later
help them rebuild it, once the common enemy of communism had been dealt
with.
Id. at 197.
356. RASHID, supra note 291, at 209.
357. See Nolen, supra note 324. Not all joined bin Laden, however. In fact, some
famous mujahedeen became allied with the Northern Alliance. Massoud, the assassinated
leader of the Northern Alliance, was a particularly well-known mujahedeen of heroic
proportion.
358. Madrassas are Islamic theology schools. RASHID, supra note 291, at 1.
359. Id. Initially, the Taliban were welcomed insofar as they "brought peace and a
relative stability to areas formerly plagued by banditry and lawlessness." ELLIOT, supra
note 308, at 22. But soon thereafter, something more "disturbing" arose as the Taliban
"brought with them an Islamicist fervour previously unknown in Afghanistan, traditionally
a place of religious moderation." Id.; see also J. Alexander Thier, Note, Afghanistan:
Minority Rights and Autonomy in a Multi-Ethnic Failed State, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 351, 352
(1999) (discussing the "power vacuum" created by Soviet withdrawal and the expansion of
Taliban control).
360. ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 30.
361. See MATINUDDIN, supra note 308, at 22-25.
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other foreign interests.36 2  Eventually, the spirit of jihad that
galvanized Afghans against the Soviets turned against the West in
general and the United States in particular.
In order for justice initiatives to be perceived as legitimate, they
will, to some extent, have to assess the role of foreign powers in
creating the dire circumstances in which Afghanistan currently finds
itself. Such assessments will encourage the construction of anti-
terrorism social norms. It may be easy and obvious for the victims to
blame the terrorists (and, undoubtedly, the terrorists are
blameworthy). However, the social and historical context that
contours the terrorists and that currently gives them a patina of
legitimacy among certain non-violent peoples in its own way
facilitated the September 11 attacks. But, individual and selective
criminal trials may not be equipped to ferret out this broader
institutional and transnational complicity; military commissions may
be even less suited to do so. Trials do little to address complex
historical realities. In fact, collective institutional, organizational, and
governmental responsibility may be masked by findings of individual,
deviant guilt. From the perspective of the victims of terrorist
violence, this means that only a very simple form of justice has been
meted out.
In the end, there may be an all-too-unsubtle irony in having a
group of foreigners judge the criminal misdeeds of the terrorists and
the Taliban when the trials over which this group presides do not
address the collective, political, and historical responsibility of the
great powers in the Taliban's rise to and ferocious consolidation of
power, not to mention the anger of those who flock to al-Qaeda (and
other) networks. Then, when the terrorists and those who harbor
them are found guilty (or are hunted down), the discussion is closed,
and the moral debt repaid. Is justice really that simple? Likely not.
Criminal justice would do well to consider issues of social and
political forces in addition to individual responsibility. Accordingly,
serious thought could be given to joining the international tribunal
with a commission of inquiry that unpacks institutional, foreign, and
international involvement in the rise to power of the Taliban and the
radicalization of certain elements of Afghan (and Muslim) society.363
362. See Anwar Ahmad, Editorial, From Kyoto to Jallozai, NEWS (Pakistan), Apr. 2,
2001, at 7 (chronicling the misery of the Jallozai refugees) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
363. For a discussion of the responsibility of the great powers for systemic violence in
Cambodia, Chile, and East Timor, and also for the need for the creation of some sort of
accountability measures-such as truth commissions-to flesh out this responsibility, see
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This radicalization cannot be disentangled from what Afghan
refugees describe as a deep-rooted sense of Islamic exclusion from
geopolitical institutions. Among the students I taught, even those
refugees most opposed to the Taliban were very vocal about the
isolation of Islamic perspectives. Although roughly a fifth of the
world's population is Muslim,3 64 no Islamic nation is a permanent
member of the Security Council. As Richard Falk opines: "Islamic
perspectives have not been equitably represented in key authority
structures and processes of world order, which helps to account for
the impression and actuality of an anti-Islamic bias in addressing
controversial issues on the global agenda. '365  This results in
perceived civilizational exclusion from the collective of humanity."
This civilizational exclusion, in turn, constitutes a human rights issue:
Within the established array of human rights, is there not a right to
meaningfully participate in the structures that create world order?367
According to David Westbrook, "[i]t can be argued that Islam
provides the sole coherent, non-liberal world view of any political
significance, and consequently the only vital external perspective on
the liberal project of public international law. '368 The fact that Islam
presents a challenge to the dominant world view yet remains
peripheralized simply heightens the sense of marginalization. This
also feeds the essentialism from which much terrorist religious
ideology draws.
VI. THE ASYMMETRICAL TREATMENT OF WESTERN VICTIMHOOD?
Thus far, this Article has focused on the perpetrators and the
states of which they are nationals. But victims, too, deserve attention.
Victims must have a comfort level with the justice process. A vibrant
generally James Rae, War Crimes Accountability: Justice and Reconciliation in
Cambodia and East Timor (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
364. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THE JUSTICE OF ISLAM, at ix (2000). By the middle of the
21st century, Muslims will likely constitute over one-third of the world's population. See
MURDEN, supra note 316, at 205.
365. RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS HORIZONS: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 161 (2000).
366. One esteemed commentator has noted a "deep sense of insecurity and profound
distrust of the international community among Arab societies." An-Na'im, supra note
333, at 725; see also Graham E. Fuller, The Future of Political Islam, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-
Apr. 2002, at 48, 54 (reporting that Muslims "see the international order as dramatically
skewed against them and their interests").
367. FALK, supra note 365, at 148.
368. David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law:
Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 820-21 (1993).
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literature discusses the dissonance between victims and the criminal
justice system, particularly retributive criminal justice. 369 This is one
reason why restorative and reparative justice approaches should be
considered. As I have argued elsewhere, these approaches may work
outside traditional retributive justice to help victims achieve a more
permanent sense of justice, facilitate personal reconciliation, and
provide financial restitution.370
On September 11, Americans and many other Westerners were
the victims of a criminal and depraved act of evil. Often we
reflexively think of victims as "others" living in faraway lands under
difficult conditions.371 We mentally construct these faraway lands as
tribal, barbaric, out-of-control, bereft with anger, and besieged with
historical animosity. Throughout the operation of the Rwandan and
Yugoslav ad hoc tribunals, as well as attempts to construct a special
tribunal for Cambodia, the United States has been a strong supporter
of open international criminal prosecutions for the faraway aggressors
of these faraway victims.372 When these victims, together with state
officials and the general public, exclaimed dissatisfaction with
international criminal prosecutions, the typical response was that
these prosecutions were necessary for the slow yet steady process of
establishing rule of law and a culture of human rights and combating
369. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION
(1989) (examining various criminological theories); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS
VIOLENCE (1998) (discussing the inadequacy of a legal response to satisfy victims of
horrible atrocities); KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS' RIGHTS: THE NEW
LAW AND POLITICS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1999) (discussing the place of crime victims
within the criminal justice system).
370. Drumbl, supra note 35, at 1264-67.
371. This reflex operates today, when the West often is presented as the sanctuary of
human rights, but it also persisted historically. This may be one reason why the Nazi
Holocaust has evoked such indescribability or inexplicability in much of the academic
literature. "Europeans had created an image of themselves that could not accommodate
such barbarity. To discover that the 'heart of darkness' was not in Central Africa, but in
Central Europe, was a stunning realisation." SHELLEY WRIGHT, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS, DECOLONISATION AND GLOBALISATION 19 (2001).
372. See Juan E. M~ndez, Human Rights Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 46 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 377, 388 (2002) (reporting that the ICTY and ICTR "enjoyed decisive support-of
a bipartisan nature-from the United States"). Proactive U.S. involvement in
international criminal law began much earlier than the ad hoc tribunals. See, e.g., GARY
JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 24 (2000) (discussing U.S. involvement in promoting due process for Nazi war
criminals).
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impunity without propagating revenge (which was posited as merely
prolonging the cycle of violence).373
Presumably the logic should not be any different now that
Westerners (in particular Americans) largely are the victims. Yet, it
is. In fact, Westerners, as victims, are doing exactly what the Tutsi are
criticized for doing: intervening in a foreign country, the Congo, and
supporting internal insurgency forces in self-proclaimed self-defense
to destroy Hutu rebel camps harbored by the Congolese government
that are seen as presenting a national security threat.374 For victims
373. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PLAYING THE "COMMUNAL CARD":
COMMUNAL VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1-18 (1995) (describing the gross human
rights abuses in Rwanda and the resulting U.N. action of enlarging the existing
international tribunal in Yugoslavia to prosecute Rwandan criminals).
374. See Stef Vandeginste, Rwanda: Dealing with Genocide and Crimes Against
Humanity in the Context of Armed Conflict and Failed Political Transition, in BURYING
THE PAST 229 (Nigel Biggar ed., 2001) (noting that the "violent dismantling of the Hutu
refugee camps in Eastern Zaire [n.b. now Democratic Republic of Congo] [by Rwandan
armed forces] were categorized as crimes against humanity ... by a special investigative
team of the U.N. Secretary General"); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Humanitarian Assistance in
Non-International Armed Conflict: The Fourth Wave of Right, Duties, and Remedies, 31
ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 183, 208 (2002) ("To counter the military threat posed by the
camps, the Tutsi leaders of Rwanda aided Congo Rebel forces .... "); Congo Rebel
Assault Jeopardizes Peace Talks, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Mar. 16, 2002), at http://
www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting that
France accused Rwanda of sending troops into the Congo to back rebel forces); see also
John Prendergast & David Smock, U.S. Inst. of Peace, Postgenocidal Reconstruction:
Building Peace in Rwanda and Burundi (Sept. 15, 1999), at http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/
sr990915/sr990915.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (reporting on
human rights groups alleging that Rwandan governmental forces committed human rights
abuses on a broad scale when fighting Hutu rebels and insurgents). The ICTR Prosecutor
has been investigating crimes allegedly committed by armed forces to which the Rwandan
government has pledged its support. Press Release, ICTR Prosecutor Meets Rwanda
President, ICTR/INFO-9-2-260.en (Apr. 12, 2001), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/
ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2001/260.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Press Release, Prosecutor Outlines Future Plans, ICTR/INFO-9-2-254.en (Dec. 13, 2000),
at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/2000/254.htm (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). A panel of international experts has recommended that the
Security Council establish a system for formally investigating and prosecuting military and
government leaders, including individuals in the Rwandan government, for the looting of
Congo's natural resources, in particular, gems, and the slaughter of protected wildlife. See
Barbara Crossette, U.N. Spotlights Plunder of Congo by Officials in Nearby Lands, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001, § 1, at 6. Compensation also has been recommended. Id. This
panel report, which Rwanda calls "totally biased," establishes a direct link between the
plunder and the Rwandan Presidency. Id. Rwanda's armed forces have been present in
Democratic Republic of Congo since 1998. Drumbl, supra note 35, at 1311; Crossette,
supra. In July 2002 a peace deal was negotiated between Democratic Republic of Congo
and Rwanda, in which Rwanda agreed to pull 30,000 troops from the Democratic
Republic of Congo in exchange for the disarmament and repatriation of 12,000 Hutu
fighters to Rwanda. Samson Mulugeta, The Target is Peace, NEWSDAY, July 31, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 2755950. On another note, asymmetries exist between U.S. policy of
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everywhere, mass atrocity may seem like an armed attack meriting
the use of force as opposed to the exacting proof of the criminal law.
Why is it that we only accept this when we are the victims? Why do
we expect more restraint from poor victims in faraway developing
countries than we demand from ourselves?
Although more subtle than with regard to the use of force,
asymmetries also exist in terms of justice mechanisms. By way of
introduction, it is true that one of the reasons that the international
community insisted on international tribunals in the case of Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia was because the national systems in both
countries were destroyed or were seen as unable fairly to prosecute
offenders.375 In fact, the principle of complementarity central to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court376  defers
international prosecutions when national courts are willing or able
genuinely to prosecute. Indeed, the United States and European
national justice systems are those that would be deemed able and
willing to prosecute, and to do so while respecting international
standards of due process. But, notwithstanding this ability to satisfy
complementarity concerns, the United States consciously has chosen
to contract out of its domestic judicial process and create new military
commissions that may run afoul of international standards. As such,
they may not be the kind of domestic mechanisms that the drafters of
the Rome Statute had in mind when they sought to ensure genuine
domestic prosecutions.377 This is not to deny that the military
commissions may be as "fair" as the normal justice systems of many
countries. International institutions, however, were designed to "take
over" unless these normal justice systems could approximate
international standards.
At this juncture, it is important to emphasize that, although the
commissions are a U.S. initiative, they are supported, albeit at times
grudgingly, by important Western allies. Although these allies
inveighed against the United States' reluctance to apply the Geneva
Conventions to detainees, some also turned over captured individuals
assassinating suspected al-Qaeda operatives, for example, the November 5, 2002, killing by
missile strike of six al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen, and U.S. opposition to Israeli
assassination of suspected terrorists and militants. See Johnston & Sanger, supra note 72.
375. In the case of Rwanda, a national effort is being made to bring over 100,000
accused to justice.
376. Rome Statute, supra note 6, art. 17. As the ICC only has prospective jurisdiction,
it could never assume jurisdiction over perpetrators of the attacks.
377. That the domestic Rwandan courts were not fully adhering to internationally
recognized due process standards was one of the reasons that the ICTR's work was
deemed so important.
20021
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to the United States for detention and potential prosecution by
commission.378 Others, such as the United Kingdom, will not turn
over captured detainees to the United States, but instead to the
Afghan authorities, knowing that the Afghans, if requested, will
immediately turn the detainees over to the United States.379 These
allies appear satisfied by the U.S. declaration that detainees receive
Geneva Convention status but none of the rights that accompany
such status, seem sufficiently comfortable with the substantive
declaration that no detainees are prisoners of war (even though that
determination had not been made in a manner that accords with
Geneva Convention process), and consistently supported the military
campaign in Afghanistan. 8 °  As such, responsibility for any
derogations the commissions may make from international law is not
limited to the United States, but is something that could be imputed
more broadly to Western allies.38" '
To be sure, the support of some allies may be uneasy and
qualified.38 z Moreover, pursuit of the death penalty against nationals
of allied countries, for example Zacarias Moussaoui of France, also
378. See supra note 282; see also Shawn McCarthy & Steven Chase, Handover of
Captives by Canadian Troops Sparks Ottawa Storm, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 30,
2002, at Al (reporting that in late January 2002 Canadian forces assisted in the capture of
two or three prisoners in Afghanistan, who were then turned over to the United States).
379. Carlotta Gall, British to Hand Captives to Afghan Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2002, at A8 (quoting a British official as stating that the United Kingdom's requirements
under the Geneva Conventions apparently are satisfied by a "legal procedure that we're
following, but it doesn't prevent those prisoners that need to be passed on from being
passed on to the Americans" and "[i]t doesn't prevent our allies from getting the people
they want").
380. See, e.g., Bush's PoWs Stance Falls Short: Red Cross, supra note 24 (citing
approval from the governments of Canada, Britain, and Germany); Ibbitson, supra note
218 (reporting that Prime Minister Blair dismissed concerns about the alleged
mistreatment of detainees held at Guantfnamo Bay); Koring, supra note 24.
381. Bush's PoWs Stance Falls Short: Red Cross, supra note 24 (reporting that the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Commission of Jurists
have stated that the decision to give Taliban detainees Geneva Convention status but then
deny them prisoner of war status "falls short of the requirements of international law").
382. Kamal Ahmed & Peter Beaumont, Blair's Warning to U.S. Taliban Suspects,
OBSERVER (London), Jan. 20, 2002, at 2 (reporting that British Prime Minister Blair was
"relaxed" about the treatment of prisoners, but "aware of the dangers of political
opposition to their treatment growing in Britain and on the Continent"); Manley Defends
Human Rights for Afghan Captives, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (Jan. 19, 2002), at http://
www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (citing Canadian
and British politicians as expressing concern over the treatment of detainees, but not as
criticizing the concept of prosecution by military tribunal, and expecting that the United
States will treat these detainees "in accordance with humane norms and international
law").
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may constitute a flash-point.383 But these qualifications are more
rhetorical than substantive. They certainly do not signal any
departure in kind from the U.S.-led war on terrorism. At most, these
represent some differences of degree. The fact that these allies, in
particular, Canada, acquiesce in support of the commissions is
striking, given Canada's lofty and vigorous support for international
criminal law institutions, such as the ICC, and for the incorporation of
standards of due process within those institutions.384 In response to
suggestions that it would be imprudent for Canada to hand prisoners
over to the United States without first obtaining assurances that the
United States would implement the Geneva Conventions, Prime
Minister Jean Chr6tien of Canada retorted that "[i]t was not
imprudent for the government, as part of the war on terrorism, to side
with the people who were attacked, and not to become defenders of
the terrorists.
385
Even in the isolated cases of potential death penalty sentences
involving citizens of allied countries, opposition may be more bark
than bite. The Moussaoui conspiracy case presents an example.
Here, the French government, committed not to implement the death
penalty, regrets the pursuit of capital charges against Moussaoui.
However, the French daily Le Monde reports that then French
Minister of Justice, Marylise Lebranchu, failed to take a clear position
regarding the cessation of France's cooperation in providing evidence
for that case.386 Instead, to the dissatisfaction of groups such as
Amnesty International, she maintained that the French government
would not refuse to share evidence requested by the United States;
383. Philip Shenon & Neil A. Lewis, U.S. to Seek Death Penalty For Moussaoui in
Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at A20.
384. See Mahoney & MacKinnon, supra note 282 (reporting that the Canadian
government will permit Canadian troops to hand over to U.S. custody prisoners taken in
Afghanistan); Shawn McCarthy & Jeff Sallot, Liberal Fears Fail to Change Troops' Orders
on Captives, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 6, 2002, at Al (reporting that Canadian
troops will hand over any prisoners they take to U.S. forces, despite fears that the United
States may be breaching the Geneva Conventions).
385. McCarthy & Sallot, supra note 384. Some controversy had been inflected towards
the Canadian Minister of Defense for his involvement in such transfers. However, this
does not appear to be affecting official governmental policy. See, e.g., Jeff Sallot, Britain
Will Give Afghans PoW Status; Canada Won't, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 30, 2002,
at Al (reporting that Canada's policy has "not changed" and that Canadian soldiers will
continue to turn captives in Afghanistan over to the United States).
386. La Peine de Mort Sera Requise Contre Zacarias Moussaoui, [The Death Penalty
Will be Requested Against Zacarias Moussaoui] LE MONDE (Mar. 28, 2002), at http://
www.lemonde.fr/article/0,5987,3222--268764-,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
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rather, it would try to resist its use in support of a death sentence.387
Germany has adopted a similar posture regarding U.S. requests to
hand over evidence of wire transfers from the Hamburg al-Qaeda cell
for the Moussaoui prosecution.388 In the end, the creation of the
commissions may reflect more than just American concerns about
American victimhood, but also Western concerns about Western
victimhood.
Whereas justice responses to mass atrocity elsewhere often are
internationalized, response to the tragedy of September 11 remains
decidedly under domestic control. This response not only breaks with
the internationalization trend imposed on others, but it may also
depart from the rule of law standards germane to all. Of course,
whether the operation of the military commissions (when begun)
shall run afoul of international due process standards remains
unclear. But, although the March 2002 Rules address many gaps that
were present in the November 2001 Presidential Order, some division
between the military process and international law remains.389
Moreover, the ongoing treatment of captured detainees arguably
flouts both the terms and spirit of international humanitarian law and,
as such, may itself represent a derogation from international
standards.39°
Domestic infrastructure destruction is not the cause of the
United States' decision not to adhere to generally recognized
standards of due process. To the contrary, Vice President Cheney
flatly insists that accused terrorists do not deserve the "same
standards and safeguards that would be used for an American citizen"
and that a perfunctory military commission is appropriate insofar as
accused individuals will be given the "kind of treatment ... we
believe they deserve.""39 Yet the United States was very supportive
of an international tribunal for Rwanda that gave the leaders of the
387. "Marylise Lebranchu a explique qu'elle ne refuserait pas de transmettre les pi~ces
demand6es aux Etats-Unis mais tenterait de s'opposer leur exploitation A I'appui de
r6quisitions en faveur de la peine de mort." [Marylise Lebranchu indicated that she would
not refuse to send the pieces of evidence requested by the United States, but that she
would endeavor to oppose the use of that evidence in support of a request for the
applicability of the death penalty.]. Id.
388. Peter Finn, Germany Reluctant to Aid Prosecution of Moussaoui, WASH. POST,
June 11, 2001, at Al (reporting that "[o]fficials are now attempting to see if Washington
can certify that Moussaoui will not be sentenced to death on the basis of German-provided
evidence alone").
389. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
390. See supra notes 21, 24, 26.
391. Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior Administration Officials Defend
Military Tribunals for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B6.
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Rwandan genocide treatment vastly superior to that of the Rwandan
domestic criminal justice system, along with more lenient
punishments.3 92 For a variety of reasons-whether it is a desire to
bury the past or for retribution-Rwandans, Bosnian Muslims, and
Cambodians may all want summary military proceedings for their
brutalizers. But the West does not look too favorably on that.
In fact, the detainees at Guantdnamo Bay already have been
called "killers" by the President, who also will have the final review of
guilty verdicts coming from the military commissions.3 93 The United
States wishes to prosecute terrorists quickly in specially created
remote commissions because Western standards of due process may
be found to be too inconvenient. Yet, paradoxically, it insists on
prosecuting Slobodan Milosevic in what is projected to be a multi-
year open and public trial that is webbed with more due process than
the Bosnian Muslims and Croats likely ever have known.394
392. William A. Schabas, Justice, Democracy and Impunity in Post-Genocide Rwanda:
Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 CRIM. L.F. 523, 551-52 (1996). Whereas
Rwandan domestic courts have awarded the death penalty, the ICTR is not empowered to
do so. Thus, the leaders of the Rwandan genocide, over whom the ICTR has custody, are
entitled to more advanced procedural protections and avoid the death penalty, whereas
the "lower-down" offenders in the custody of the Rwandan government have less
procedural protection but face more severe sentences. See id. at 554 (admonishing
Rwandan judicial officials to forego the death sentence for lower ranking officials
convicted of genocide).
393. Katharine Q. Seelye, Government Sets Rules for Military on War Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at Al. The President cannot change a verdict of not guilty. Rules,
supra note 19, § 6(H)(2).
394. Fisher, supra note 256 (estimating that the Milosevic trial will last "at least two
years"); Marlise Simons, Milosevic Is Ill; Trial May Slow, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2002, at Al
(reporting that "even at the current rate, [Milosevic's trial] could last three years"). The
United States was very supportive of the Milosevic trial, going so far as to threaten
withdrawal of economic assistance should the FRY not transfer him to the ICTY. See
Indictment Against Milosevic Enlarged, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (June 29, 2001), at
http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (quoting
President Bush as stating: "The transfer of Milosevic to The Hague is an unequivocal
message to those persons who brought such tragedy and brutality to the Balkans that they
will be held accountable for their crimes."); Yugoslav Government Approves Milosevic
Extradition, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (June 23, 2001), at http://www.globeandmail.com
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("U.S. and other western leaders had been
pushing for Mr. Milosevic's handover .... Despite his initial resistance, [the Yugoslav
President] eventually backed extradition efforts for fear of losing billions in aid pledged to
help rebuild his country."). Threatening withdrawal of assistance (and even imposing
sanctions) continues to be used by the United States in particular and the West in general
as a method of promoting compliance by the FRY and the Serbian government with the
ICTY. See Misha Savic, Serb Officials Promise Arrests of War Crimes Suspects Soon, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 3, 2002, at 3. In April 2002, the FRY approved a law to allow the handover of
indictees to the ICTY in order to end a freeze by the United States of $40 million in
financial aid imposed by the U.S. Congress. See Sally Buzbee, U.S. Says Yugoslavia is
Cooperating With War-Crimes Tribunal, Lifts Freeze on Aid, A.P. NEWSWIRE, May 21,
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We fear technical acquittals, yet technical acquittals are a reality
of life for the Tutsi.395 So, too, for Bosnian Muslims.396 Fearful of
lengthy proceedings and complicated appeals, we seek solace in the
abridged justice of a military commission or on the battlefield of self-
defense. However, we impose open, lengthy, and non-military
2002, at WESTLAW, Newswires; see also Del Ponte Says She "Now Expects Results" in
Yugoslavia, BALKAN TIMES (Apr. 19, 2002), http://www.balkantimes.com/default2.asp?
lang=english&page=news-archive&date=4/19/02&ns-list=yes#2 (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) ("United States Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Pierre-
Richard Prosper told reporters that the United States and NATO were committed to
finding ICTY indictees and bringing them to justice .... He warned that Republika
Srpska would continue to suffer the consequences of international isolation until the entity
starts co-operating.").
395. The Barayagwiza affair is an example. Here, excessive pretrial detention arising
in part out of complicated extradition matters resulted in charges being dropped against
one of the leaders of the genocide, only to be reinstated when the ICTR Prosecutor
requested a special reconsideration hearing and successfully obtained a favorable decision.
See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
App. Chamber Nov. 2, 1999), at http://www.un.org.icty/Supplement/supp9-elbarayagwiza.
htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); William A. Schabas, Barayagwiza v.
Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 563, 565 (2000). Moreover, the Bagilishema decision, issued
in June 2001, was a split decision leading to an acquittal on charges of complicity in
genocide and crimes against humanity. Press Release, Tribunal Acquits Bagilishema,
ICTR/INFO-9-2-271.en (June 7, 2001), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/
PRESSREL/2001/271.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("After
reviewing all testimonial and documentary evidence presented during the trial, the
Tribunal ruled that the testimonies of the witnesses for the Prosecution were riddled with
inconsistencies and contradictions. The Tribunal found that the Prosecution had failed to
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt."). The dissenting judge held that he was
"thoroughly convinced" of Bagilishema's complicity in genocide and crimes against
humanity. Id. This acquittal "provoked a public outcry in Rwanda." Search For Speed
and Reconciliation, ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2001, at 48. On July 3, 2002, the ICTR Appeals
Chamber unanimously confirmed the majority judgment at trial, and Bagilishema was
immediately released. Press Release, Appeals Chamber Confirms Acquittal,
ICTR/INFO-9-2-319.en (July 3, 2002), at http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/
PRESSREL/2002/319e.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
396. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-95-16-A, 246
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia App. Chamber Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.un.
org/icty/kupreskic/appeal/judgement/index.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (overturning the convictions of Bosnian Croats accused of involvement in the
Ahmici massacre of Bosnian Muslims). The Appeals Chamber held that the Trial
Chamber had occasioned a "miscarriage of justice" and that it had been "wholly
erroneous" in its assessment of the evidence in part because of its reliance upon an
unreliable witness. Id. it 222-27, 245-46. The Appeals Chamber also acquitted or
reduced the sentences of other Bosnian Croats convicted in that 1993 massacre. Id.
IT91 304, 438-39, 465-66. It commented that the function of the ICTY is "to decide the
guilt or innocence of individual accused according to standards of procedure and evidence
that commend themselves to all civilised nations .... [Ilt has striven to follow the
principle laid down by the First Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg that we must 'establish
incredible events by credible evidence.' " Press Release, Summary of Judgement in the
Kupreskic Appeal, Int'l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia (Oct. 23, 2001), at http://www.
un.org/icty/pressreal/kup-sumOllO23e.htm (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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proceedings rife with delays and complications on the Tutsi and
Bosnian Muslims, and endeavor to do so on the Cambodians. By way
of example, on April 3, 2002, the trial of the military masterminds of
the Rwandan genocide, including Colonel Thdoneste Bagosora, was
adjourned for nearly six months because the defense had not received
French translations of the prosecution's pretrial brief and the report
of the first expert witness. 397 Rwanda continues to wait. The ICTR
has convicted fewer than ten people for their role in organizing the
Rwandan genocide.
39
We worry about the mental and physical health of witnesses, but
are supportive of rape victims in Rwanda and Bosnia having to testify
at great length about their ordeal, and deem such a sacrifice
worthwhile in securing important convictions that have changed the
interface of international criminal law and sexual violence. Why is it
acceptable for "other" victims to deal with these traumas and
concerns but not for ourselves as victims? Why should we not be
similarly involved in contributing to the definition and prosecution of
terrorism as an international crime? Why should we not be
concerned with creating new and important precedent for
international law, just like the Bosnian rape victims bravely did?
In arguing for military commissions, Ruth Wedgwood remarks
that international tribunals are "less practical" since "Americans
could not expect to fill the majority of slots in an ad hoc tribunal, and
a trial chamber ... might have no Americans at all. '399 Here, too,
there are asymmetries. We are nervous about ousting the territorial
presumption in favor of trying criminals in the places where they
commit their crimes, but we have been very willing to oust this
presumption when creating international tribunals for others. For
example, the trial chamber of the Rwanda tribunal, which judges
crimes committed by Rwandans against Rwandans, is located in
Arusha, Tanzania. In another prominent example, the tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia is located in The Hague. The Security
Council, with U.S. support, placed these tribunals far away from the
situs of the violence. Why should the same approach not apply to the
September 11 tragedy? Given that nationals of eighty-one countries
397. The defendants "refused to leave their jail cells to attend the trial's opening
claiming their rights had been violated by the failure to supply them with the translations."
Andrew England, Tribunal Adjourns Trial of Man Accused of Masterminding Rwandan
Genocide, A.P. NEWSWIRES, Apr. 3, 2002, at WESTLAW, Newswires.
398. Search for Speed and Reconciliation, supra note 395, at 48.
399. Wedgwood, supra note 261.
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perished on September 1140 and nationals of thirty-nine countries are
implicated in the attacks, a transnational approach may be especially
appropriate.40 '
We resist the notion that judges of other nationalities decide the
cases presented by prosecutors of other nationalities involving crimes
directed against us. Yet, once again, this is precisely the type of
international institution we have sponsored, built, and supported in
Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. There is no Tutsi on the
Rwanda tribunal, over the objections of the Rwandan government.4 2
No members of any victimized ethnic group are on the tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia. This was done deliberately to avoid the
appearance of bias.403 Slobodan Milosevic will be prosecuted by a
Swiss national, defended by himself but with the curially appointed
assistance of Dutch and Canadian nationals, and adjudged by British,
Jamaican, and Korean nationals.4° Why should Osama bin Laden
not be subject to the same procedures? Why should Mullah Omar
benefit from fewer rights than Milosevic or Jean Kambanda, the
leader of Rwanda's genocidal regime? Why should both bin Laden
and Omar be exempted from international human rights law and due
process? Is the fact that terrorists killed thousands of Westerners
"worse" than the tens of thousands killed under Milosevic's order or
the hundreds of thousands killed under Kambanda's watch or the
nearly two million killed under the Khmer Rouge regime? The
nationality of the victims should not determine the due process owed
to the perpetrators.
The United States feels that bin Laden has declared war. Did
the Tutsi feel any differently: Did they not feel that their oppressors
declared war on them? Why are they unable to claim the "war" and
"national security" exemptions we claim for ourselves? When
400. Letter from John Negroponte, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to
Richard Ryan, President of the U.N. Security Council (Oct. 8, 2001), reprinted in United
States Officially Informs United Nations of Strikes, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2001, at A14,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
401. Gutman et al., supra note 11, at 35.
402. Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 421, 425-26 (1994).
403. Tolbert, supra note 274, at 9.
404. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, The Registrar
Appoints a Team of Experienced International Lawyers as Amicus Curiae to Assist the
Trial Chamber (Sept. 6, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p617-e.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review); Press Release, Int'l Criminal Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic Will Begin on Tuesday 12 February at 9:30
A.M. (Feb. 5, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p658-3.htm (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
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Rwanda established domestic courts to prosecute its g~nocidaires, the
United States Department of State, along with many Western
governments, inveighed against these proceedings (along with more
recent proposals for extrajudicial dispute resolution (gacaca)),
arguing that they fell short of international human rights standards
and that this was, deontologically, a problem in its own right. 5
Notwithstanding its previously announced concerns regarding the
procedural integrity of Rwandan courts, the United States now
proposes to create military commissions that, by conscious design,
would shrink due process guarantees below international standards.
Moreover, these commissions expand liability such that guilt could be
found even in the absence of specific evidence the accused engaged in
war crimes. On a related note, the United States has been critical of
Rwanda's detention of Hutu suspects indefinitely with little prospect
of being charged or facing trial. The Rwandan government justified
this imprisonment, in part, on fears that released prisoners would join
the ranks of anti-government guerilla movements.4 6 But now, finding
itself the victim of radical evil, the United States actively considers
indefinite pretrial detention as a policy option for Guantinamo
detainees. 4 Not only does the U.S. government suggest indefinite
pretrial detention, it has gone so far as to suggest that indefinite
405. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, RWANDA COUNTRY REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES FOR 1997 (1998), at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1997-
hrp-report/rwanda.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Field Operation in
Rwanda, The Administration of Justice in Post-Genocide Rwanda, U.N. Doc.
HRFOR/JUSTICE/June 1996/E (1996) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Carla J. Ferstman, Rwanda's Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity,
5 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (1997); AVOCATS SANS FRONTItRES, PROJET "JUSTICE POUR
TOUS AU RWANDA" RAPPORT ANNUEL [Lawyers Without Borders, Project "Justice for
all in Rwanda" Annual Report] (1997) (on file with North Carolina Law Review); see, e.g.,
Neil Boisen, U.S. Inst. of Peace, Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices Among Inmates of
Rwandan Detention Facilities Accused of Crimes of Genocide 31 (1997) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (making recommendations to the Rwandan Ministry of
Justice regarding its commitment to the law and consistency in its application based on
interviews conducted with Rwandan prison inmates). On April 20, 2001, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights ended its mandate for Rwanda; however, nearly all
Western nations opposed that decision, citing concerns regarding ongoing violations of
human rights law and humanitarian law by Rwanda related, inter alia, to domestic trials,
extensive detention, and involvement in armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. C.H.R. Res. 2001/23, U.N. C.H.R., 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2001/23
(2001); see Michael J. Dennis, The Fifty-Seventh Session of the UN Commission on Human
Rights, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 181, 194-95 (2002). At that time, the United States was not a
member of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.
406. Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in
Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545,601 (1998).
407. Mintz, supra note 21.
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detention might remain an option even after acquittal by military
commissions. ° Under the proposed system, if it is convenient for
detainees to be combatants, they are so classified; but then, if they are
to be tried, they become criminals; but then, if acquitted as criminals,
then they once again become combatants so that they can remain
prisoners. Law is thus manipulated by politics, instead of standing in
the way of politics. Law remains left to the Bosnians and Rwandans,
but not to "us." Due process is rhetorically presented as an
inconvenience to the pursuit of justice post-September 11, whereas in
other post-atrocity situations due process is rhetorically presented as
a prerequisite for justice.4 9
Perhaps the fact that Westerners now are victims will prod the
international legal community to rethink some of the modalities of
international criminal justice. Such a rethinking would be helpful,
insofar as there is a need to improve the quality, accessibility, and
credibility of international criminal law (particularly given the
newness of much of that law). There is a need to make that law more
"real" in the places where breaches of that law have taken place, such
as Rwanda, where many of the precedential effects of international
criminal process have become externalized owing to a lack of
contextual significance for Rwandans.
However, thus far, U.S. responses to the attacks may prompt an
ad hoc and checkerboard enforcement of international criminal law;
namely as applying abstractly to poor victims in mysterious places,
but not to wealthy victims in familiar places. This is not to argue
against the need for international criminal law to take over the
punishment and prosecution of terrorists. Rather, it is to call for
international criminal law to be applied equally to all in a diversified
and pluralist manner. International criminal law should not be built
upon the travails of the disempowered objects of international
institutions while the masters of those same institutions pursue the
sort of self-help forbidden to others. Western exceptionalism to the
machinery of international criminal and human rights law corrodes
this machinery and stifles its improvement. Moreover, when this
exceptionalism derogates from international human rights standards,
which could be the case with the military commission,4 ' the United
States loses much legitimacy when it extols the need for international
408. Seelye, supra note 20.
409. See supra notes 391-94 and accompanying text.
410. See Drumbl, supra note 35, at 1277-92.
411. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text (discussing the ICCPR and the
Geneva Conventions).
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due process for others. Right now, it seems that faraway victims in
the most desperate of circumstances and dilapidated of polities are
expected to have more emotional restraint than Westerners and are
expected to intellectualize the importance of due process legalism
more than Westerners expect themselves to do. Instead, the West
should take the lead.
The post-Nuremberg era has seen the gradual emergence in
international relations of what political theorist Judith Shklar called
"legalism," defined as "the ethical attitude that holds moral conduct
to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of
duties and rights determined by rules." '412 Legalism includes an
important element of process and has come into play even "when so
doing has greatly complicated international diplomacy."4 3 Law has
attempted, principally through the vehicle of international human
rights and international criminal law, to answer complex problems of
violence, hatred, and aggression. The reaction to massacre in
Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Cambodia, and East Timor has been legalist,
despite the fact that "this legalism may sometimes seem eccentric [or]
absurdly pious. '"414 Now, Western response to al-Qaeda atrocity-
whether on the level of modifying the rules regarding self-defense,
avoiding strict adherence to Security Council approval of the use of
force, demonstrating diffidence to the Geneva Conventions, using
military trials, or thinning international standards regarding indefinite
detention-may signify a movement away from legalism.
CONCLUSION
The terrorist attacks, and our response thereto, consolidate a
new era in which certain precepts of the international legal order
have become more ambiguous, porous, and permeable. These
include the role of the Security Council, the coordinates of self-
defense, the definition of an armed attack, and the content of the jus
ad bellum. In fact, extensive state support for and international
organization non-objection to the strikes suggest that international
law regarding the legality of armed intervention to support collective
security concerns is changing, in this case when security threats
emerge from non-state actors harbored by a nation-state. These
changes may demonstrate the realist presumption that powerful states
412. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 1
(1986).
413. BASS, supra note 372, at 280.
414. Id. at 281.
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are increasingly able and willing to proceed independently of
international institutions when their security interests are threatened.
State practice regarding Iraq shall constitute a litmus test of just how
much international law may have changed following the terrorist
attacks.
Creating mechanisms to mete out legal accountability will be an
important part of building a culture of human rights in the wake of
the September 11 attacks. Here, the trials that form a central part of
the accountability mechanisms must be made meaningful in those
societies where disaffected individuals join terrorist networks. One
way this meaning might be constructed is by translating the trials into
language that resonates within these societies. Domestic U.S. trials
and perfunctory military commission proceedings will not construct
much meaning. This is why it might be desirable for these trials to
involve Islamic law and legal personalities, together with local
customary law. Cosmopolitan tribunals may be better able to
integrate comparative criminal law, human rights law, and religious
law than national courts.415 Individual victims need justice, and peace
and security requires detaining and prosecuting perpetrators.
However, the pursuit of these goals cannot be disconnected from a
thoughtful assessment of how the heinousness of the crimes can be
made cognizable to a broad, heterogeneous audience in the Islamic
world.
To be sure, the Taliban's theocracy was a particularly unusual
and largely unrepresentative form of Islam. However,
notwithstanding the sui generis nature of much of the Taliban's edicts
and the reality that they mostly emerged from a culture of war,416 the
fact remains that they also drew from Islam.417 "Osama bin Laden
and his Al Qaeda followers may not represent Islam ... but they do
arise from within Muslim civilization ....4
415. See Richard Goldstone, Comments at the American Branch of the International
Law Association, International Law Weekend (Oct. 27, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (observing that, in the 2001 Kupreskic appeals decision, ICTY
Judge Wald extensively referred to comparative criminal law).
416. See, e.g., ELLIOT, supra note 308, at 395-96 (reporting that Taliban edicts do not
accurately reflect the style of Islam traditionally practiced in Afghanistan or elsewhere).
417. In fact, Taliban means "students of religion." Id. at 22. The word derives from
the Arabic verb talaba ("to seek"), of which the Persian plural is taliban. Id.
418. Bernard Lewis, The Revolt of Islam: When Did the Conflict With the West Begin,
and How Could it End?, NEW YORKER, Nov. 19, 2001, at 50, 60; see also Doran, supra
note 318, at 29 (explaining that although al-Qaeda follows a very narrow view of Islam, its
basic thoughts spring from mainstream Islam); Howard, supra note 172, at 12 (noting that
Osama bin Laden and his followers "are neither representative of Islam nor approved by
Islam," yet their appeal lies in today's challenges to the Islamic culture). Following the
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By and large, the imposition of many Western legal norms
creates dissonance among certain constituents of the Islamic world.
419
This emerges in part from tangible conceptual differences between
Islamic and Western legal norms,42 ° whereby both represent different
attacks, bin Laden stated that "God has blessed a group of vanguard Muslims, the
forefront of Islam, to destroy America." Bin Laden's Statement: " 'The Sword Fell,'
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at B7.
419. There is a rich scholarly literature on the divergences and confluences between
international human rights law and Islamic constructions of law. See ABDULLAHI A. AN-
NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION: CIVIL LIBERTIES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-87 (1990) (describing the relationship between Islamic law and
basic human rights); An-Na'im, supra note 333, at 706-20 (providing an overview of the
Arab human rights movement); Bahar, supra note 338, at 167 (noting that Islamic jurists at
one time viewed law and religion as "one composite unit where there could be no public
constitutional law"); Nabil Hilmy, Historical Development of Human Rights and its
Influence on Some Aspects of Islamic Law, AFR. LEGAL AID Q., Oct.-Dec. 2000, at 14, 15
(explaining the traditional idea that religion and state were one, with "no necessity to spell
out individual rights because there was no conflict of interest between the ruler and the
ruled"); Westbrook, supra note 368, at 823 (describing the concept of the shari'a, the
Islamic law, and its relation to international law). An important caveat: the terms "West"
and "Islam" are used here at a very high-and clumsy-level of generality. The
clumsiness is required for expediency; it glosses over the tremendous heterogeneity within
both civilizations and the influences that both civilizations have historically exerted on
each other.
420. An-Na'im, supra note 333, at 726 (noting that there are "obvious fundamental
contradictions between shari'a principles and international human rights norms"). These
differences and similarities merit extensive discussion and not a footnote. However, even
cursory discussion can be of some guidance, although it is clear that this discussion
constitutes the equivalent of painting with a very broad brush. It is important not to
overstate the differences (as so often is done in legal and popular discourse), but rejoice in
the fact that many tenets of international human rights law are central to Islamic law. As
such, although there are important differences between the two, international human
rights law and Islam are not incommensurable nor mutually exclusive. In a nutshell, under
Islamic law-the shari'a (or siyar for external relations of the Muslim world)-there is no
clear distinction between law, morality, religion, belief, and rights. The attainment of
God's will is the only goal that the law, in its purest form, should or can attain. See
Westbrook, supra note 368, at 823. Historically, "for Muslim jurists, law and religion
formed one composite unit where there could be no public constitutional law other than
the Will of God as revealed through the Prophet." Bahar, supra note 338, at 167. State
and religion, too, in the original Islamic community under Muhammad, "were one."
Hilmy, supra note 419, at 15. Shari'a laws that are to be administered are pre-existing, and
are set forth and originate from a number of important sources, including the Qur'an, the
interpretations thereof found in the sunna, and the ijtihad (a process of deductive
reasoning by which Qur'an or sunna are applied to new issues). The shari'a does not
provide for an enumeration of individual rights. Id. This differs somewhat from the
positivist world of Western law, particularly public international law, in which the
legitimacy of law largely derives from individual (or state) consent to contractual
arrangements (e.g., treaties, agreements, constitutions, social contracts, statutes, customs)
regardless of their content, although there has been a focus on contracting for individual
human rights as part of a social compact with the state. See MURDEN, supra note 316, at
187-91. "Where Westerners speak a language of rights and entitlements, Arabs speak a
language of context and relationship .... " See ROSEN, supra note 364, at 173. Of course,
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ontologies, but these differences also may be exacerbated by
geopolitical tensions and misunderstandings, along with local cultural
beliefs (through which many Islamic precepts are filtered, such as in
Afghanistan). But more important than the exact nature of the
differences and overlap between Western and Islamic legal norms is
the fact that many individuals in Islamic societies may resent the
globalization of Western norms through the software of international
law.42 As a result, regardless of the actual etymology of that which
presently constitutes international human rights law,422 the corpus of
this law is perceived by many in the Muslim world, including our
students in Peshawar, as decidedly Western in flavor, yet imposed on
all. But when Westerners are the victims of mass violence, the same
rights and norms that restrain the responses of others through the
guise of putative universality become derogable. What is necessary
for others is cloying for us. When taken together, resistance to
universalism and the apparent non-applicability of the universal to
the particular authors of that universality risk feeding popular
sentiment in the Muslim world whereby bin Laden may be
empathized with more for what he stands against than for the evil he
represents. "[A]mong a significant number of Muslims, [Osama bin
Laden is] ... a kind of Robin Hood figure. 4
23
Prosecuting the terrorists and those who harbor them thus brings
to the forefront the nexus between international human rights and
criminal law, on the one hand, and cultural pluralism and Islamic
this is a theoretical and purist discussion. It is important to appreciate how Islam becomes
applied through the filter of local culture and practice, and also to realize that the Muslim
world is deeply heterogeneous. See ROBERT F. DRINAN, S.J., THE MOBILIZATION OF
SHAME: A WORLD VIEW ON HUMAN RIGHTS 163 (2001); MURDEN, supra note 316, at
159, 181. Moreover, Muslim states have positivistically adopted human rights documents,
the 1990 Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam being one example.
421. Michael Ignatieff, The Attack on Human Rights, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Dec. 2002,
at 102, 103 (noting that since the 1970s the relation of Islam to human rights has grown
more hostile).
422. There has been significant scholarly writing discussing whether international
human rights law in fact represents the "universalization" of Western legal values; there is
considerable heterogeneity as to the answer to this question. For an overview, see
DRINAN, supra note 420 (outlining the struggle to develop an international standard for
human rights); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FOUR INQUIRIES 57-
86 (1998) (discussing the universality of human rights); WRIGHT, supra note 371
(discussing different perspectives as contributing to an analysis of international human
rights).
423. Jeffrey Bartholet, Method To the Madness, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22, 2001, at 54, 55;
see also Fuller, supra note 366, at 56 ("The vast bulk of Muslims, of course, will go no
further than to cheer on those who lash out. But such an environment is perhaps the most
dangerous of all, because it legitimizes and encourages not the tolerant and liberalizing
Islamists and peacemakers, but the negativistic hard-liners and rejectionists.").
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exclusion, on the other. It also presents an important opportunity to
bridge these two elements. This would encourage a greater
legitimization of public international law within the Muslim world.
After all, "universal rights must be subject to local
implementation, '4 24 and "every people must have an existential sense
of such rights rather than a sense of them having been imposed upon
them under the guise of what is the universally valid. 4 25  A
cosmopolitan tribunal may stimulate cultural inclusion rather than the
politics of cultural containment of the Islamic world that have been in
vogue since political scientist Samuel Huntington first published his
"clash of civilizations" thesis in 1993.426
In addition to deterring future terrorism through punishment and
delegitimization of terrorist mystique, international law also can
functionally impede terrorism. Here, important international
negotiations eschewed by the United States could be revitalized.427
These include, in particular: (1) an international convention
restricting trade in handguns and small arms;428 (2) international
conventions addressing biological,429 chemical and nuclear weapons
424. ROSEN, supra note 364, at 215.
425. Id.
426. See generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF.,
Summer 1993, at 22, 22 (exploring the hypothesis that in the new phase of world politics
the "great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be
cultural").
427. The Bush Administration's construction of a multilateral coalition against the
Taliban "puts to shame the contempt the Bush Administration has consistently shown for
international treaties and instruments, including those in areas relevant to the fight against
terrorism." Hendrik Hertzberg, Tuesday, and After, NEW YORKER, Sept. 24, 2001, at 27,
28.
428. Flora Lewis, Opinion, The U.S. is Turning its Back on Any Global Rules, INT'L
HERALD-TRIB., July 14, 2001, at 6; Editorial, Shooting Down Hope, INT'L HERALD-
TRIB., July 11, 2001, at 6. U.S. opposition to this convention was partly rooted in concerns
it would limit the freedoms of Americans to own weapons. See Contemporary Practice of
the United States Relating to International Law: Arms Control and Other National Security
Law, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 899, 901-02 (2001) [hereinafter Arms Control]. However, one
major purpose of the convention was to assist fragile states that have to cope with
extensive numbers of weapons in their territories. One example is the North-West
Frontier Province of Pakistan, where there are approximately five million unregistered
weapons freely in circulation. See Mike Chinoy, In Pakistan, Anti-U.S. Sentiment
Growing, CNN NEWS (Sept. 21, 2001), at http://www.cnn.com/200lWORLD/asiapcf/
central/09/21/ret.pakistan.peshawar/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). The United States is the leading exporter of small arms. See Arms Control,
supra, at 901.
429. In the wake of the anthrax scare, the Bush Administration switched gears and
pushed for an international biological warfare treaty. Graeme Smith, U.S. Pushes Canada
for Tougher Treaty on Biological Warfare, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Oct. 29, 2001, at
Al. However, this push corresponds with the Bush Administration's previous position
that mandatory international inspections of plants in which germ weapons could be made
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and their manufacture and proliferation;43 ° (3) banning landmines;43'
and (4) international discussion about racism,432  slavery,
environmental security,433 and developing nation poverty. Each of
these, in their own way, will mitigate the scourge of terrorism. So,
too, might the ICC, vigorously resisted by the United States.434
should be avoided, since this would permit foreign inspectors too much access to
American installations and companies, thereby threatening national security and
confidential business information. See Arms Control, supra note 428, at 901; Judith Miller,
U.S. Seeks Changes in Germ War Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001, at Al. Instead, the
United States is pushing for signatories to pledge to open their countries to international
investigations when there are suspicious outbreaks. See id. This difference of opinion had
resulted in the United States' refusal to commit to an enforcement accord for the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention that had been accepted in principle by over fifty other
countries. See Dismay as US Blocks New Accord, BBC NEWS (July 25, 2001), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid_1457000/1457324.stm (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review). This enforcement accord was the product of many years of
negotiation and was abandoned by the United States in July 2001. Id.
430. See Fred Gutherl, The Nagging Fear of Nukes, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 2001, at 28, 28
(reporting on concern of diversion of nuclear weapons into the wrong hands following the
breakup of the Soviet Union). There is no indication that the United States will ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on Nuclear Weapons. Moreover, the United States has
withdrawn from the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty concluded during the Cold War with
the former Soviet Union (whose successor in international law is the Russian Federation).
See Steven Mufson & Dana Milbank, U.S. Sets Missile Treaty Pullout Bush to Go Ahead
with Defense Tests, WASH. POST, Dec. 14, 2001, at Al. To be sure, this treaty permits
withdrawal by one party after giving six months' notice. Id. However, in May 2002 the
United States indicated it would sign a new arms treaty with the Soviet Union to cut the
two countries' long-range nuclear weapons by two-thirds. See John Ibbitson, U.S., Russia
Set to Cut Nuclear Arsenals, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 14, 2002, at Al; Dana
Milbank, Bush and Putin Sign Arms Pact, WASH. POST, May 25, 2002, at Al.
431. Afghanistan is one of the most heavily-mined countries in the world. Patrick E.
Tyler, 4 U.N. Workers Killed in Initial Strike on Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2001), at
http://www.nytimes.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
432. See Jane Perlez, Powell Will Not Attend Racism Conference in South Africa, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 2001, at A6; Roth, supra note 60, at 1 (noting that the United States
"walked out of the United Nations racism conference in South Africa").
433. For example, the United States has withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol on global
warming. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Bush
Administration Proposal for Reducing Greenhouse Gases, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 487
(2002). Unchecked global warming likely would raise sea levels, thereby flooding small
island states and nations with low-lying regions that do not have the technologies to adapt
to such flooding. Is this not a security issue? For such nations, is this much less of a
security issue than terrorist violence?
434. Barbara Crossette, War Crimes Tribunal Becomes Reality, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11,
2002, at A3. On May 6, 2002, the United States renounced formal involvement in the
Rome Statute shortly after the Rome Statute had received enough ratifications to enter
into force on July 1, 2002. Neil A. Lewis, U.S. is Set to Renounce Its Role in Pact for World
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, at A18. The United States no longer considers itself
bound in any way to the purpose and objective of the Rome Statute, despite former
President Clinton's having signed the Rome Statute in 2000. Id. The United States
prefers ad hoc arrangements for particular conflicts, not a permanent institution. U.S.
Renounces International Criminal Court, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto) (May 6, 2002), at
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Ironically, one of the reasons why the United States opposes the ICC
is because it does not contain the due process protections and jury
trials found in the U.S. criminal justice system.435 As such, the United
States fears having its citizens subject to mechanisms that appear less
procedurally correct than those operative at home. However, when
the United States suffers at the hands of the type of defendants who
commit crimes that would fall within the ICC's compass, then the
United States creates special commissions that offer less due process
than the ICC, even though the ICC's alleged lack of due process was
one of the reasons it was called a "kangaroo court" in the U.S.
Senate.436
Prosecuting terrorists through multiple layers, which includes a
coordinated, diversified cosmopolitan tribunal, can attenuate Islamic
exclusion and empower the United Nations. It can help Western, yet
presumptively universal, human rights become more pluralist and
representative.437 It can discredit the allure of the idea of terrorism,
which is more effective than destroying bases that can simply be
rebuilt elsewhere. Establishing an international tribunal can lend a
principled basis to the elimination of terrorism, instead of a
checkerboard, ad hoc approach that may result from unilateralist and
exceptionalist responses. Ad hoc, manipulative foreign policy
bargains can achieve short term gains but can devolve into Faustian
bargains leading to instability and vulnerability.
But trials, even if carefully constructed, are not a panacea. The
mere process of investigating crimes, holding trials, and gaveling
accountability will not restore peace to war-torn regions nor pacifism
to religious extremism. This is not to deny the fact that carefully
designed trials can facilitate peace and reconciliation, but, rather, to
http://www.globeandmail.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Moreover,
on July 12, 2002, the United States persuaded the Security Council to pass Resolution
1422, which gives non-party, including U.S., peacekeepers a renewable yearly exemption
from potential ICC prosecution. Serge Schmemann, U.S. Peacekeepers Given Year's
Immunity from New Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at A3. On September 30, 2002, the
European Union agreed not to extradite American diplomats and military personnel to
the ICC, on the condition that any suspects would be tried in U.S. courts. Paul Meller,
Europeans to Exempt U.S. From War Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2002), at http://www.
nytimes.com (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
435. Scharf Comments, supra note 262.
436. James Graff, America is Not Pleased, TIME (Europe) (June 30, 2002), http://
www.time.com/time/europe/magazine (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
437. After all, "international criminal justice.., cannot enjoy long-term credibility if it
becomes an instrument of hegemony for powerful states." Payam Akhavan, Beyond
Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities, 95 AM. J. INT'L L.
7, 30 (2001).
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underscore the important limits to judicial romanticism.438 In fact, the
closure encouraged by the criminal trial may divert attention from
important longer-term issues of nation-building,439  ethnic
consociationalism, 440 political stability, 441 equality, poverty,442 building
a civil society, and trade relationships between the developed and
developing world. If trials cause Western attention to dissipate when
the perpetrators face their day in court, they will leave unaddressed
some of the pervasive issues of injustice, exclusion, and frustration
438. Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Law after the Destruction of the Towers, European
Journal of International Law Discussion Forum, at http://ejil.org/forum (last visited Nov.
11, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("The prevention of international
terrorism calls for a range of responses on many different levels, administrative, police,
economic and financial. The law, here as elsewhere, is only an instrument of, not a
substitute for, political action.").
439. The United States has somewhat warmed to nation-building in Afghanistan. See
James Dao, Bush Sets Role for U.S. in Afghan Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2002, at
Al (reporting that President Bush has called for a major American role in rebuilding
Afghanistan, although this does not include using American forces to provide
peacekeeping security). This represents a policy reversal from initial U.S. reticence about
nation-building, a task which had been deemed to fall within the province of the United
Nations. See Patrick E. Tyler & Elisabeth Bumiller, "Just Bring Him In": President Hints
He Will Halt War if bin Laden is Handed Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at Al.
However, for the most part, U.S. nation-building operations in Afghanistan have been
directed at pursuing Taliban and al-Qaeda fugitives rather than peacekeeping, a policy
that is becoming open to question given the continued political violence against the
transitional Karzai regime. See Riaz Khan, Afghans Fear Instability After "Hero" Shot
Dead, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), July 8, 2002, at All. Furthermore, commentators have
characterized U.S. financial assistance to Afghanistan as "scant." Michael Hirsch, Bush
and the World, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2002, at 18, 24; see also Ian Fisher, Ready to
Rebuild, Afghans Await Promised Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, § 1, at 10 (reporting a
"growing sense of disappointment in Afghanistan" as only one-third of pledged aid
actually has arrived in the country).
440. Given that politics and power have been linked to ethnicity throughout much of
Afghanistan's history, it will be necessary to include Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen,
and Hazaras in a multi-ethnic government.
441. See Pamela Constable, Ethnic Leaders Call for Afghan Justice, Unity, WASH.
POST, July 10, 2002, at A12 (reporting on the assassination of Afghan Vice President
Abdul Qadir in July 2002 and noting that "[t]he government of Karzai, who was elected
president in June by a national assembly ... is militarily weak and politically tenuous");
David Rohde, Afghan Warlord Muddles Interim Government's Plans, N.Y. TIMES, May
21, 2002, at A10 (reporting that the Karzai regime is unable to control spreading political
violence).
442. Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world, suffering from famine,
drought, little clean water, twenty-two years of internal armed conflict, and essentially no
market economy. See RASHID, supra note 291, at 107-08; Barry Bearak, Taliban Plead for
Mercy to the Miserable in a Land of Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at A18. Life
expectancy hovers in the forties. See David Rohde, 12-Year-Olds Take Up Arms Against
Taliban, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2001, at Al (reporting average life expectancy as forty-three
for men and forty-four for women).
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that, when blended with the volatility of an apocalyptic mind, can
prompt more terror.
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